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1. See Urban Dictionary:  Mate, available at 
www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=mate (last visited Apr. 9, 2017) (defining the 
word “mate” as a slang term Australian’s commonly use when referring to a friend); 
Dictionary:  Checkmate, DICTIONARY.COM, available at 
www.dictionary.com/browse/checkmate (last visited Apr. 9, 2017) (defining the word 
checkmate as a maneuver in chess where the opponent’s king is in a position from which it 
cannot escape; which brings the game to a victorious conclusion).  Therefore, the title of the 
article is in reference to Australia gaining an advantage over the United States in regard to gun 
control and the reduction of mass shootings. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“My biggest frustration [as President] so far is the fact that this 
society has not been willing to take some basic steps to keep guns out of the 
hands of people who can do just unbelievable damage.”2  “We know that 
other countries, in response to one mass shooting, have . . . [managed] to 
craft laws that almost eliminate mass shootings.  Friends of ours; allies of 
ours—Great Britain, Australia; countries like ours.”3 
–President Barack Obama 
 
The morning of June 12, 2016, I awoke in my apartment in Orlando, 
Florida.  Everything felt like a typical relaxing Sunday morning.  As I rolled 
over and scratched my dog on the head, I picked up my phone lying beside 
me.  As part of my typical routine, I started to scroll through the news feed 
on my Facebook account.  Through the myriad of posts and pictures, I came 
across one from a colleague of mine stating that there had been a shooting at 
Pulse Nightclub in Downtown Orlando.  Having lived in New York City on 
September 11, 2001, waking up to a morning of tragedy in my hometown 
was not a new experience for me; but the same questions still arise:  Why did 
                                                 
2. Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by 
the President in Q&A with David Karp, CEO of Tumblr (June 10, 2014), 
http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/10/remarks-president-qa-
david-karp-ceo-tumblr; see also Jonathan Weg, We Don’t Come from a Land Down Under:  
How Adopting Australia’s Gun Laws Would Violate the Second Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution, 24 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 657, 658 (2016). 
3. Press Release, Barack Obama, President, Statement by the President at 
Umpqua Cmty. Coll., Roseburg, Or. (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/10/01/statement-president-shootings-umpqua-community-college-roseburg-
oregon (statement made at a press conference on October 1, 2015, after a college campus 
shooting in Oregon where a twenty-six-year-old student shot a professor and eight students); 
see also Jacqueline Howard, Australia’s Mass Shootings Dropped to Zero After Gun Reforms, 
CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/23/health/australia-gun-law-reform-study (last updated 
June 23, 2016). 
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this occur and what can we do as a nation to prevent this from happening 
again? 
Mass shootings—defined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(“FBI”) as “the slaying of four or more people”—have begun to occur at 
record numbers and with devastating results in the United States.4  
Americans are saturated with the stories and images of those who suddenly 
lost their lives at the hands of a person equipped with a powerful weapon.5  
                                                 
4. There Have Been More Mass Shootings Since Newtown than You’ve 
Heard About (INFOGRAPHIC), HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 17, 2013, 5:31 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/17/mass-shootings-2013_n_3941889.html; NAT’L 
CTR. FOR THE ANALYSIS OF VIOLENT CRIME, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SERIAL MURDER: MULTI-
DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES FOR INVESTIGATORS 8 (Mark A. Hilts & Robert J. Morton eds., 
2005); see also infra Part II. 
5. See August 01, 1966:  An Ex-Marine Goes on a Killing Spree at the 
University of Texas, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/an-ex-marine-goes-
on-a-killing-spree-at-the-university-of-texas (last visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
 Charles Whitman [took] a stockpile of guns and ammunition to the 
observatory platform atop a 300-foot tower at the University of Texas and 
[proceeded] to shoot [forty-six] people, killing [fourteen] people and wounding 
[thirty-one].  A fifteenth died in 2001 because of his injuries.  Whitman, who had 
killed both his wife and mother the night before, was eventually shot to death after 
courageous Austin police officers, including Ramiro Martinez, charged up the stairs 
of the tower to subdue the attacker. 
Id. 
 On . . . [July 18, 1984], James Huberty drove to the McDonald’s, 200 
yards from his apartment, carrying a semi-automatic pistol, an Uzi, a [twelve]-
gauge shotgun and a cloth bag filled with hundreds of rounds of ammunition and 
told his daughter, “Goodbye.  I [will not] be back.” 
 He began to gun down his victims—who ranged in age from eight 
months to [seventy-four] years old—and after an hour and ten minutes, a [sixty]-
member [Special Weapons and Tactics] (“SWAT”) team surrounded the building 
and killed James Huberty with a sniper shot. 
Paul Liotta, Daughter of 1984 Gunman James Huberty Speaks Out and Gives Advice to 
Daughter of San Bernardino Terrorists, DAILY NEWS (Dec. 13, 2015, 2:42 PM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/daughter-1984-gunman-speaks-article-
1.2464531.  (He killed twenty and wounded twenty others.).  Id. 
 On the morning of Aug[ust] 20, 1986, part-time letter carrier Patrick 
Sherrill, [forty-four], barged through the back door of the post office in Edmond, 
just north of Oklahoma City.  A quarter of an hour later, [fourteen] people were 
dead and six wounded.  By the time the SWAT team stormed the place, Sherrill had 
put a gun to his own head and pulled the trigger. 
Mara Bovsun, Mailman Massacre:  14 Die After Patrick Sherrill ‘Goes Postal’ in 1986 
Shootings, DAILY NEWS (Aug. 15, 2010, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/mailman-massacre-14-die-patrick-sherrill-postal-
1986-shootings-article-1.204101.  On October 16, 1991, in Killeen, Texas, 
[a] man smashed a pickup truck into a busy restaurant at lunchtime, . . . stepped out 
of the cab, shot [twenty-two] people dead and wounded at least [twenty] others. 
 As blood-drenched patrons and employees tried to scramble to safety, 
dozens of police officers arrived and exchanged gunfire with the man, apparently 
wounding him.  He then shot and killed himself with a bullet through the left eye, 
witnesses said. 
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 . . .  The police said the killer, a [thirty-five]-year-old man, reloaded and 
emptied his Glock-17, a semiautomatic .9-millimeter pistol, several times. 
Thomas C. Hayes, Gunman Kills 22 and Himself in Texas Cafeteria, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 
1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/17/us/gunman-kills-22-and-himself-in-texas-
cafeteria.html.  “On April 20, 1999, two teens went on a shooting spree at Columbine High 
School in Littleton, Colorado, killing [thirteen] people and wounding more than [twenty] 
others before turning their guns on themselves and committing suicide.”  Columbine High 
School Shootings, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/columbine-high-school-shootings 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2017).  “Twenty-three year old Seung-Hui Cho killed [thirty-two] people 
on the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University campus in Blacksburg, Virginia, 
before taking his own life.”  Virginia Tech Shootings Fast Facts, CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/31/us/virginia-tech-shootings-fast-facts/ (last updated Apr. 3, 
2017). 
 On . . . [November 5], 2009, [thirteen] people are killed and more than 
[thirty] others are wounded, nearly all of them unarmed soldiers, when a [United 
States] Army officer goes on a shooting rampage at Fort Hood in central Texas.  
The deadly assault, carried out by Major Nidal Malik Hasan, an Army psychiatrist, 
was the worst mass murder at a [United States] military installation. 
November 05, 2009:  Army Major Kills 13 People in Fort Hood Shooting Spree, HISTORY, 
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/army-major-kills-13-people-in-fort-hood-
shooting-spree (last visited Apr. 9, 2017).  On July 20, 2012, a gunman, dressed in tactical 
clothing, entered a movie theater in Aurora, Colorado, set off tear gas grenades and shot into 
the audience with multiple firearms.  Dan Frosch & Kirk Johnson, Gunman Kills 12 in 
Colorado, Reviving Gun Debate, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/21/us/shooting-at-colorado-theater-showing-batman-
movie.html.  “[Twelve] people . . . [were killed] and [around seventy] others [were] injured, 
making it [one of] the largest number of casualties” in a shooting in the United States until the 
Orlando nightclub shooting four years later.  Colo. Shooting DA Says Two Evaluations Found 
Holmes Sane, PBS: NEWS HOUR (Apr. 27, 2015, 6:15 PM), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/colo-shooting-da-says-two-evaluations-found-holmes-sane/; 
Julie Shapiro & Melissa Chan, What to Know About the Pulse Nightclub Shooting in Orlando, 
TIME, http://www.time.com/4365260/orlando-shooting-pulse-nightclub-what-know/ (last 
updated June 12, 2016).  On December 14, 2012, 
[a] gunman forces his way into Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, 
Conn[ecticut], and shoots and kills [twenty] first-graders and six adults.  The 
shooter, Adam Lanza, [twenty], kills himself at the scene.  Lanza also killed his 
mother at the home they shared, prior to his shooting rampage. 
Deadliest U.S. Mass Shootings, 1984–2016, L.A. TIMES (June 12, 2016, 8:50 AM), 
http://timelines.latimes.com/deadliest-shooting-rampages/; accord Steve Vogel et al., Sandy 
Hook Elementary Shooting Leaves 28 Dead, Law Enforcement Sources Say, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/sandy-hook-elementary-school-
shooting-leaves-students-staff-dead/2012/12/14/24334570-461e-11e2-8e70-
e1993528222d_story.html.  On June 18, 2015, 
 Dylann Storm Roof is charged with nine counts of murder and three 
counts of attempted murder in an attack that killed nine people at a historic black 
church in Charleston, S[outh] C[arolina]. 
 Authorities say Roof, a suspected white supremacist, started firing on a 
group gathered at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church after first praying 
with them.  He fled authorities before being arrested in North Carolina. 
Deadliest U.S. Mass Shootings, 1984–2016, supra.  On December 2, 2015,  
two assailants killed [fourteen] people and wounded [twenty-two] more in a 
shooting at the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino.  The two attackers, who 
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As guns become more technologically advanced and capable of expelling a 
large number of rounds in an instant, the devastation and number of those 
killed or harmed increases.6  American citizens typically respond to the news 
of mass shootings that occur on American soil by either disavowing guns and 
urging the government to remove them from the public’s use7 or feeling the 
need to acquire more guns in order to protect themselves and their families.8  
Regardless of the response to the horrific news of a mass shooting, what is 
clear to all American citizens is that mass shootings are a modern day reality 
and a serious issue that needs to be resolved or mitigated.9 
In an effort to explore what the United States can do to prevent or 
eliminate the occurrence of mass shootings, this Article will explore the gun 
control legislation in Australia.10  First, this Article will present statistics 
                                                                                                                   
were married, were killed in a gun battle with police.  They were [United States] 
born Syed Rizwan Farook and Pakistan-national Tashfeen Malik and [they] had an 
arsenal of ammunition and pipe bombs in their Redlands home. 
Deadliest U.S. Mass Shootings, 1984–2016, supra; see also San Bernardino Shooting 
Updates, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-
ln-san-bernardino-shooting-live-updates-htmlstory.html.  On June 12, 2016,  
the United States suffered the worst mass shooting in its modern history when 
[forty-nine] people were killed and fifty-three injured in Orlando, Florida, after a 
gunman stormed into a packed gay nightclub.  The gunman was killed by a SWAT 
team after taking hostages at Pulse, a popular gay club.  He was . . . identified as 
[twenty-nine] year old Omar Mateen. 
Deadliest U.S. Mass Shootings, 1984–2016, supra; see also Shapiro & Chan, supra. 
6. Nick Wing & Mollie Reilly, Here’s What You Need to Know About the 
Weapons of War Used in Mass Shootings, HUFFINGTON POST (June 13, 2016, 9:23 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/mass-shootings-weapons-ar-
15_us_575ec6b7e4b00f97fba8de0e (finding that “modern AR-style rifles are modeled off” the 
ones created for the United States military during the Vietnam War and that “[t]hese weapons 
are designed to fire off bullets” rapidly with “[s]ome manufacturers boast[ing] that an 
experienced shooter could fire as many as [forty-five] rounds in one minute.”). 
7. Nathan Rott & Jeff Landa, After Mass Shootings, Action on Gun 
Legislation Soars at State Level, NPR (July 12, 2016, 6:12 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/2016/07/12/485726439/mass-shootings-influence-spike-in-gun-related-
laws-at-state-level. 
8. Gregor Aisch & Josh Keller, What Happens After Calls for New Gun 
Restrictions? Sales Go Up, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/12/10/us/gun-sales-terrorism-obama-
restrictions.html (last updated June 13, 2016); Zachary Crockett, What Happens After a Mass 
Shooting?  Americans Buy More Guns., VOX (June 15, 2016, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.vox.com/2016/6/15/11936494/after-mass-shooting-americans-buy-more-guns; 
Rott & Landa, supra note 7. 
9. See James Barron, Gunman Massacres 20 Children at School in 
Connecticut; 28 Dead, Including Killer, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2012, at A16; Rick Orlov, Gun 
Buyback Nets 1,500 Weapons — and Debate Over Program’s Value, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 
16, 2013, 3:54 PM), http://www.dailynews.com/government-and-politics/20131216/gun-
buyback-nets-1500-weapons-x2014-and-debate-over-programs-value. 
10. See infra Parts VI–VII. 
21
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 2017
144 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
relating to gun ownership and shootings in the United States.11  Next, this 
Article will discuss the details surrounding four of the most recent mass 
shooting tragedies in the United States to extrapolate why these events 
happened and what the United States deduced was the main reason for the 
shootings.12  In the next section, this Article will explore the legal precedents 
that enable U.S. citizens to purchase firearms for private use.13  Next, this 
Article will discuss a mass shooting event that took place in Australia and the 
resulting gun laws.14  Finally, this Article will analyze whether or not the 
United States could implement Australia’s gun laws, in order to reduce or 
eliminate—as Australia has—the occurrence of mass shootings.15 
II. STATISTICS REGARDING GUN OWNERSHIP AND HOMICIDES IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
In order to understand the gun control issue in the United States, it 
helps to understand the current statistics regarding gun ownership and 
homicides by firearms.16  According to a 2007 survey, the United States has 
about 35-50% of the world’s civilian-owned guns, despite holding 5% of the 
world’s population.17  According to a 2016 study, completed by Harvard 
University and Northeastern University, “there are about 265 million guns” 
in the United States “for only 242 million adults,” which results in more than 
one gun for every adult.18  However, the study estimates that there are fifty-
five million gun owners in the United States that have on average three guns, 
with “3% of the adult population . . . hav[ing] anywhere between eight and 
140 guns each.”19  Further, “[a] November 2012 Congressional Research 
Service report found that, as of 2009, there were approximately . . . 110 
million rifles and 86 million shotguns” owned by American citizens in the 
                                                 
11. See infra Part II. 
12. See infra Part III. 
13. See infra Part IV. 
14. See infra Parts V–VI. 
15. See Jonathan Masters, U.S. Gun Policy:  Global Comparisons, COUNCIL 
ON FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/society-and-culture/us-gun-policy-global-
comparisons/p29735 (last updated Jan. 12, 2016); infra Parts VI–VII. 
16. See Masters, supra note 15. 
17. Aaron Karp, Completing the Count: Civilian Firearms, in SMALL ARMS 
SURVEY 2007 39, 46 (Eric G. Berman et al. eds., 2007); Masters, supra note 15. 
18. Michal Addady, A Tiny Percentage of U.S. Adults Own Half the Country’s 
Guns, FORTUNE (Sept. 19, 2016), http://www.fortune.com/2016/09/19/us-gun-ownership; see 
also Lois Beckett, Gun Inequality:  US Study Charts Rise of Hardcore Super Owners, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 19, 2016, 1:47 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/sep/19/us-
gun-ownership-survey. 
19. Addady, supra note 18; Beckett, supra note 18. 
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United States.20  The author found that “data [is] not available on the number 
of ‘assault weapons’ in private possession or available for sale, but one study 
estimated that 1.5 million assault weapons were privately owned in 1994.”21  
These findings indicate that the United States is saturated with guns and an 
alarming amount of assault weapons.22 
“The United States also has the highest homicide-by-firearm rate 
among the world’s most developed nations.”23  A 2016 study, published by 
the American Journal of Medicine, found that “Americans are [ten] times 
more likely to be killed by guns than [other] people in . . . developed 
countries.”24  Erin Grinshteyn, the author of the study and a professor at the 
University of Nevada-Reno School of Community Health Science, stated:  
“Overall, our results show that the United States, which has the most 
firearms per capita in the world, suffers disproportionately from firearms 
compared with other high-income countries.  These results are consistent 
with the hypothesis that our firearms are killing us rather than protecting 
us.”25  Further, according to the Wall Street Journal, between 1966 and 2012 
the United States had “five times as many [mass shootings] as the next 
highest country—the Philippines.”26 
When gun homicide rates in the United States are compared to those 
in some of the most violent nations in the world, the findings are 
astonishing.27  The Atlantic Online found that American cities have rates of 
gun homicides comparable to some of the most violent nations in the 
                                                 
20. Justin Peters, How Many Assault Weapons Are There in America?  How 
Much Would It Cost the Government to Buy Them Back?, SLATE: CRIME (Dec. 20, 2012, 
4:50 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/crime/2012/12/20/assault_rifle_stats_how_many_assault_rifles_ar
e_there_in_america.html. 
21. Id. 
22. See id. 
23. Masters, supra note 15. 
24. Robert Preidt, How U.S. Gun Deaths Compare to Other Countries, CBS 
NEWS (Feb. 3, 2016, 1:44 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-u-s-gun-deaths-compare-
to-other-countries/; see also Erin Grinshteyn & David Hemenway, Violent Death Rates:  The 
US Compared with Other High-Income OECD Countries, 2010, 129 AM. J. MED. 266, 269 
(2016). 
25. Grinshteyn & Hemenway, supra note 24, at 272 (footnote omitted). 
26. Joe Palazzolo & Alexis Flynn, U.S. Leads World in Mass Shootings, 
WALL STREET J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-leads-world-in-mass-shootings-1443905359 
(last updated Oct. 3, 2015) (study completed by Adam Lankford, an Associate Professor at the 
University of Alabama Department of Criminal Justice, looking at the years spanning from 
1966 to 2012). 
27. See Richard Florida, Gun Violence in U.S. Cities Compared to the 
Deadliest Nations in the World, CITYLAB (Jan. 22, 2013), 
http://www.citylab.com/politics/2013/01/gun-violence-us-cities-compared-deadliest-nations-
world/4412/. 
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world.28  Using data provided by the Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, a study 
compared the rate of gun murders in American cities to nations around the 
world.29  According to the study: 
 
x If it were a country, New Orleans, with a rate [of] 62.1 gun 
murders per 100,000 people, would rank second in the world; 
x Detroit’s gun homicide rate, 35.9, is just a bit less than El 
Salvador, 39.9; 
x Baltimore’s rate, 29.7, is not too far off that of Guatemala, 
34.8; 
x gun murder in Newark, 25.4, and Miami, 23.7, is comparable 
to Colombia, 27.1; 
x Washington, D.C., 19, has a higher rate of gun homicide than 
Brazil, 18.1; 
x Atlanta’s rate, 17.2, is about the same as South Africa, 17; 
x Cleveland, 17.4, has a higher rate than the Dominican 
Republic, 16.3; 
x gun murder in Buffalo, 16.5, is similar to Panama, 16.2; 
x Houston’s rate, 12.9, is slightly higher than Ecuador’s, 12.7; 
x gun homicide in Chicago, 11.6, is similar to Guyana, 11.5; 
x Phoenix’s rate, 10.6, is slightly higher than Mexico, 10; 
x Los Angeles, 9.2, is comparable to the Philippines, 8.9; 
x Boston’s rate, 6.2, is higher than Nicaragua, 5.9; 
x New York, where gun murders have declined to just four per 
100,000, is still higher than Argentina, 3; 
x even the cities with the lowest homicide rates by American standards, 
like San Jose and Austin, compare to Albania and Cambodia 
respectively.30 
 
These statistics are alarming, as the countries being compared to the 
various United States cities are designated as some of the most violent 
countries in the world.31  For example, El Salvador, which has comparable 
gun homicides as Detroit, Michigan, has been recently coined the “murder 
capital of the world.”32  Most of the countries listed appear on the U.S. 
                                                 
28. See id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. See id. 
32. Alan Gomez, El Salvador:  World’s New Murder Capital, USA TODAY 
(Jan. 7, 2016, 10:57 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/01/07/el-
salvador-homicide-rate-honduras-guatemala-illegal-immigration-to-united-states/78358042/ 
(“Government data show[s] 6657 people were murdered in the small country [in 2015], a 70% 
increase from 2014.”); see also Florida, supra note 27. 
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Department of State’s travel warnings website, which urges American 
citizens to avoid visiting the areas or to take serious precautions if traveling 
to one of these countries is necessary.33 
As the above statistics indicate, the United States has a high level of 
gun saturation and a startling number of guns that are categorized as assault 
weapons.34  As will be demonstrated in the next section, semi-automatic and 
assault style weapons are commonly used during mass shootings because of 
their ability to effectuate the greatest amount of damage in a fraction of the 
time that a handgun would.35  These statistics make it clear that there is a 
problem pertaining to gun violence in the United States, and new legislation 
needs to be implemented to prevent further mass shootings and deaths by 
firearms.36 
III. OVERVIEW OF FOUR OF THE MOST RECENT MASS SHOOTINGS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
In order to explore possible solutions to prevent mass shootings in 
the United States, it is beneficial to analyze the facts and circumstances 
surrounding mass shooting tragedies that have occurred in the United 
States.37  This Article will explain the events that unfolded in:  Newton, 
Connecticut; Charleston, South Carolina; San Bernardino, California; and 
Orlando, Florida.38 
A. Newtown, Connecticut—December 14, 2012 
On December 14, 2012, a gunman forced his way into Sandy Hook 
Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut, where he shot and killed 
                                                 
33. See Alerts and Warnings, U.S. PASSPORTS & INT’L TRAVEL, 
http://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/alertswarnings.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2017); 
Florida, supra note 27. 
34. See Florida, supra note 27; Peters, supra note 20. 
35. Aisch & Keller, supra note 8; Connecticut Shootings Fast Facts, CNN, 
http:www.cnn.com/2013/06/07/US/Connecticut-shootings-fast-facts/ (last updated Dec. 14, 
2016); Jack Date et al., Orlando Shooter Bought Weapons at Nearby Gun Shop, ABC NEWS 
(June 13, 2016, 12:19 PM), http://www.abcnews.go.com/US/Orlando-shhoter-brought-
weapons-nearbygun-shop/story?id=39817471; see also infra Section III.A–D. 
36. See Florida, supra note 27; Palazzolo & Flynn, supra note 26. 
37. Palazzolo & Flynn, supra note 26; see also Peters, supra note 20; infra 
Section III.AD. 
38. See Connecticut Shootings Fast Facts, supra note 35; Date et al., supra 
note 35; Katie Zavadski, Everything Known About Charleston Church Shooting Suspect 
Dylan Roof, DAILY BEAST (June 20, 2015, 5:29 PM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/06/18/everything-known-about-charleston-
church-shooting-suspect-dylann-roof.html; San Bernardino Shooting Updates, supra note 5. 
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twenty first graders and six adults.39  The shooter, Adam Lanza, was twenty 
years old and killed himself at the scene.40  Lanza also killed his mother at 
the home they shared, prior to his shooting rampage.41  This was “the third 
deadliest mass shooting in U.S. history.”42 
“Lanza used a Bushmaster Model XM15-E2S rifle during the 
shooting spree.  Three weapons were found next to his body:  the 
semiautomatic .223-caliber rifle made by Bushmaster and two handguns.  
A[] . . . [twelve] gauge semi-automatic shotgun was found in his car.”43  All 
of the “[w]eapons found . . . were legally purchased by [the shooter’s 
mother], Nancy Lanza.”44  The entire shooting spree, which killed twenty-six 
total, only took eleven minutes to complete from the time he entered the 
school, walked through the halls, and entered two separate classrooms 
performing the shootings.45  The bulk of the killings, which occurred inside 
the classrooms, only took 264 seconds to complete.46 
The families of nine children who were killed, along with one 
teacher who survived the attack, filed a wrongful death suit against the 
manufacturers and distributors of the Bushmaster rifle.47  The lawsuit alleged 
that the gun used should not have been entrusted to the general public 
because it is a military assault weapon that is unsuited for civilian use.48  
Connecticut “Superior Court Judge Barbara Bellis [dismissed the lawsuit], 
invok[ing] a federal statute known as . . . the Protection of Lawful 
Commerce in Arms Act.”49  “The law prohibits lawsuits against gun 
manufacturers and distributors if their firearms were used in the commission 
of a criminal act.”50 
                                                 
39. See Barron, supra note 9, at A1. 
40. Id.; Connecticut Shootings Fast Facts, supra note 35. 
41. Barron, supra note 9, at A1; Connecticut Shootings Fast Facts, supra note 
35. 
42. Connecticut Shootings Fast Facts, supra note 35. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id.; Matt Smith, Sandy Hook Killer Took Motive to His Grave, CNN 
(Nov. 26, 2013, 7:33 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/25/justice/sandy-hook-shooting-
report/. 
46. See Connecticut Shootings Fast Facts, supra note 35; Smith, supra note 
45. 
47. See George Zornick, Can Sandy Hook Families Hold the Gun Industry 
Accountable?, THE NATION (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www.thenation.com/article/can-sandy-
hook-families-hold-the-gun-industry-accountable/. 
48. See Deborah Feyerick & Chris Welch, Sandy Hook:  Judge Dismisses 
Families’ Lawsuit Against Gunmaker, CNN (Oct. 14, 2016, 9:49 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/14/health/sandy-hook-lawsuit-gun-maker/; Zornick, supra note 
47. 
49. Feyerick & Welch, supra note 48. 
50. Id. 
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B. Charleston, South Carolina—June 18, 2015 
On June 18, 2015, “Dylann Storm Roof . . . kill[ed] nine people at a 
historic black church in Charleston, [South Carolina].”51  Authorities say 
Roof started firing at a group gathered at Emanuel African Methodist 
Episcopal Church after having first prayed with them.52  He fled authorities 
and was later arrested in North Carolina.53  “According to Roof’s 
grandfather, [Roof’s] family gave him money for his birthday [in] April, 
which it is believed he used to purchase a .45-caliber Glock pistol” that was 
used during this attack.54 
Roof told friends that he wanted to commit the shooting to start a 
race war and wrote online:  “We have no skinheads, no real KKK, no one 
doing anything but talking on the internet.  Well, someone has to have the 
bravery to take it to the real world and I guess that has to be me.”55  These 
statements were found on a website that Roof started in February 2015.56  
“The site shows a stash of [sixty] photographs, many of them of . . . Roof at 
Confederate heritage sites or slavery museums, and includes a nearly 2500-
word manifesto in which the author criticized blacks as being inferior while 
lamenting the cowardice of white flight.”57 
The Department of Justice charged him with murder, attempted 
murder, and use of a firearm, all in the commission of a hate crime.58  Even 
with the statements he made about the intent of the shootings, he was not 
charged as a terrorist.59  “Critics [argued] that the label of terrorism is too 
often only applied to Islamic extremists and not white supremacists or anti-
government anarchists.”60 
 
                                                 
51. Zavadski, supra note 38. 
52. Frances Robles, Dylann Roof Photos and a Manifesto Are Posted on 
Website, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/21/us/dylann-storm-
roof-photos-website-charleston-church-shooting.html. 
53. Zavadski, supra note 38. 
54. Id. 
55. Robles, supra note 52; Zavadski, supra note 38. 
56. See Zavadski, supra note 38. 
57. Robles, supra note 52. 
58. Loretta Lynch, U.S. Atty Gen., Statement Following the Federal Grand 
Jury Indictment Against Dylann Storm Roof (July 22, 2015) [hereinafter Attorney General 
Lynch Statement]. 
59. See Jenna McLaughlin, Why Wasn’t Dylann Roof Charged with 
Terrorism?, INTERCEPT (July 22, 2015, 5:43 PM), 
http://theintercept.com/2015/07/22/department-justice-didnt-charge-dylan-roof-domestic-
terrorism/. 
60. Id. 
27
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 2017
150 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
Roof’s crime . . . seems to fit the federal description of 
domestic terrorism, which the FBI defines as:  activities . . . [that] 
involve acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state 
law . . . appear [to be] intended (i) to . . . intimidate or coerce a 
civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by 
intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a 
government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.61 
 
However, Attorney General Loretta Lynch stated that “there is no 
specific domestic terrorism statute.”62  She went on to state that “[e]ven 
when the USA Patriot Act . . . redefined terrorism to include domestic 
crimes, the provision simply allowed the government to investigate more 
broadly what it called ‘terrorism,’” and that “[a]ctually charging someone 
with domestic terrorism remains a separate matter.”63 
C. San Bernardino, California—December 2, 2015 
On December 2, 2015, two shooters killed fourteen people and 
wounded twenty-two in a shooting at the Inland Regional Center in San 
Bernardino, California.64  The attackers were United States born Syed 
Rizwan Farook and Pakistan-national Tashfeen Malik, who were married.65  
On the day of the attack, “the San Bernardino health department employees . 
. . gathered for an event in a conference room at the center, which provides 
services to disabled people.”66  “A police official said that Mr. Farook, a 
county health inspector, was at the event and left early.”67  At approximately 
eleven o’clock in the morning, “Mr. Farook returned with his wife, Ms. 
Malik.”68  The couple was 
 
[d]ressed in combat gear [when] they entered the building’s east 
side and sprayed [sixty-five] to [seventy-five] rounds with assault 
                                                 
61. See Jenna McLaughlin, Charging Crimes as “Terrorism”, 6 U. MIAMI 
NAT’L SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV. 101, 102 (2016) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2331 
(2012)). 
62. McLaughlin, supra note 61, at 102; McLaughlin, supra note 59. 
63. McLaughlin, supra note 61, at 103; McLaughlin, supra note 59. 
64. Gregor Aisch et al., What Investigators Know About the San Bernardino 
Shooting, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/12/02/us/california-mass-
shooting-san-bernardino.html (last updated Dec. 10, 2015); San Bernardino Shooting 
Updates, supra note 5. 
65. Aisch et al., supra note 64; San Bernardino Shooting Updates, supra note 
5. 
66. Aisch et al., supra note 64. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
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rifles.  People, in nearby buildings, sheltered in place [and] 
remain[ed] hidden in their offices for two hours.  Within four 
minutes, the police began clearing the scene and evacuating the 
injured.69 
 
“The suspects . . . escaped . . . in a black S.U.V.” and were later 
“killed in a gun battle with police.”70  It was later found that the two “had an 
arsenal of ammunition and pipe bombs in their Redlands, [California], 
home.”71 
When the FBI took over the investigation, they declared that they 
were treating it as a terrorist attack.72  The female shooter made a public 
declaration of loyalty to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) while the 
attack was underway by posting to Facebook a pledge of allegiance to ISIS 
leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.73  The FBI director found that the assailants 
“had been talking of an attack as far back as two years” before they acted.74  
The FBI also “uncovered evidence that the couple were radicalized long 
before they got married in 2014.”75  “They have video evidence that the 
couple participated in target practice at ranges in the Los Angeles area and 
had even gone to a shooting range just days before the attack.”76  The 
suspects used 
 
two .223-caliber semiautomatic weapons and two 9mm 
semiautomatic pistols . . . .  While they were originally sold 
legally, with magazine locking devices, commonly known as 
bullet buttons, the rifles were subsequently altered in different 
ways to [enhance] them . . . .  Those alterations made the weapons 
unlawful under California’s ban on assault weapons, which bans 
guns with magazines that can detach for quick reloading.77 
                                                 
69. Id. 
70. Id.; San Bernardino Shooting Updates, supra note 5. 
71. San Bernardino Shooting Updates, supra note 5. 
72. See Michael S. Schmidt & Richard Pérez-Peña, F.B.I. is Treating 
Rampage as Act of Terrorism:  [National Desk], N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2015, at A1. 
73. Id.; Aisch et al., supra note 64; Pete Williams et al., Tashfeen Malik, 
Mother in San Bernardino Massacre, Pledged Allegiance to ISIS Leader:  Sources, NBC 
NEWS (Dec. 4, 2015, 5:04 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/sanbernardino-
shooting/tashfeen-malik-mother-san-bernardino-massacre-pledged-allegiance-isis-leader-
n474246. 
74. Aisch et al., supra note 64. 
75. Id.; see also Schmidt & Perez-Pena, supra note 72, at A1. 
76. Aisch et al., supra note 64. 
77. Ashby Jones & Dan Frosch, Rifles Used in San Bernardino Shooting 
Illegal Under State Law, WALL STREET J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/rifles-used-in-san-
bernardino-shooting-illegal-under-state-law-1449201057 (last updated Dec. 3, 2015). 
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D. Orlando, Florida—June 12, 2016 
On June 12, 2016, the United States suffered the worst mass 
shooting in modern history when forty-nine people were killed and fifty-
three injured in Orlando, Florida, after a gunman stormed into a packed gay 
nightclub known as Pulse.78  The gunman, later identified as twenty-nine 
year old Omar Mateen, was killed by a SWAT team after taking hostages.79  
During the attack, Mateen called 911 and pledged his allegiance to ISIS.80  
Mateen had purchased a Sig Sauer .223 caliber assault rifle at St. Lucie 
Shooting Center, a firearms shop near his Florida home on June 4, 2016 and, 
later, a Glock 17 at the same store on June 5, 2016.81  “Mateen had returned 
to the store a third time on June 9, [2016], to buy magazines for his 
weapons.”82  “Mateen left a third weapon [in his van], a revolver, [which is 
only] capable of firing . . . six shots . . . .”83 
 
The store [that sold him the weapons] is a federally licensed 
firearms dealer.  Under law, the seller would have had to notify the 
[FBI] of Mateen’s purchase so that his name could be checked 
against the National Instant Criminal Background Check System . . 
. .  Mateen was actually listed on two federal watch lists . . . :  The 
Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment, which contains 
                                                 
78. Date et al., supra note 35; Ralph Ellis, Pulse Nightclub:  Chilling 911 
Tapes Capture Killer’s Voice, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/31/us/orlando-pulse-911-
calls/ (last updated Oct. 31, 2016); How Did Orlando Shooter Legally Buy Guns?  Your 
Questions Answered, USA TODAY (June 13, 2016, 9:20 AM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2016/06/13/orlando-shooting-what-we-dont-
know/85811424/; Shapiro & Chan, supra note 5. 
79. Date et al., supra note 35; How Did Orlando Shooter Legally Buy Guns?  
Your Questions Answered, supra note 78; Shapiro & Chan, supra note 5. 
80. Ellis, supra note 78. 
Mateen first made contact with police, calling 911 at 2:35 [A.M.] to say, 
“I want to let you know [I am] in Orlando and I did the shooting.”  When the 
dispatcher asked his identity, he said, “My name is I pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi of the Islamic State.”  Then, he hung up.  The negotiator stationed at 
the 911 center then called and got through three times to Mateen, who was inside 
the nightclub.  Mateen started out repeating phrases in an insistent, almost robotic 
manner.  When the negotiator asked what was going on, meaning at the nightclub, 
Mateen replied, “What [is] going on is that I feel the pain of the people getting 
killed in Syria and Iraq,” a subject he returned to repeatedly. 
Id. 
81. Date et al., supra note 35. 
82. Michael Daly & Shane Harris, How the Orlando Killer Omar Mateen Got 
His Guns, DAILY BEAST (June 13, 2016, 11:26 AM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/06/13/how-the-orlando-killer-omar-mateen-got-
his-guns.html. 
83. Id. 
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classified information, and the Terrorist Screening Database, 
which is the FBI’s central watch list.84 
 
Mateen’s name had been removed from the second watch list in 2014.85 
Even if his name had been in the system, “it [still] might not have 
prevented him from purchasing weapons.”86  “In December [2015], the 
Senate voted down an amendment that would have kept suspected terrorists 
from purchasing firearms.”87  The amendment was introduced by the 
Democratic Senator of California, Dianne Feinstein.88  It would have allowed 
“the attorney general to prevent someone from buying a gun if that person is 
a known or suspected terrorist.  A person could also be barred from buying a 
firearm if the attorney general has a ‘reasonable belief’ that the individual 
would use it in connection with a terrorist act.”89 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY FOR GUN OWNERSHIP AND GUN 
LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 
The Second Amendment of the United States Constitution, passed by 
Congress on September 25, 1789 and ratified on December 15, 1791 as part 
of the Bill of Rights, has made it possible for U.S. citizens to own firearms 
for personal use.90  The Second Amendment states that “[a] well regulated 
[m]ilitia, being necessary to the security of a free [s]tate, the right of the 
people to keep and bear [a]rms, shall not be infringed.”91  There has been a 
great deal of controversy and debate regarding what was meant by the text of 
                                                 
84. Id. 
85. Id.; Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Does a Known or Suspected Terrorist Face ‘a 
Long Waiting Period’ Before Buying a Gun?, WASH. POST (June 21, 2016), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/06/21/does-a-known-or-
suspected-terrorist-face-a-long-waiting-period-before-buying-a-gun/. 
86. How Did Orlando Shooter Legally Buy Guns?  Your Questions Answered, 
supra note 78. 
87. Id.; see also Khorri Atkinson, GOP Blocks Bill to Stop Terrorists From 
Buying Guns, MSNBC (Dec. 4, 2015, 12:23 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/gop-blocks-
bill-stop-terrorists-buying-guns. 
88. Atkinson, supra note 87; How Did Orlando Shooter Legally Buy Guns?  
Your Questions Answered, supra note 78. 
89. How did Orlando Shooter Legally Buy Guns?  Your Questions Answered, 
supra note 78. 
90. U.S. CONST. amend. II; see also Nelson Lund & Adam Winkler, The 
Second Amendment, NAT’L CONST. CTR., http://www.constitutioncenter.org/interactive-
constitution/amendments/amendment-ii/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
91. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
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the Second Amendment.92  Scholars differ on their interpretations of the text, 
with some finding that the Second Amendment only allows for firearms to be 
owned by the militia and others arguing that it allows for firearms both in the 
military and for personal use.93  The Supreme Court of the United States 
clarified the scope of the Second Amendment in three seminal cases.94 
A. Supreme Court Decisions 
In 1939, the Supreme Court of the United States heard United States 
v. Miller.95  In Miller, the Court rejected a claim that indictments under the 
National Firearms Act of 1934 violated the right to keep and bear arms.96  
The defendants were charged with possessing a short-barreled shotgun, a 
firearm that was considered illegal under the Act.97  The defendants initially 
persuaded the lower court to quash the indictment as a violation of the 
Second Amendment, but a unanimous Supreme Court reversed.98  Justice 
McReynolds found that the Second Amendment “must be interpreted and 
applied with [the] end” of maintaining a well-regulated militia.99  The Court 
also held: 
 
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that 
possession or use of a “shotgun having a barrel of less than 
eighteen inches in length,” at this time, has some reasonable 
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated 
militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the 
right to keep and bear such an instrument.  Certainly, it is not 
within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary 
military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common 
defense.100 
 
                                                 
92. See Robert Hardaway et al., The Inconvenient Militia Clause of the 
Second Amendment:  Why the Supreme Court Declines to Resolve the Debate Over the Right 
to Bear Arms, 16 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 41, 94–95 (2002). 
93. David B. Kopel, The Right to Arms in the Living Constitution, 2010 
CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 99, 104–07, 118 (2010); see also U.S. CONST. amend. II.. 
94. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010); District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595, 635 (2008); United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 
(1939). 
95. 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
96. Id. at 176–78. 
97. Id. at 175. 
98. United States v. Miller, 26 F. Supp. 1002, 1003 (W.D. Ark. 1939), rev’d, 
307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
99. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178. 
100. Id. 
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Therefore, the defendants were not entitled to any constitutional 
protection because a civilian-owned short-barreled shotgun did not relate to 
the ability to maintain a well-regulated militia.101  The Court’s decision in 
Miller was precedent for almost seventy years, until the Supreme Court of 
the United States heard District of Columbia v. Heller (“Heller I”)102 in 
2008.103 
In 2008, in Heller I, the Supreme Court of the United States held for 
the first time that the Second Amendment protects the right of an individual 
law-abiding adult citizen to possess an operable firearm, including a 
handgun, in his or her home for self-defense.104  Heller I dealt with 
provisions in the District of Columbia Code that made it illegal to carry an 
unregistered firearm and prohibited the registration of handguns.105  The 
Code also contained provisions that required owners of lawfully registered 
firearms to keep them “‘unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger 
lock or other similar device’ unless [the firearms were] located in a place of 
business or . . . being used for [legal] recreational activities.”106  Dick 
Anthony Heller was a District of Columbia “special police officer [that was] 
authorized to carry a handgun while on duty.”107  He applied for a one-year 
license for a handgun that he wanted to keep at home, but his application was 
denied.108  Heller sued the District of Columbia, seeking an injunction 
against the enforcement of the relevant parts of the Code, by arguing that it 
violated his Second Amendment right to keep a functional firearm in his 
home without a license.109 
Justice Scalia, writing for the Heller I majority, revisited the Second 
Amendment’s text and broke it apart.110  He found that the first clause 
relating to a well-regulated militia is prefatory and the second clause 
concerning “the right of the people to keep and bear [a]rms” is operative.111  
To illustrate this point, Justice Scalia stated that “[t]he Amendment could be 
rephrased [as]:  ‘Because a well-regulated [m]ilitia is necessary to the 
security of a free [s]tate, the right of the people to keep and bear [a]rms shall 
not be infringed.’”112  The Court ultimately decided that the operative portion 
                                                 
101. See id. 
102. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
103. Id. at 623–25; Miller, 307 U.S. at 183. 
104. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
105. Id. at 574–75. 
106. Id. at 575. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Heller, 554 U.S. at 575–76. 
110. Id. at 576–77. 
111. Id. at 576, 579, 595. 
112. Id. at 577. 
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“unambiguously refer[s] to individual rights, not ‘collective’ rights or rights 
that may be exercised only through participation in some corporate body.”113  
Although this enabled individuals to keep a handgun in their home for self-
defense, the Court clarified that “[l]ike most rights, the right secured by the 
Second Amendment is not unlimited.”114  Justice Scalia stated: 
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons 
and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in 
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws 
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of 
arms.115 
The Court also reaffirmed a portion of the holding in Miller by 
finding that the sorts of weapons that would be protected “were those ‘in 
common use at the time.’”116  In responding to the dissent, Justice Scalia 
reaffirmed that although handguns are not the type of weapon that would 
ordinarily be used in modern day militia, that would not prevent the 
interpretation of the Second Amendment, which would be to allow handguns 
to be owned by civilians.117  Therefore, after Heller I, adult citizens were 
deemed to be allowed to possess an operable handgun in their home for self-
defense.118 
In 2010, in McDonald v. City of Chicago,119 the Supreme Court of 
the United States held “that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporate[d] the Second Amendment right, recognized in 
Heller,” to the states.120  In this case, “Otis McDonald, Adam Orlov, Colleen 
                                                 
113. Id. at 579. 
114. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
115. Id. at 626–27. 
116. Id. at 627 (citing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)). 
117. Id. at 627–28. 
 It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful in military 
service—M–16 rifles and the like—may be banned, then the Second Amendment 
right is completely detached from the prefatory clause.  But, as we have said, the 
conception of the militia at the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification was 
the body of all citizens capable of military service, who would bring the sorts of 
lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty.  It may well be true 
today that a militia, to be as effective as militias in the [eighteenth] century, would 
require sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at large.  Indeed, it 
may be true that no amount of small arms could be useful against modern-day 
bombers and tanks.  But, the fact that modern developments have limited the degree 
of fit between the prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change our 
interpretation of the right. 
Id. 
118. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
119. 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
120. Id. at 750, 791; see also Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
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Lawson, and David Lawson . . . [were] Chicago residents who [wanted] to 
keep handguns in their homes for self-defense.”121  They were “prohibited 
from doing so by Chicago’s firearms laws.”122  A city ordinance required 
that, in order to possess a firearm, a person must have a “valid registration 
certificate for [the] firearm.”123  “The Code [also] prohibit[ed] registration of 
most handguns, thus, effectively banning handgun possession by almost all 
private citizens who reside in the City.”124  The Court found “that Heller had 
explicitly refrained from ‘opin[ing] on [whether] . . . the Second 
Amendment’” applied to the states.125  Justice Alito found: 
 
We have previously held that most of the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights apply with full force to both the Federal Government and 
the [s]tates.  Applying the standard that is well established in our 
case law, we hold that the Second Amendment right is fully 
applicable to the [s]tates.126 
 
Therefore, after McDonald, the Second Amendment rights were 
incorporated to the states.127 
B. How Gun Laws Are Established in the United States 
In light of the Supreme Court holdings that firearms ownership does 
extend to civilians, the structure for gun laws and regulations is also 
important to understand.128  Currently, the gun laws of the United States are 
defined and established by both state and federal statutes.129  The federal gun 
laws of the United States are enforced by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”).130  The ATF establishes the minimum 
requirements and leaves it to the states to develop additional legislation.131  
Most of the legislation pertaining to firearms comes from the states, and 
                                                 
121. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 750. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 752. 
126. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 750. 
127. See id. 
128. See id. at 767–68, 785; District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 
(2008); Firearms, ATF, http://www.atf.gov/firearms (last visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
129. See 18 U.S.C. § 921 (2012); Nicholas Duva, Gun Laws Vary State by 
State:  CNBC Explains, CNBC (Nov. 20, 2014, 8:47 AM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/2014/11/20/gun-laws-vary-state-by-state-cnbc-explains.html; Firearms, 
supra note 128. 
130. See Firearms, supra note 128. 
131. Duva, supra note 129; Firearms, supra note 128. 
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there is a varying degree of what is allowed depending on the state.132  For 
example, Texas allows citizens to apply for open carry permits—which 
enables them to carry their firearms out in public without having to conceal it 
under clothing or within a bag—whereas New York City does not generally 
allow citizens to carry any firearms, whether open carry or concealed.133  
State legislation is typically necessary in today’s political climate in order to 
see any changes to gun laws.134  After the 2016 mass shooting in Orlando, 
Florida, House Democrats conducted a twenty-six hour sit-in at the Capitol, 
in order “to push for [federal] gun . . . legislation.”135  During the sit-in, the 
House Democrats chanted “‘No Bill, No Break’ and wav[ed] posters with the 
names of victims of gun violence.”136  The House Democrats stated that their 
intention was to forestall “House business . . . until . . . vot[ing began] on . . . 
gun control measures.”137  “A total of 168 House Democrats, out of 188 total, 
joined at least part of the sit-in . . . .  A number of senators [also] joined them 
. . . .”138  However, no new gun legislation at the federal level was passed.139 
States typically see an increase in proposed legislation after a mass 
shooting tragedy occurs.140  The tragedy spurs debate on gun issues and 
brings them to the forefront of the people’s minds, and legislators see it as an 
opportunity to pass legislation they have been contemplating.141  According 
                                                 
132. See Duva, supra note 129. 
133. Id.; see also Getting a NYC Handgun Permit License, N.Y.C. GUNS, 
http://www.newyorkcityguns.com/getting-a-nyc-handgun-permit (last visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
134. See Camila Domonoske & Jessica Taylor, Almost 26 Hours Later, House 
Democrats End Gun Control Sit-In, NPR (June 23, 2016, 7:51 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/06/23/483205589/house-democrats-continue-
gun-control-sit-in. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. See Domonoske & Taylor, supra note 134. 
140. Rott & Landa, supra note 7; see also Neil Irwin, After Mass Shootings, 
It’s Often Easier to Buy a Gun, N.Y. TIMES:  THE UPSHOT (June 14, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/15/upshot/policy-changes-after-mass-shootings-tend-to-
make-guns-easier-to-buy.html. 
 A mass shooting takes place, followed by emotional vigils, intensive 
news media coverage and sorrowful statements by politicians.  But what does it 
actually mean for laws and policies around guns?  Lots of                                                                                                                              
gun laws are proposed in the aftermath of an attack, new research shows.  But in 
terms of what actually is enacted, the results [are not] what you might expect.  In 
states where a mass shooting happened, 15[%] more gun-related bills were 
introduced in state legislatures, three Harvard Business School professors found in 
a working paper published last month. 
Irwin, supra. 
141. See id. 
 [There is] no doubt that there is a surge of attention around gun policy 
when a major shooting takes place.  Polling data from the Pew Research Center 
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to a working paper released by researchers at Harvard Business School, 
“[m]ore than 20,400 pieces of gun-related legislation have been proposed 
following mass shooting events in the past [twenty-five] years.  Of those 
bills, more than 3000 have become law . . . .”142  One of the authors of the 
paper, Deepak Malhotra, stated that, “[it is] not that nothing changes after a 
mass shooting . . . .  A lot of the action on [gun control] happens across states 
instead of at the federal level.”143  This was the case after the Newton, 
Connecticut, shooting at the elementary school.144  According to the New 
York Times, “almost every state enacted at least one new gun law” in the 
year following Newtown; “1500 state gun bills were introduced” of which 
178 passed one chamber, and of which 109 subsequently became state 
law.145  Where many thought these laws would result in tightened gun 
restrictions, “[n]early two-thirds of the . . . laws [enacted instead] ease[d] 
restrictions and expand[ed] the rights of gun owners.”146 
Further, a Pew Research poll conducted between December 2012 
and December 2014 asked individuals whether gun ownership in the United 
States did more to protect people from being crime victims or put people’s 
safety at risk.147  There was a nine point increase since 2012—when the 
Newtown, Connecticut, massacre occurred—in the percentage of Americans 
that said gun ownership protects people from becoming crime victims, as 
opposed to putting people’s safety at risk; nearly 40% said gun ownership 
does more to put people’s safety at risk.148 
                                                                                                                   
shows sharp, but temporary, swings in public opinion on gun control after 
particularly high-profile, emotionally resonant attacks like the ones at Columbine 
High School in 1999 and Sandy Hook Elementary School in 2012. . . .  [H]igh-
profile shootings create a “policy window” in which an issue comes to the forefront 
for media and politicians alike, even if “mass shooting” [does not] automatically 
translate into “more restrictive gun laws.” 
Id. 
142. Rott & Landa, supra note 7; see also Michael Luca et al., The Impact of 
Mass Shootings on Gun Policy 6–7 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 16-126, 2016). 
143. Rott & Landa, supra note 7 (alteration in original). 
144. Barron, supra note 9, at A1. 
145. Karen Yourish et al., State Gun Laws Enacted in the Year After Newtown, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/12/10/us/state-gun-
laws-enacted-in-the-year-since-newtown.html. 
146. Id. 
147. More Conservative Republicans, African Americans Say Gun Ownership 
Protects People from Crime, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.people-
press.org/2014/12/10/growing-public-support-for-gun-rights/12-10-2014-2-23-41-pm. 
148. Id. 
37
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 2017
160 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
C. Current Federal Gun Laws 
Although most of the gun laws in the United States are created by 
the states, there are federal laws regarding gun control—specifically, in 
relation to background checks.149  The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention 
Act of 1993 (“Brady Act”) requires federally licensed firearms dealers 
(“FFLs”) to perform background checks on prospective firearms purchasers 
to ensure that the firearm transfer will not violate federal, state, or local 
laws.150  Through the Brady Act, the National Instant Criminal Background 
Check System (“NICS”) was established.151  States have the option of 
serving as a state point of contact and conducting their own NICS checks or 
having those checks performed by the FBI.152 
FBI searches will include three federal databases:  (1) The National 
Crime Information Center (“NCIC”), “which includes . . . records 
[regarding] wanted persons” and persons subject to protective or restraining 
orders; (2) The Interstate Identification Index, which contains state criminal 
history records; and (3) The NICS Index, which contains records of other 
persons prohibited under federal law from receiving or possessing 
firearms.153  Once the initial search is complete, the FBI or point of contact 
notifies the dealer that the sale:  (1) may proceed; (2) may not proceed; or (3) 
is delayed pending further investigation.154 
Under the Brady Act, if the dealer has not been notified within three 
business days that the sale would violate federal or state laws, the sale may 
proceed by default.155  This is known as the default proceed loophole.156  The 
law pertaining to the default loophole provides: 
                                                 
149. See Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, § 102, 
107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921925A (2012)); Rott & 
Landa, supra note 7. 
150. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act § 102(a). 
151. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERVS. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL 
INSTANT CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM (NICS) (2015), https://www.fbi.gov/file-
repository/nics-overview-brochure.pdf; see also Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act § 
102(b). 
152. Id. 
153. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERVS. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL 
INSTANT CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM (NICS): 2000 OPERATIONS REPORT 1 (2001), 
https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/operations_report_2000.pdf; see also John Pike, National 
Crime Information Center (NCIC), FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/is/ncic.htm (last updated June 2, 2008). 
154. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERVS. DIV., supra note 153, at 3, 40. 
155. Id. at 17, 37; see also Press Release, Richard Blumenthal, Senator, 
Senators Introduce “No Check, No Sale” Bill to Close Loophole Allowing Gun Sales Without 
a Completed Background Check (Oct. 28, 2015). 
38
Nova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol41/iss2/1
2017] CHECK MATE:  AUSTRALIA'S GUN LAW REFORM 161 
Section 25.6(c)(1)(iv)(B)—Delayed response provided to FFL: 
“Delayed” response, if the NICS search finds a record 
that requires more research to determine whether the prospective 
transferee is disqualified from possessing a firearm by [f]ederal or 
state law.  A “[d]elayed” response to the FFL indicates that the 
firearm transfer should not proceed pending receipt of a follow-up 
“[p]roceed” response from the NICS or the expiration of three 
business days—exclusive of the day on which the query is made—
whichever occurs first.  Example:  An FFL requests a NICS check 
on a prospective firearm transferee at 9:00 [A.M.] on Friday and, 
shortly thereafter, receives a “[d]elayed” response from the NICS.  
If state offices in the state in which the FFL is located are closed 
on Saturday and Sunday and open the following Monday, 
Tuesday, and Wednesday, and the NICS has not yet responded 
with a “[p]roceed” or “[d]enied” response, the FFL may transfer 
the firearm at 12:01 [A.M.] Thursday.157 
Section 25.2—Definition of Open transaction: 
“Open” means those non-canceled transactions where the 
FFL has not been notified of the final determination.  In cases of 
“open” responses, the NICS continues researching potentially 
prohibiting records regarding the transferee and, if definitive 
information is obtained, communicates to the FFL the final 
determination that the check resulted in a proceed or a deny.  An 
“open” response does not prohibit an FFL from transferring a 
firearm after three business days have elapsed since the FFL 
provided to the system the identifying information about the 
prospective transferee.158 
The default loophole “allowed 3849 prohibited purchasers to buy 
guns during the first year of operation, November 30, 1998, through 
November 30, 1999, of NICS.”159  “[T]he FBI has found that a purchaser 
whose NICS check takes longer than [twenty-four] hours to complete is 
[twenty] times more likely to be a prohibited purchaser than other 
                                                                                                                   
156. See Jennifer Mascia, How America Wound Up with a Gun Background 
Check System Built More for Speed Than Certainty, TRACE (July 21, 2015), 
https://www.thetrace.org/2015/07/brady-bill-amendment-default-proceed-loophole-
amendment-nra/. 
157. 28 C.F.R. § 25.6(c)(1)(iv)(B) (2012) (emphasis added). 
158. 28 C.F.R. § 25.2 (2012) (emphasis added). 
159. Federal Law on Background Checks, L. CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, 
http://www.smartgunlaws.org/gun-laws/federal-law/sales-transfers/background-checks/ (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
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applicants.”160  Further, “between November 1998 and December 31, 2005, 
ATF received 26,600 referrals from the FBI requesting further review, 
evaluation, and possible retrieval of firearms that had been sold to ineligible 
persons by default.”161 
There is also a gun show loophole where persons who purchase 
firearms from private sellers are not required to undergo background 
checks.162  It is estimated that 40% of all gun purchasers buy their guns from 
private sellers and do not have to undergo background checks.163  The most 
common arena for these purchases are gun shows, however the ability to 
purchase a gun without a background check is available when a person 
purchases a firearm by any private dealer in any setting.164 
V. MASS SHOOTING TRAGEDY IN AUSTRALIA 
In order to compare gun laws in the United States to those of 
Australia, it is necessary to understand where Australia’s motive in creating 
their current gun laws derives from.165  Australia had a focusing event 
                                                 
160. Federal Law on Background Checks, supra note 159. 
161. Id. 
162. Andrew Goddard, A View Through the Gun Show Loophole, 12 RICH. J.L. 
& PUB. INT. 357, 357 (2009). 
 The term Gun Show Loophole came about as a result of the passage of 
the Firearm Owners Protection Act of 1986 and the Brady Handgun Violence 
Prevention Act of 1993.  These laws effectively created a dual standard for gun 
sales based on the federal license status of the seller.  The Brady Act mandated that 
licensed gun dealers must conduct criminal background checks on potential buyers 
regardless of whether the sale takes place at the dealer’s store or at a gun show, 
whereas the Firearm Owners Protection Act expressly exempted “persons making 
occasional sales or selling all or part of a personal collection” from the need to 
obtain a federal license to sell firearms.  Thus, a private individual who is not 
considered to be “engaged in the business” of buying and selling guns, or who sells 
occasionally, is not required, or even allowed, to conduct a background check on a 
prospective buyer.  The reason for the exception to the background check 
requirement for private sellers [is] to allow for the unregulated sale or transfer of 
guns between friends and relatives or the “occasional” sale of guns by individuals 
from their personal collection. 
Id. 
163. Kate Masters, Just How Many People Get Guns Without a Background 
Check?  Fast-Tracked Research Is Set to Provide an Answer, TRACE (Oct. 21, 2015), 
http://www.thetrace.org/2015/10/private-sale-loophole-background-check-harvard-research/. 
164. See Goddard, supra note 162, at 357. 
165. Matthew Grimson, Port Arthur Massacre:  The Shooting Spree that 
Changed Australia’s Gun Laws, NBC NEWS (Apr. 28, 2016, 6:52 AM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/port-arthur-massacre-shooting-spree-changed-australia-
gun-laws-n396476; see also Emily Crane, Martin Bryant’s Old Volvo Crammed with 
Weapons, a Surfboard on the Roof and 35 Innocent Lives Lost:  Harrowing Photos Show How 
Australia’s Worst Massacre Unfolded at Port Arthur 20 Years Ago Today, DAILYMAIL.COM 
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pertaining to mass shootings on April 28, 1996, at a seaside resort in Port 
Arthur, Tasmania.166  It was considered the worst massacre in Australian 
history.167  The gunman Martin Bryant, a twenty-eight year old that was 
armed with a semi-automatic rifle, killed thirty-five people and wounded 
twenty-three others.168  He “drove a yellow Volvo to Port Arthur armed with 
a sports bag full of ammunition and a military-style semi-automatic rifle.”169  
Bryant “ate lunch before pulling [out the] semi-automatic rifle from his bag 
and embarking on a killing spree.”170  Bryant was found guilty of the 
shootings and given “[thirty-five] life sentences without [the possibility of] 
parole.”171  After this tragedy, John Howard, the Australian Prime Minister at 
the time, urged for more restrictive gun laws commenting, “‘I hate guns’ . . . 
.  ‘One of the things I [do not] admire about America is their slavish love of 
guns . . . , [w]e do not want the American disease imported into 
Australia.’”172 
VI. AUSTRALIA’S GUN LAWS 
On May 10, 1996, twelve days after the attacks at Port Arthur, 
Australia enacted uniform gun control laws.173  “Between June 1996 and 
August 1998, the new restrictions were . . . implemented in all six states and 
two territories.”174  The act is known as the National Firearms Agreement.175 
                                                                                                                   
(Apr. 27, 2016, 11:17 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3562751/Harrowing-
photos-Port-Arthur-massacre-unfolded-20-years-ago.html. 
166. Crane, supra note 165; Grimson, supra note 165. 
167. Crane, supra note 165; Grimson, supra note 165. 
168. Crane, supra note 165; Grimson, supra note 165. 
169. Crane, supra note 165. 
170. Grimson, supra note 165. 
171. Crane, supra note 165. 
172. Daniel Williams, Australia’s Gun Laws:  Little Effect, TIME (May 1, 
2008), http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1736501,00.html; see also Calla 
Wahlquist, It Took One Massacre:  How Australia Embraced Gun Control After Port Arthur, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 14, 2016, 4:49 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/15/it-
took-one-massacre-how-australia-made-gun-control-happen-after-port-arthur. 
173. See How Australia Dealt with Mass Shootings, CBS NEWS (Mar. 13, 
2016, 10:14 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-australia-dealt-with-mass-shootings/; 
Laura Smith-Spark, This Is What Happened When Australia Introduced Tight Gun Controls, 
CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/19/world/us-australia-gun-control/ (last updated June 19, 
2015, 12:35 PM).  “Only [twelve] days after the shootings, in John Howard’s first major act of 
leadership and by far the most popular in his first year as Prime Minister, his government 
announced nationwide gun law reform.”  Smith-Spark, supra. 
174. See Simon Chapman et al., Australia’s 1996 Gun Law Reforms:  Faster 
Falls in Firearm Deaths, Firearm Suicides, and a Decade Without Mass Shootings, 12 INJ. 
PREVENTION 365, 365 (2006). 
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The National Firearms Agreement:  (1) prohibits automatic and 
semiautomatic assault rifles; (2) stiffened licensing and ownership rules—for 
example, the private sale and transfer of firearms is prohibited unless 
conducted and registered by a licensed firearms dealer; (3) instituted a 
temporary gun buyback program that took approximately 700,000 assault 
weapons out of public circulation; (4) requires licensees to demonstrate a 
genuine need for a particular type of gun—self-defense does not qualify; (5) 
requires a firearm safety course; (6) determined that licenses cannot be 
issued until after a waiting period of not less than twenty-eight days and for a 
period of no more than five years; (7) mandates that licensees need to 
comply with storage requirements and submit to inspection by licensing 
authorities, subject to immediate withdrawal of license and confiscation of 
firearms in certain circumstances; and (8) requires separate permits for the 
acquisition of every firearm.176 
Before the National Firearms Agreement, only handguns were 
required to be registered.177  As previously mentioned, after the Agreement, 
all jurisdictions in Australia banned the sale, resale, transfer, ownership, 
possession, manufacture, and the use of automatic and semi-automatic long-
arms.178  Further, the requirement that owners of guns needed a genuine 
reason for owning the gun only encompassed the uses of recreational 
shooting and hunting, bona fide gun collection, and sporting shooters with a 
valid membership to an approved club.179  This effectively removed any 
person from claiming self-protection as a genuine reason for gun 
ownership.180 
An article in Time Magazine contains a firsthand account of an avid 
gun owner and collector living in Australia during the time when the 
National Firearms Agreement was implemented.181  The gun owner is 
                                                                                                                   
175. See Kelly Buchanan, Australia, in FIREARMS-CONTROL LEGISLATION AND 
POLICY 16, 17 (2013).  What emerged from the APMC’s meeting was the implementation of 
the Nationwide Agreement on Firearms, “commonly referred to as the National Firearms 
Agreement” (the “Agreement”) in 1996.  Id. at 17.  Legislative Reforms, AUSTL. INST. 
CRIMINOLOGY http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/rpp/100-
120/rpp116/06_reforms.html (last modified June 29, 2012).  The Australian government 
responded swiftly, and “the Australasian Police Ministers’ Council (“APMC”) convened a 
special meeting” and made resolutions to create a national plan for the regulation of firearms. 
176. Buchanan, supra note 175, at 19–21. 
177. Legislative Reforms, supra note 175. 
178. Id. 
179. Id.; Jeffrey Sachs, Australia Gun Ownership Regulations, JEFFSACHS.ORG 
(Dec. 16, 2012), http://www.jeffsachs.org/2012/12/australis-gun-ownership-regulations/. 
180. See Legislative Reforms, supra note 175; Sachs, supra note 179. 
181. Peter, What It’s Like to Own Guns in a Country with Strict Gun Control, 
TIME (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.time.com/4172274/what-its-like-to-own-guns-in-a-country-
with-strict-gun-control/. 
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referenced in the article only by his first name, Peter, due to his fear that 
disclosing the contents of his gun collection might make him a target for 
weapon thieves.182  Peter admitted that he was not thrilled about the idea of 
having to turn in six to eight semiautomatic rifles and shotguns to the police, 
but he came to the realization that the laws are actually an improvement.183  
Peter stated: 
 
[It is] actually not that hard to own a gun.  But, you do have to 
have a genuine reason.  You have to be a member of a target 
shooting club, or a hunter, and you have to prove it.  For hunting, 
you can get written permission from a landowner who says you are 
hunting on his land.  Or, you can join a hunting club.  Pistols 
[handguns], on the other hand, are heavily restricted.  All 
applicants undergo a background check by the police and there is a 
mandatory [thirty] day cooling off period for all license 
applications, both long arms and pistols.  Firearms safety training 
courses are mandatory as well.184 
 
Peter also mentions the requirements of having a trigger lock on all 
firearms that are being transported throughout Australia and the provision 
requiring firearms to only be transported unloaded with ammunition in a 
separate locked container.185  Approving of the restrictions, he stated: 
 
                                                 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
[A]fter the 1996 massacre, I probably had to hand in six to eight semiautomatic 
rifles and shotguns to the police.  We got fair value for them but I [was not] thrilled 
to be doing it because I thought “Well gee, what have I done wrong?”  Would 
anything untoward ever have happened with the firearms I owned?  No. 
Id. 
184. Id. 
 One of the biggest changes is that the government established different 
types of firearms for different categories of guns and ruled that each would need 
different licenses.  [Here is] roughly how it works:  Category A is .22s, shotguns 
and air rifles.  [That is] the easiest license to obtain.  No semiautomatics are 
allowed.  Category B is for center fire rifles.  You have to provide a reason for why 
you need a more powerful gun.  I shoot feral pigs and foxes; [that is] a valid reason.  
Again, no semiautomatics.  Category C is available only to farmers; they can own a 
semiautomatic shotgun or .22 but the cartridges are limited to five shots for the 
shotgun and [ten] shots for the .22.  Category D, for semiautomatic guns and rifles, 
is only for professional shooters:  [Y]ou have to have a registered business and 
prove that you are earning an income through shooting.  An H license is for 
handguns.  If you want to buy a pistol in Australia, [you have] . . . to be a member 
of a target pistol club.  [You have] . . . to do a minimum of eight competition shoots 
per year to keep your license.  If you [do not], you lose it.  Category G is for 
collectors.  For that, [you have] . . . to attend at least one meeting per year. 
Peter, supra note 181. 
185. Id. 
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All these things I agree with.  I would feel less safe in 
Texas where [everybody is] walking around with open carry.  That 
would freak me out.  It freaks me out enough to see the police all 
armed at the airport.  Would I walk around the street with a pistol 
loaded on my waist?  No way.186 
 
Although he found the provision requiring a new permit for each 
additional firearm acquired to be tedious, overall, he believes that most 
Australians think the law is beneficial and still allows them to enjoy the use 
of firearms for particular purposes.187 
In 2002, Australia also implemented the National Trafficking and 
Handgun Agreement.188  This agreement was implemented to control the 
illegal trade of firearms in Australia.189  The agreement:  (1) increased border 
protection; (2) introduced nationally consistent regulations of the legal 
manufacture of firearms; (3) created tighter recording and reporting 
provisions for dealer transactions involving firearm and major firearm parts; 
and (4) established new offenses or penalties for the illegal possession and 
supply of firearms, the defacing of serial numbers, and conspiracy to commit 
interstate crimes with firearm.190  “The [F]ederal Parliament also enacted the 
National Handgun Buyback Act [in] 2003,” resulting in the surrender of 
“about 70,000 handguns and more than 278,000 parts and accessories” “that 
did not comply with the new restrictions.”191 
According to a study published in the Journal of the American 
Medical Association, after the enactment of nationwide gun law reform in 
May of 1996, there have been no mass shootings in Australia.192  In 
Australia, mass shootings are defined as fatal shootings, “with five or more 
victims killed, not including the perpetrator.”193  The study also found that 
since the passing of the legislation, “gun suicides declined by an average of 
                                                 
186. Id. 
187. Id. 
 Australia is a great country.  You can go hunting, you can go shooting.  
And, as long as you hurt nobody and abide the law, you can continue to do it.  That, 
to me, is freedom.  The idea of having people own guns with no concept of gun 
safety and no reason to have a gun?  That is not my idea of freedom. 
Id. 
188. Buchanan, supra note 175, at 22. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. at 22–23. 
191. Id. at 24. 
192. Simon Chapman et al., Association Between Gun Law Reforms and 
Intentional Firearm Deaths in Australia, 1979-2013, 316 AM. MED. ASS’N 291, 298 (2016); 
Howard, supra note 3. 
193. Chapman et al., supra note 192, at 293; Howard, supra note 3. 
44
Nova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol41/iss2/1
2017] CHECK MATE:  AUSTRALIA'S GUN LAW REFORM 167 
4.8% per year and gun-related homicides declined by an average of 5.5% per 
year.”194 
So, how was Australia able to pass sweeping legislative change so 
quickly?  First, the Australian Constitution does not provide an explicit 
individual right to bear arms.195  Second, firearms regulation in Australia is 
the sole responsibility of the individual states and territories, as Section 51 of 
the Australian Constitution does not confer lawmaking powers to the Federal 
Parliament in relation to firearms.196  “Federal laws . . . regarding the import 
of firearms and other weapons [can be enacted] under the overseas trade and 
commerce powers of the . . . Parliament.”197  Third, Australia does not have a 
powerful gun rights lobbying organization that has unyielding control to 
influence legislative reform.198  These details are helpful in order to 
determine if the structure of the United States government would enable 
America to adopt Australia’s gun law policy. 
VII. CAPABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO ADOPT AUSTRALIA’S GUN 
LAW PROVISIONS 
This Article will now look at the various provisions of Australia’s 
comprehensive gun control agreement and determine if the United States can 
implement a similar law.199 
A. Australia’s Genuine Use for Owning, Possessing, or Using a 
Firearm 
As previously mentioned, Australia’s gun laws include a provision to 
show a genuine use for owning, possessing, or using a firearm.200  Personal 
protection, or self-defense, does not qualify as a genuine reason to own a 
firearm in Australia.201  Only “reasons relating to sport shooting, recreational 
                                                 
194. Chapman et al., supra note 192, at 298; Howard, supra note 3. 
195. See John Howard, I Went After Guns.  Obama Can, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
17, 2013, at A27.  John Howard, the prime minister who oversaw the passage of Australia’s 
current gun laws, stated that “we have no constitutional right to bear arms.  After all, the 
British granted us nationhood peacefully; the United States had to fight for it.”  Id. 
196. See Australian Constitution s 51. 
197. Buchanan, supra note 175, at 17. 
198. Howard, supra note 195, at A27.  “Our challenges were different from 
America’s. . . .  Our gun lobby [is not] as powerful, or well-financed, as the National Rifle 
Association in the United States.”  Id. 
199. See Buchanan, supra note 175, at 19–24; infra Sections VII.A-D. 
200. Buchanan, supra note 175, at 20. 
201. Id. 
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shooting, [or] hunting, collecting, and occupational requirements” are valid 
reasons for gun ownership or use in Australia.202 
As discussed, the Supreme Court of the United States’ cases Heller I 
and McDonald held that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s 
right to keep and bear arms in the home for traditionally lawful purposes, 
such as self-defense, and that the Second Amendment applies against the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.203 
Therefore, in light of the Court’s interpretation of the Second 
Amendment, it follows that the United States cannot implement a law that 
excludes self-defense as a genuine reason for owning, possessing, or using a 
firearm.204 
B. Ban on Assault Weapons 
Although banning all handgun sales—purchased for the purpose of 
self-defense—cannot be instituted in light of the Supreme Court of the 
United States’ decisions, a ban on assault weapons—similar to the one 
adopted in Australia—can be implemented.205 
First, the United States had a nationwide ban on semiautomatic 
assault weapons and large capacity ammunition feeding devices from 1994 
through 2004.206  This law was known as the Federal Assault Weapons 
Ban.207  The law eventually expired in 2004 and has not been reinstituted 
since.208  However, the Federal Assault Weapons Ban was riddled with 
loopholes and did not mirror the Australian ban on assault weapons.209  In an 
effort to not ban all semiautomatic weapons, Congress focused on eighteen 
specific firearms, thus, allowing some semi-automatic weapons to be deemed 
legal.210  Further, although the law made it illegal to manufacture any of the 
                                                 
202. Id. 
203. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 749–50 (2010); District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
204. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 636. 
205. See id.; Buchanan, supra note 175 at 19. 
206. Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act of 1994, Pub. 
L. No. 103-332, §§ 110102(a), 110103(a), 108 Stat. 1996; Brad Plumer, Everything You Need 
to Know About the Assault Weapons Ban, in One Post, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Dec. 17, 
2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2012/12/17/everything-you-need-to-
know-about-banning-assault-weapons-in-one-post. 
207. Plumer, supra note 206; see also Public Safety and Recreational Firearms 
Use Protection Act § 110101. 
208. Plumer, supra note 206.  “The original assault weapons law was written 
so that it would expire after ten years.  When 2004 came around, some Democrats tried to 
renew it but there [was not] much interest in Congress.”  Id. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
46
Nova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol41/iss2/1
2017] CHECK MATE:  AUSTRALIA'S GUN LAW REFORM 169 
assault weapons laid out in the act—for use by private citizens—“[a]ny 
assault weapon . . . that was manufactured before the law went into effect . . . 
was . . . legal to own or resell.”211  There were approximately 1.5 million 
assault weapons already owned by private citizens at the time.212  However, 
even with these loopholes, a Princeton study indicated that “the number of 
people [murdered] in mass shootings did go down in the years the ban was in 
effect.”213 
Second, seven states have taken it upon themselves to ban assault 
weapons in their particular states.214  These include:  California, Connecticut, 
the District of Columbia, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New 
York.215 
                                                                                                                   
[I]n crafting the 1994 ban, lawmakers mainly focused on [eighteen] specific 
firearms, as well as certain military-type features on guns.  Complicated flow charts 
laid it all out.  Certain models of AR-15s and AK-47s were banned.  Any 
semiautomatic rifle with a pistol grip and a bayonet mount was an “assault 
weapon.”  But, a semiautomatic rifle with just a pistol grip might be okay.  It was 
complicated.  And its complexity made it easy to evade. 
Id. 
211. Plumer, supra note 206. 
212. Id. 
213. Id. 
214. Assault Weapons, L. CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, 
http://www.smartgunlaws.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/classes-of-weapons/assault-weapons/ 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
215. Id. 
Some state assault weapon bans prohibit specific weapons by listing them by name.  
Some bans list features that, when present, make a gun an assault weapon.  The 
latter are known as generic feature tests.  Generic feature tests, emphasizing high 
capacity and enhanced control during firing, are intended to identify assault 
weapons based on the military features that enhance a weapon’s lethality.  Generic 
feature tests that require a weapon to have only one of a list of features are more 
comprehensive than those that require two.  A one-feature test captures more 
assault weapons and makes it harder for the gun industry to evade the law by 
modifying banned weapons.  California, Connecticut, New York, and the District of 
Columbia have the most comprehensive approaches to defining assault weapons.  
California law bans roughly [seventy-five] assault weapon types, models, and series 
by name and provides a one-feature generic test for rifles and pistols.  Connecticut 
bans roughly [seventy] assault weapon types, models, and series by name and uses 
a one-feature generic test for rifles and pistols.  The District of Columbia includes a 
list of assault weapon types, models, and series by name that closely follows the 
California list and provides a one-feature generic test for rifles, pistols, and 
shotguns.  The District also allows its Chief of Police to designate a firearm as an 
assault weapon based on a determination that the firearm would pose the same or 
similar danger to the residents of the District as other assault weapons.  New York 
has adopted a one-feature test for assault pistols, shotguns, and rifles.  New Jersey 
bans roughly [sixty-five] assault weapon types, models, and series and copies of 
those weapons by name and uses a one-feature generic test for shotguns.  
Connecticut and New Jersey also ban parts that may be readily assembled into an 
assault weapon. 
Id. 
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Third, in several states that have enacted a ban on assault weapons, 
courts have found the bans to be constitutional.216  For example, in the 
District of Columbia, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia heard Heller v. District of Columbia (“Heller II”).217  In this case, 
the court reviewed amended legislation that was introduced after Heller I 
was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States.218  This new 
legislation, among other limitations, banned assault weapons in the District 
of Columbia.219  In Heller II, the court adopted the following test:  (1) Does 
the regulation infringe upon a Second Amendment right, and (2) If so, does 
the regulation pass muster under intermediate scrutiny?220 
“The plaintiffs contend[ed] [that] semi-automatic [weapons] . . . are 
commonly possessed for self-protection in the home [and] for sport.”221  
They also argued that high capacity magazines are needed in a stressful 
situation when reloading might be difficult and imposing a ban on them 
would be an undue burden.222  The district court argued that “neither assault 
weapons, nor weapons with large-capacity magazines, are among the [a]rms 
protected by the Second Amendment because they are both dangerous and 
unusual and because prohibiting them minimally burdens the plaintiffs.”223  
Additionally, “[t]he [d]istrict [court] . . . contends magazines holding more 
than ten rounds are disproportionately involved in the murder of law 
enforcement officers, as well as mass shootings, and have little value for 
self-defense or sport.”224  The court held: 
                                                 
216. Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1247–48, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 
2011); Assault Weapons, supra note 214; Duva, supra note 129. 
217. 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
218. Id. at 1247–48; see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 
(2008). 
219. Heller, 670 F.3d at 1247. 
220. Id. at 1260–61.  Intermediate scrutiny is one test used to determine a law’s 
constitutionality.  Id. at 1261.  To pass intermediate scrutiny, the challenged law must further 
an important government interest by means that are substantially related to that interest.  Id. at 
1262.  The court in Heller II determined that intermediate scrutiny is the proper standard by 
finding: 
 As we did in evaluating the constitutionality of certain of the registration 
requirements, we determine the appropriate standard of review by assessing how 
severely the prohibitions burden the Second Amendment right.  Unlike the law held 
unconstitutional in Heller, the laws at issue here do not prohibit the possession of 
“the quintessential self-defense weapon,” to wit, the handgun.  Nor does the ban on 
certain semi-automatic rifles prevent a person from keeping a suitable and 
commonly used weapon for protection in the home or for hunting, whether a 
handgun or a non-automatic long gun. 
Id. at 1261–62 (citation omitted). 
221. Heller, 670 F.3d at 1260. 
222. Id. at 1260–61. 
223. Id. at 1261 (citation omitted). 
224. Id. 
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We think it [is] clear enough in the record that semi-
automatic rifles and magazines holding more than ten rounds are 
indeed in “common use,” as the plaintiffs contend.  Approximately 
1.6 million AR-15s alone have been manufactured since 1986 and, 
in 2007, this one popular model accounted for 5.5[%] of all 
firearms, and 14.4[%] of all rifles, produced in the [United States] 
for the domestic market.  As for magazines, . . . 18[%] of all 
firearms owned by civilians in 1994 were equipped with 
magazines holding more than ten rounds and approximately 4.7 
million more such magazines were imported into the United States 
between 1995 and 2000.  There may well be some capacity above 
which magazines are not in common use but, if so, the record is 
devoid of evidence as to what that capacity is; in any event, that 
capacity surely is not ten. 
Nevertheless, based upon the record as it stands, we 
cannot be certain whether these weapons are commonly used, or 
are useful specifically for self-defense or hunting, and, therefore, 
whether the prohibitions of certain semi-automatic rifles and 
magazines holding more than ten rounds meaningfully affect the 
right to keep and bear arms.  We need not resolve that question, 
however, because even assuming they do impinge upon the right 
protected by the Second Amendment, we think intermediate 
scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review and the prohibitions 
survive that standard.225 
 
Therefore, the court concluded that the ban on assault weapons had a 
substantial relationship with the government’s interest in protecting the 
police and the public and upheld the ban as constitutional.226 
Further, the California Court of Appeal held that Section 12280 of 
the California Penal Code, which bans assault weapons, was 
constitutional.227  Here, the defendant was convicted “of unlawful possession 
of an assault weapon” and argued that the statute was an unconstitutional 
infringement on his Second Amendment rights.228  The California Court of 
Appeal held that the Second Amendment did not extend to assault 
weapons.229  The court looked to the legislative intent for implementing the 
                                                 
225. Id. 
226. Heller, 670 F.3d at 1264. 
227. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12280 (West 2017), repealed by S.B. 1080, 2010 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012), CAL. PENAL CODE § 30600 (West 2017); People v. James, 94 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 576, 585–86 (Ct. App. 2009). 
228. James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 58384. 
229. Id. at 585. 
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assault weapons ban and determined that the primary concern was the 
increase in the use of unusually dangerous weapons.230  The court found that: 
[T]he Legislature enacted the [Roberti-Roos] Assault Weapons 
Control Act of 1989, and the .50 Caliber BMG Regulation Act of 
2004, in order to address the proliferation and use of unusually 
dangerous weapons:  [A]ssault weapons, with an incredibly “high 
rate of fire and capacity for firepower,” which can be used to 
indiscriminately “kill and injure human beings;” and .50 caliber 
BMG rifles, which “have such a high capacity for long distance 
and highly destructive firepower that they pose an unacceptable 
risk to the death and serious injury of human beings, destruction or 
serious damage of vital public and private buildings, civilian, 
police and military vehicles, power generation and transmission 
facilities, petrochemical production and storage facilities, and 
transportation infrastructure.”231 
The court went on to conclude that the California Penal Code 
classifies assault weapons as weapons of war, and since there was no 
indication in Heller I that Second Amendment rights protected the use or 
possession of atypical weapons, California’s ban on assault weapons was 
constitutional.232 
Therefore, the United States could successfully implement a ban on 
all assault weapons as Australia did.233  The ban would not violate the 
Second Amendment of the Constitution as it would pass muster under 
constitutional analysis by the courts.234 
C. Gun Buyback Programs 
If the United States is successful in banning assault weapons, the 
next issue for consideration would be to determine if the United States could 
                                                 
230. Id. 
231. Id. at 583–84 (citations omitted). 
232. Id. at 576, 586; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 12280; District of Columbia 
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008). 
233. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 636; Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 
1244, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 2011); James, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 576, 579, 585–86; Christina Sterbenz, 
Australia Enacted One of the Largest Gun Reforms Ever 2 Decades Ago — and Gun Deaths 
Plummeted, BUS. INSIDER (Jun. 14, 2016, 10:32 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/australia-gun-control-shootings-2016-6.  “Australia’s 
government . . . purchase[d] nearly 700,000 guns.  Percentagewise, that [is] the equivalent of 
forty million in the US.”  Sterbenz, supra note. 
234. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 636; Heller, 670 F.3d at 1264; James, 94 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d at 576. 
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legally implement a buyback program like Australia’s.235  The buyback 
program that Australia instituted after the National Firearms Agreement was 
extremely successful and removed approximately 700,000 assault weapons 
from civilian use.236  A 2010 study from the Australian National University 
“found that the gun buyback program lowered the proportion of Australian 
homes with guns from 15% to 8%.”237  The author of the study stated that, 
“[o]ur gun buyback took about a fifth of our guns out of circulation but it 
approximately halved the number of gun-owning households.”238 
In order to determine if the United States could compel citizens to 
turn in their guns—as part of a buyback program—the underlying laws of the 
United States need to be assessed and compared to those of Australia.239  The 
Australian and United States Constitutions each contain a Takings Clause, 
which allows the governments to actually or constructively seize private 
properties for public use as long as just compensation is provided.240  
Australia’s Takings Clause is located in Section 51 of the Australian 
Constitution and states that 
 
[t]he Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to 
make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the 
Commonwealth with respect to . . . the acquisition of property on 
just terms from any State or person for any purpose in respect of 
which the Parliament has power to make laws.241 
 
The United States Takings Clause is found in the last clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.242  The clause reads, “nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation.”243 
Although the United States has a long history of taking real 
property,244 the Supreme Court of the United States recently held that the 
                                                 
235. See Sterbenz, supra note 233. 
236. Id. 
237. Doug Stanglin, Researcher:  U.S. Could Learn from Aussie Gun Buyback, 
USA TODAY (Dec. 17, 2012, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/12/17/australia-gun-reform-buyback-us-
national-firearm-agreement/1774549. 
238. Id. 
239. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Australian Constitution s 51; Stanglin, supra 
note 238. 
240. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Australian Constitution s 51. 
241. See Australian Constitution s 51 (footnote omitted). 
242. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
243. Id. 
244. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 469–70 (2005); 
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–28 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 825, 841–42 (1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
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Takings Clause requires the government to pay just compensation for takings 
of personal property.245  Justice Roberts stated that, 
 
Nothing in the text or history of the Takings Clause, or 
our precedents, suggests that the rule is any different when it 
comes to appropriation of personal property.  The Government has 
a categorical duty to pay just compensation when it takes your car, 
just as when it takes your home.246 
 
Therefore, in light of the Takings Clause,247 and the Supreme Court’s 
holding,248 the United States would be required to pay just compensation, 
which is normally described as fair market value for any guns the 
government requires citizens to turn over as part of a buyback program, 
which is what Australia was required to do.249 
In Australia, the Federal Parliament introduced the Medicare Levy 
Amendment Act of 1996.250  This Act was implemented to raise the funds for 
the gun buyback program—which was estimated to be 500 million dollars.251  
This Act increased the rate of the Medicare levy for the 1996-1997 financial 
year.252  Although there has never been a mandatory gun buyback program in 
the United States, there have been several voluntary buyback programs in 
various states.253  Los Angeles has provided grocery-store gift cards in seven 
buybacks since 2009, receiving more than 12,000 guns in all.254  On 
                                                                                                                   
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 419, 441 (1982); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 
105, 125 (1978); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926); Pa. Coal Co. 
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412 (1922). 
245. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2015); Debra Cassens 
Weiss, Takings Clause Applies to Personal Property, SCOTUS Rules in ‘Major Blow’ to Set-
Aside Programs, A.B.A J. (June 22, 2015, 9:23 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/us_taking_of_personal_property_requires_compensat
ion_scotus_rules_in_major/.  See, e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469–70; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027–28; 
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 825; Loretto, 458 U.S. at 419, 441; Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 
105, 125; Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 397; Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 412. 
246. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2426; see also Weiss, supra note 245. 
247. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
248. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2419, 2426, 2429, 2432. 
249. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2419, 2423, 2429, 2432; 
Sterbenz, supra note 233. 
250. Medicare Levy Amendment Act, No. 16 (1996) (Austl.). 
251. Id.; see also Larry Sharpe, Australia’s Landmark Gun Reforms:  The 
Aftermath of the Port Arthur Massacre, HUFFINGTON POST AUSTL. (Apr. 28, 2016, 6:30 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com.au/2016/04/28/port-arthur-gun-reform_n_9717980.html. 
252. Medicare Levy Amendment Act, No. 16; Sharpe, supra note 251. 
253. See Eric P. Dolce, To Keep and Bear Arms:  Reconciling Firearms and 
the Public Health After Heller and McDonald, 15 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 155, 169 (2012). 
254. Rick Orlov, Gun Buyback Nets 1,500 Weapons — and Debate Over 
Program’s Value, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 16, 2013, 3:54 PM), 
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December 14, 2013, the one-year anniversary of the Sandy Hook massacre, 
California held a statewide gun-buyback program where more than 1500 
firearms were voluntarily surrendered.255  Further, the New Jersey Attorney 
General’s Office launched a gun buyback initiative in 2012.256  Through this 
initiative, ten events have been conducted where approximately 16,000 
firearms, including 7300 handguns and 1900 illegal guns were received.257 
Therefore, buyback programs could be implemented for guns that 
are made illegal—such as assault weapons—and voluntary ones can 
encourage citizens to turn in legal guns.258  The United States would be 
required to pay just compensation for the guns in order to satisfy the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment,259 which is plausible from what has been 
done with voluntary programs in various states.260 
D. Universal Background Checks 
Regardless of whether or not the United States implements a ban on 
assault weapons and introduces a buyback program, the United States should 
close the gun show loophole and require background checks for all gun sale 
purchases, as Australia has done.261 
                                                                                                                   
http://www.dailynews.com/government-and-politics/20131216/gun-buyback-nets-1500-
weapons-x2014-and-debate-over-programs-value; see also Kate Mather, LAPD Collects 
Nearly 780 Firearms in Latest Gun Buyback Event, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2014, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/crime/la-me-gun-buyback-20141216-story.html. 
255. Id. 
256. Press Release, Governor Chris Christie, Fighting to Keep New Jersey Safe 
(June 7, 2013); Marli Horwitz, Gun Buyback in Hudson, Union Counties Brings in 1,600 
Weapons, NJ.COM (July 16, 2013, 5:05 PM), 
http://www.nj.com/hudson/index.ssf/2013/07/gun_buyback_in_hudson_union_counties_bring
s_in_almost_1600_weapons.html; Record Number of Weapons Obtained Through Gun 
Buyback Initiative in Camden County, CNBNEWS.NET (Dec. 19, 2012, 6:15 PM), 
http://www.gloucestercitynews.net/clearysnotebook/2012/12/attorney-general-chiesa-
announces-record-number-of-weapons-obtained-through-gun-buyback-initiative-in-camden-
county-click-o.html. 
257. See Press Release, Governor Chris Christie, supra note 256; Horwitz, 
supra note 256; Record Number of Weapons Obtained Through Gun Buyback Initiative in 
Camden County, supra note 256. 
258. See Press Release, Governor Chris Christie, supra note 256; Horwitz, 
supra note 256; Record Number of Weapons Obtained Through Gun Buyback Initiative in 
Camden County, supra note 256. 
259. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 
(2005). 
260. See Horwitz, supra note 256; Mather, supra note 254; Orlov, supra note 
254; Record Number of Weapons Obtained Through Gun Buyback Initiative in Camden 
County, supra note 256. 
261. See Buchanan, supra note 175, at 19–20. 
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Although not flawless, NICS “has prevented more than two million 
convicted felons and other prohibited purchasers from buying guns.”262  The 
law also provides a deterrent to prohibited purchasers who “are less likely to 
try to buy guns when they know comprehensive background check 
requirements are in place.”263  The United States should also look into 
extending the waiting period from three days to at least twenty-eight days, 
like Australia.264  This can allow for a more thorough background check and 
a cooling-off period.265 
Even though there are not any legal restrictions to implementing 
universal background checks, initiatives to pass a law on the issue have not 
been successful.266  In April of 2013, a few months after the shooting at 
Sandy Hook Elementary School, a bipartisan proposal from Senators Joe 
Manchin, Democrat of West Virginia, and Pat Toomey, Republican of 
Pennsylvania, was rejected in a fifty-four to forty-six vote.267  This 
legislation would have expanded background checks to cover all firearms 
sales at gun shows and online.268 
One explanation for the inability to pass a universal background 
check law is the unyielding power of the National Rifle Association 
                                                 
262. Universal Background Checks, CSGV, 
http://www.csgv.org/issues/universal-background-checks/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2017); see also 
Background Check Procedures, L. CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, 
http://www.smartgunlaws.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/gun-dealer-sales/background-check-
procedures/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2017); Miles Kohrman & Jennifer Mascia, Everything You 
Need to Know About Federal Background Checks, TRACE (July 11, 2015), 
http://www.thetrace.org/2015/07/background-checks-nics-guns-dylann-roof-charleston-
church-shooting. 
263. Universal Background Checks, supra note 262. 
264. See Buchanan, supra note 175, at 20–21; Sharpe, supra note 251. 
265. Sharpe, supra note 251; see also Background Check Procedures, supra 
note 262. 
266. Ted Barrett & Tom Cohen, Senate Rejects Expanded Gun Background 
Checks, CNN, www.cnn.com/2013/04/17/politics/senate-guns-vote (last updated Apr. 18, 
2013); see also Background Check Procedures, supra note 262; Universal Background 
Checks, supra note 262. 
267. Barrett & Cohen, supra note 266; Laura Matthews, Background Checks 
Bill Rejected by Senate by 54-46, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2013, 4:40 PM), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/background-checks-bill-rejected-senate-54-46-1199553; Molly 
Moorhead, A Summary of the Manchin-Toomey Gun Proposal, POLITIFACT (Apr. 30, 2013, 
2:26 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2013/apr/30/summary-manchin-
toomey-gun-proposal/; John Whitesides & David Lawder, Senate Democratic Leader Reid 
Hits “Pause” on Gun-Control Bill, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Apr. 18, 2013), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-04-18/news/sns-rt-us-usa-gunsbre93f00d-
20130415_1_gun-legislation-gun-control-proposals-nevada-democrat. 
268. Barrett & Cohen, supra note 266; Matthews, supra note 267; Moorhead, 
supra note 269. 
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(“NRA”).269  The NRA was founded in 1871 and currently has over four 
million members.270  It has been referred to as the “most powerful lobbying 
group] in Washington.”271  The NRA contributed twenty-five million dollars 
of lobbying funds over the past fourteen years and plays a large role in the 
federal elections process.272  From 1990 to 2010, the NRA contributed over 
eighteen million dollars to congressional election campaigns.273  Nearly 85% 
of that money went solely to Republican candidates.274  This extensive 
                                                 
269. Barrett & Cohen, supra note 266; Matthews, supra note 267; see also A 
Brief History of the NRA, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N, http://home.nra.org/about-the-nra (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2017). 
270. A Brief History of the NRA, supra note 269; Fox Butterfield, Aggressive 
Strategy By N.R.A. Has Left Its Finances Reeling, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1995, at A1. 
271. Walter Hickey, How the NRA Became the Most Powerful Special Interest 
in Washington, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 18, 2012, 1:43 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/nra-
lobbying-money-national-rifle-association-washington-2012-12; see also James Surowiecki, 
Taking on the N.R.A., NEW YORKER (Oct. 19, 2015), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/10/19/taking-on-the-n-r-a#; US Gun Control:  
What Is the NRA and Why Is It So Powerful?, BBC (Jan. 8, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-35261394; Sarah Westwood, How Powerful Is the 
‘Gun Lobby?’, WASH. EXAMINER (Dec. 5, 2015, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/how-powerful-is-the-gun-lobby/article/2577699. 
272. See Chris Amico & Sarah Childress, How Loaded Is the Gun Lobby?, 
FRONTLINE (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/how-loaded-is-the-
gun-lobby; Blake Ellis & Melanie Hicken, The Money Powering the NRA, CNNMONEY (Oct. 
15, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/news/cnnmoney-investigates/nra-funding-donors; Evan 
Horowitz, Gun Rights Lobbyists Netted 7 Times the Money as Gun Control Counterparts, 
BOSTON GLOBE (June 19, 2015), 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2015/06/19/tracking-influence-gun-rights-
lobby/wIdnirHWAqdHh6AslPXzGI/story.html; Elisabeth Parker, The NRA Gave These 9 
Senators Over $22 Million to Vote Down Gun Laws, REVERBPRESS (Dec. 6, 2015), 
http://reverbpress.com/politics/nra-pays-senators-millions/. 
273. Alan Berlow & Gordon Witkin, Gun Lobby’s Money and Power Still 
Holds Sway Over Congress, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 1, 2013, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2013/05/01/12591/gun-lobbys-money-and-power-still-holds-
sway-over-congress; Leigh Ann Caldwell, How the NRA Exerts Influence Beyond Political 
Contributions, NBC NEWS (June 15, 2016, 5:47 PM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/orlando-nightclub-massacre/nra-s-political-influence-far-
goes-beyond-campaign-contributions-n593051; National Rifle Ass’n, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/lookup2.php?strID=C00053553 (last visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
274. See Mike Spies & Sarah Ryley, NRA Spending More Money Than Ever, 
Only to Help Pro-Gun GOP, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 19, 2016, 9:47 PM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/nra-big-spending-stop-congress-enacting-gun-
safety-laws-article-1.2643408 [hereinafter NRA Spending More Money Than Ever, Only to 
Help Pro-Gun GOP]; Mike Spies & Sarah Ryley, The NRA’s New Campaign Math:  Pour 
More Money into Fewer Races, Defeat Democrats at Any Cost, THE TRACE (May 19, 2016), 
http://www.thetrace.org/2016/05/nra-election-campaign-spending [hereinafter The NRA’s New 
Campaign Math]; How the NRA Exerts Influence Over Congress, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/nra-congress. 
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lobbying has prevented legislators from exercising their ability to vote in 
favor of gun legislation that favors universal background checks.275  In 
contrast, Australia’s gun lobby—Sporting Shooters Association of 
Australia—has not experienced the strength or success of the NRA.276  They 
gained momentum in the early 1990s, but the Port Author Massacre shifted 
the public focus towards stricter gun laws and defused any attempt to reduce 
firearm restrictions.277 
However, even though the NRA pushed for an agenda that would not 
require universal background checks, numerous “[g]un owners . . . believe . . 
. the NRA is out of touch with them on [the] issues.”278  According to a 
survey: 
 
x 83[%] of gun owners nationally support criminal background 
checks on all sales of firearms, while only 14[%] of gun 
owners oppose them; 
x there is strong bipartisan agreement on the issue, with 90[%] 
of Democrat and 81[%] of Republican gun owners in support 
of background checks; . . .  
x 72[%] of NRA members support [universal background 
checks];  
x 79[%] of gun owners nationally want to see their politicians 
take action on this issue and require more gun sellers to 
conduct criminal background checks before they sell guns, 
while only 19[%] do not want to see their elected leaders act 
on this issue.279 
 
These statistics demonstrate that politicians need to start listening to 
what their constituents actually want when it comes to particular firearm 
regulations, such as background checks.280  Transitioning to background 
                                                 
275. See Tom Cahill, See How Much the NRA Paid Your Senator to Vote 
Against Gun Reform, U.S. UNCUT (June 21, 2016), http://usuncut.com/politics/see-how-much-
nra-paid-your-senator/. 
276. Will Oremus, How Many Shootings Will it Take for America to Control Its 
Guns?, SLATE: CRIME (Dec. 12, 2012, 10:00 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/crime/2012/12/16/gun_control_after_connecticut_shooting_could
_australia_s_laws_provide_a.html; see also Sporting Shooters’ Association of Australia, 
SSAA, http://www.ssaa.org.au/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
277. How Australia Dealt with Mass Shootings, supra note 173. 
278. Benton Strong, Release:  Gun Owners Overwhelmingly Support 
Background Checks, See NRA as Out of Touch, New Poll Finds, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 
(Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.americanprogress.org/press/release/2015/11/17/125618/release-
gun-owners-overwhelmingly-support-background-checks-see-nra-as-out-of-touch-new-poll-
finds/. 
279. Id. 
280. See Background Check Procedures, supra note 262. 
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checks for all firearm purchases would not be difficult to implement, as the 
systems to perform the checks are already in place and as background checks 
are required at licensed dealers.281  Therefore, the United States should 
follow in Australia’s footsteps and implement universal background checks. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
What is clear from the glaring statistics and media coverage of 
multiple mass shootings occurring at elevating rates in the United States is 
that the gun control issue needs to be tackled and new legislation 
implemented.  Members of federal and state legislators need to start a 
conversation on gun control and work collaboratively to establish policies 
that effectuate change.  The murder of innocent American citizens at the 
hands of those with firearms is an issue of national importance and should be 
a bipartisan one.  America’s culture and climate of gun ownership needs to 
be analyzed and reevaluated in order to spare the United States from another 
mass shooting tragedy.  Australia was able to implement sweeping legislative 
reform regarding gun control only twelve days after one mass shooting 
event.282  As discussed in this Article, the United States can effectively 
implement most of the Australian gun control legislation and should work 
towards making that a priority.283 
Take a moment to reflect on the following statement from former 
Australian Prime Minister John Howard, the conservative leader behind the 
Australian reform.284  Former Prime Minister Howard made the statement 
after visiting the United States in the wake of the Aurora, Colorado, 
shooting.285  In the Aurora shooting, a gunman dressed in tactical clothing 
entered a movie theater, where he set off tear gas grenades and shot into the 
audience with multiple firearms.286  Twelve people were killed and around 
seventy others were injured.287  The Prime Minister said: 
 
There is more to this than merely the lobbying strength of the 
National Rifle Association and the proximity of the November 
presidential election.  It is hard to believe that their reaction would 
have been any different if the murders in Aurora had taken place 
                                                 
281. Id. 
282. How Australia Dealt with Mass Shootings, supra note 173. 
283. See Howard, supra note 3; Masters, supra note 15; see also supra Parts 
VI-VII. 
284. See Oremus, supra note 276. 
285. Stanglin, supra note 237. 
286. Frosch & Johnson, supra note 5. 
287. Colo. Shooting DA Says Two Evaluations Found Holmes Sane, supra note 
5. 
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immediately after the election of either Obama or Romney.  So 
deeply embedded is the gun culture of the [United States] that 
millions of law-abiding Americans truly believe that it is safer to 
own a gun, based on the chilling logic that because there are so 
many guns in circulation, one’s own weapon is needed for self-
protection.  To put it another way, the situation is so far gone there 
can be no turning back.288 
 
In this statement, the former Prime Minister believes that America’s 
gun culture and attitude towards gun ownership is blinding the United States 
from being able to effectuate change.289  Instead of conceding to the belief 
that the United States will never be able to implement stricter gun control 
laws, the United States should set an example for the world and truly become 
“the land of the free” in reference to freedom from gun violence and fear. 
 
                                                 
288. Oremus, supra note 276. 
289. See id. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Emergency medicine is a relatively new medical specialty, and has 
gained popularity in the last decade for both its irreplaceable role in the 
healthcare system, as well as the numerous social, legal, and administrative 
developments that have emerged as a result of the field’s exponential 
                                                 
* Sai Balasubramanian is an M.D./J.D. dual degree candidate at the SIU 
School of Medicine and School of Law.  His areas of specialty outside of clinical medicine 
include corporate governance, healthcare administration, and health policy.  In his previous 
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and management related topics for various media outlets and professional organizations.  Sai 
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growth.1  Emergency medicine is defined by the American College of 
Emergency Physicians (“ACEP”) as “the medical specialty dedicated to the 
diagnosis and treatment of unforeseen illness or injury.”2  The actual 
rendering of emergency care proceeds with initially evaluating the patient; 
consulting with any specialists as required; issuing a diagnosis; providing 
treatment and performing any acute, stabilizing, or emergency procedures; 
and, finally, transferring the patient to the appropriate specialist for more 
acute care as needed.3  Emergency medicine was first recognized as an 
independent and standalone medical specialty in 1979 by the American 
Board of Medical Specialties (“ABMS”), which acknowledged the need for 
dedicated emergency training and care.4  Moreover, physician organizations 
and universities around the country started to become aware of the increasing 
trend of Emergency Department (“ED”) visits by the public, which further 
illustrated the need for specially trained physicians rather than physicians of 
other specialties filling in on a transient basis.5  Since then, emergency 
medicine as a field has continued to grow, and has shown increased demand 
both from the perspective of physician specialty choice as well as patient 
care.6  Regarding increased demand for emergency patient care, data as 
recent as 2009 reported “124 million [ED] visits [for that year], compared to 
[just] 90.3 million [visits] in 1996,” indicating a sharp 35% increase.7  
Notably, emergency services have also catered to the increasingly “aging 
population, with over 60 visits per 100 persons” correlating to individuals 
aged 75 years and older.8  In 2011 alone, a “National Hospital Ambulatory 
Medical Care Survey revealed that EDs in the United States saw more than 
                                                 
1. See Robert E. Suter, Emergency Medicine in the United States:  A 
Systemic Review, 3 WORLD J. EMERGENCY MED. 5, 6–9 (2012). 
2. Definition of Emergency Medicine, AM. C. EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, 
http://www.acep.org/Clinical---Practice-Management/Definition-of-Emergency-Medicine/ 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2017).  The ACEP is a professional organization of emergency medicine 
physicians in the United States, which is committed to developing, improving, and 
promulgating best practices in emergency care.  About ACEP, AM. C. EMERGENCY 
PHYSICIANS, http://www.acep.org/aboutus/about/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2017).  With more than 
30,000 physician members, the organization is the leading advocate for emergency physicians.  
Id. 
3. Definition of Emergency Medicine, supra note 2. 
4. AAEM History, AM. ACAD. EMERGENCY MED., 
http://www.aaem.org/about-aaem/aaem-history (last visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
5. See Suter, supra note 1, at 6, 9. 
6. See id. 
7. Id. at 9. 
8. Id. 
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136 million patient[s],” noting this figure to be the highest number of visits 
to date.9 
Accordingly, to meet the increasing demand for emergency 
physicians, the respective medical associations and education boards have 
made strong efforts to emphasize the specialized training of medical students 
for the field.10  Therefore, today there are over 160 board certified and 
accredited emergency medicine residency training programs available to 
medical students.11  There are also several certified and recognized 
fellowship or subspecialty options available to physicians that complete 
residency training in emergency medicine, intended for practitioners that 
want to pursue a specific course of study within emergency services.12  The 
most common of these include hyperbaric medicine, which entails training in 
the treatment of decompression and altitude based illnesses, and using 
hyperbaric chambers for therapeutic measures; ultrasound medicine, which 
trains physicians in using ultrasound technology as a diagnostic and 
treatment tool; wilderness medicine, which entails training to address natural, 
tropical, and wilderness based injuries; sports medicine, which trains 
physicians in preventing and diagnosing athletic and sports related injuries 
and the respective recovery therapies; medical toxicology, which entails 
training on how to diagnose and manage acute and immediate injuries related 
to poison or toxin exposure; and medical administrative fellowships, which 
focus on training physicians in the administrative and management functions 
of a hospital system.13  This emphasis on general emergency medicine 
training, as well as specialization in acute skills, is a direct response to an 
aging population, an increasing proclivity by the public to seek emergency 
room (“ER”) care, and a quickly growing general and primary care physician 
shortage.14  Accordingly, thanks to the growth, flexibility, and expansiveness 
                                                 
9. James J. Augustine, The Demand for Emergency Care, PHYSICIAN’S 
WKLY. (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.physiciansweekly.com/the-demand-for-emergency-care/. 
10. See Suter, supra note 1, at 9. 
11. Emergency Medicine, WASH. U. SCH. MED., 
http://residency.wustl.edu/CHOOSING/SPECDESC/Pages/EmergencyMedicine.aspx (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
12. Id.; see also Suter, supra note 1, at 9. 
13. Megan Boysen, Fellowship Opportunities in Emergency Medicine, 
AAEMRSA, http://www.aaemrsa.org/UserFiles/fellowship_opportunities_novdec08.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2017); Emergency Medicine, supra note 11. 
14. Suter, supra note 1, at 9–10; Christopher Cheney, Physician Shortage to 
Quadruple Within Decade, AAMC Says, HEALTHLEADERS MEDIA (Jan. 4, 2011), 
http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/physician-leaders/physician-shortage-quadruple-within-
decade-aamc-says?nopaging=1.  The report determines that the American healthcare system 
will reach a shortage of 91,500 physicians by 2020.  Cheney, supra.  Specifically, as 
mentioned in the HealthLeaders Media Article, the Association of American Medical Colleges 
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of the field, emergency medicine has become a comprehensive, necessary, 
and vital discipline of medicine in society.15 
As with any other field of medicine, legislative bodies, regulatory 
agencies, and the judicial system have independently and collaboratively 
designed intricate frameworks and laws to try and keep up with the 
expansion of emergency medicine.16  The need for these frameworks is 
critical, as the field inherently entails a wide spectrum of services, ranging 
from the front lines of general medical care, all the way to disaster 
management and public health crises.17  These frameworks, congruent to the 
field’s growth and graduation to an independent specialty, have been 
promulgated in order to protect both the community and the respective 
healthcare providers.18  However, while many of these frameworks and legal 
developments have indeed achieved their promises of helping fuel and grow 
the field while protecting the public and the providers, others have 
unequivocally stifled progress, and have made the actual delivery and 
execution of emergency care unnecessarily onerous.19 
The purpose of this Article is to provide an examination of two such 
legal areas, which have significantly affected the field of emergency 
medicine.20  These areas are:  1) malpractice/negligence frameworks in 
emergency medicine and 2) the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor 
Act (“EMTALA”).21 
The reasons for focusing on these two issues is multifold.  Most of 
the scholarship centered around legal medicine topics has increasingly 
become narrowed down to specific case scenarios or particular practice area 
pain points, especially on subjects which have resulted in significant legal 
outcomes or have raised novel ethical questions.22  While these subjects are 
vital in promoting the discussion of intricate legal issues, as related to the 
nuances in the practice of medicine, there is also a critical need to reengage 
conversation and continuously reconsider larger legal frameworks and issues 
as well, especially given that the field of medicine is in a particularly 
dynamic growth and development period globally.23 
                                                                                                                   
(“AAMC”) predicts an overall need of approximately 45,000 primary care specialists— 
reflecting the general primary care crisis—and 46,000 surgeons and medical specialists.  Id. 
15. See Suter, supra note 1, at 9–10. 
16. Id. at 6–7. 
17. See Boysen, supra note 13. 
18. See Suter, supra note 1, at 7–10. 
19. See infra Section II.C. 
20. See infra Parts II–III. 
21. See infra Parts II–III. 
22. See infra Part II. 
23. See infra Part II. 
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Therefore, this Article takes a hybrid approach.  The first part of this 
Article addresses a relatively dormant, yet expansive, area of legal 
scholarship in the recent years, providing a macroscale view of the 
development, nuances, and impact of ER malpractice and negligence 
frameworks.24  While whitepapers and court cases on this topic are 
numerous, the fact remains that there has been a shift away from the larger 
perspective of how malpractice in emergency medicine has transformed over 
the years, and if there is a need to revisit the system to enact change in this 
arena.25  The second portion of this Article is focused on issues regarding 
EMTALA, which is specific legislation that has had significant impacts on 
both emergency medicine providers and larger hospital systems, both of 
which are ultimately accountable to patients and financial stakeholders.26  
EMTALA has been a household name for hospitals and emergency 
physicians for a few decades, but remains contentious with regards to its 
financial, legal, and value-based costs.27  These areas of contention and the 
nuances of the legislation deserve revived analysis, as EMTALA continues 
to affect healthcare from both microscopic and systemic perspectives.28 
Overall, this Article serves to review both of these topics in order to 
provide an in-depth analysis of their impacts on emergency medicine, 
propose potential solutions for identified problem areas, and speculate what 
future practitioners can expect of these issues.29 
II. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND NEGLIGENCE IN EMERGENCY 
MEDICINE 
A. What Exactly Is Medical Malpractice/Negligence? 
Medical negligence—also known as medical malpractice—entails a 
suit against a physician, which comports with the traditional legal elements 
of negligence.30  For a plaintiff to be successful in a suit against a physician, 
he or she must prove a duty, a breach of duty, causation of harm as a result of 
the breach of duty, and damages.31  In medical terms, the patient must first 
                                                 
24. See infra Part II. 
25. See infra Sections II.B–E. 
26. See infra Part III. 
27. See infra Section III.B. 
28. See infra Sections III.B–C. 
29. See infra Parts II–IV. 
30. B. Sonny Bal, An Introduction to Medical Malpractice in the United 
States, 467 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED RES. 339, 340 (2009); Peter Moffett & 
Gregory Moore, The Standard of Care:  Legal History and Definitions:  The Bad and Good 
News, 12 WESTERN J. EMERGENCY MED. 109, 109 (2011). 
31. Bal, supra note 30, at 342; Moffett & Moore, supra note 30, at 109. 
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prove that the physician had a duty to treat.32  This is essentially established 
in accordance with the patient-physician relationship, when a physician 
agrees to take on a patient and begin the diagnostic process.33  Whereas, for 
most other specialties, this is a matter of choice—an emergency physician’s 
right of refusal is extremely limited and, therefore, will often meet this prong 
of the negligence test by default, especially in an ER context.34  The second 
prong of negligence requires that there is a breach of duty.35  Essentially, this 
requires the patient to prove that the physician fell short of the standard of 
care, the same standard that would have been afforded to a similarly situated 
patient presenting a similar medical issue.36  The definition of the standard of 
care has evolved over time, leaving physicians with mixed results and 
thresholds by which they can gauge the care that they provide.37  However, it 
is generally accepted in modern litigation that the standard of care is 
established by employing the knowledge and the methods an average, 
congruently situated physician would have employed given a similar context 
and set of circumstances—hence, what a reasonable physician in the same 
situation would have done.38  The third prong requires a showing of 
causation.39  That is, the patient has to show that there was a causal 
relationship and a direct link between the physician’s breach of duty and the 
                                                 
32. Bal, supra note 30, at 342. 
33. Regina A. Bailey, The Litigators Lions Pit:  The Top 10 Medical 
Malpractice Issues Every Resident Should Know, EMRA, 
http://www.emra.org/publications/whats-up/the-litigators-lions-pit--the-top-10-medical-
malpractice-issues-every-resident-should-know/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2017); Bal, supra note 
30, at 342. 
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1) (2015); David A. Ansell & Robert L. 
Schiff, Patient Dumping: Status, Implications, and Policy Recommendations, 257 JAMA 
1500, 1500–01 (1987); Bailey, supra note 33.  See discussion below regarding an emergency 
physician’s responsibility to treat per the EMTALA of 1986.  See infra Section II.B. 
35. Bal, supra note 30, at 342; Moffett & Moore, supra note 30, at 109. 
36. Bal, supra note 30, at 342; Moffett & Moore, supra note 30, at 109. 
37. See Moffett & Moore, supra note 30, at 109, 112. 
38. Bal, supra note 30, at 342; Moffett & Moore, supra note 30, at 109, 112.  
Standard of care and negligence, in general, are not limited to medical malpractice, but are 
legal terms of art used expansively in tort actions.  Bal, supra note 30, at 340.  Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines negligence as “[t]he failure to exercise the standard of care that a 
reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar situation.”  Negligence, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  To bring a successful claim of negligence, a plaintiff has 
to prove the same elements discussed:  duty, breach of that duty, causation, and damages.  Bal, 
supra note 30, at 342; Moffett & Moore, supra note 30, at 109; see also Archive of What Is 
the Medical Standard of Care?, NOLO: MED. MALPRACTICE, 
http://www.webarchive.org/web/20161127091821/http://www.medicalmalpractice.com/resour
ces/medical-standard-of-care.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
39. Bal, supra note 30, at 342. 
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injury faced by the patient.40  The final prong, damages, is typically the 
category that determines the compensation award that is granted as a result 
of the suit.41  This is where the plaintiff has an opportunity to show the extent 
of damages the harm has caused him or her.42  The extent of damages caused 
will take into account a variety of factors, including economic and non-
economic losses, which may entail categories ranging from lost income and 
wages, to the need for future medical care, to pain and suffering.43 
While the above standards dictate the general parameters which 
define a malpractice suit, individual states mandate the specific nuances 
behind personal injury cases and the respective negligence claims.44 
B. Medical Malpractice in the ER 
Emergency medicine, inherently based on real-time, unplanned, and 
immediate decisions, is a breeding ground for potential medical errors, and 
must comply with the same negligence standards—discussed above—as all 
other medical specialties.45  Given the nature of the field, emergency 
physicians often do not have the time to assert their decisions based on the 
full calculus of context and history, but rather they are forced to make 
spontaneous calls to mitigate trauma and damage as much as possible.46 
                                                 
40. Id.  Causation, as a legal principal, has many different splits.  See But-for 
Cause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Proximate Cause, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Superseding Cause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
The most commonly used versions entail but-for causation or proximate causation.  See But-
for Cause, supra; Proximate Cause, supra.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines but-for causation 
as “[t]he cause without which the event could not have occurred.”  But-for Cause, supra.  
Proximate causation is defined as “[a] cause that is legally sufficient to result in liability.”  
Proximate Cause, supra.  For negligence claims generally, showing a superseding cause can 
null causation by a party.  See Superseding Cause, supra.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines a 
superseding cause as “[a]n intervening act or force that the law considers sufficient to override 
the cause for which the original tortfeasor was responsible, thereby exonerating that tortfeasor 
from liability.”  Id. 
41. Bal, supra note 30, at 342. 
42. See id. at 340. 
43. Id.  Aside from damages accounted for economic and non-economic 
losses, courts may also sometimes grant punitive damages, in cases of extreme recklessness or 
wanton negligence.  Id. at 342.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines punitive damages as 
“[d]amages awarded in addition to actual damages when the defendant acted with 
recklessness, malice, or deceit; specif[ically], damages assessed by way of penalizing the 
wrongdoer or making an example to others.”  Punitive Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014). 
44. See Bal, supra note 30, at 340; Moffett & Moore, supra note 30, at 112. 
45. See Moffett & Moore, supra note 30, at 109. 
46. See AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, EMERGENCY 
SEVERITY INDEX (ESI): A TRIAGE TOOL FOR EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT CARE 1 (2012); Moffett 
& Moore, supra note 30, at 109. 
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This elevated level of acuity also has to be balanced with a constant 
inflow of patients into the ER, often which the physicians themselves cannot 
control.47  Various methods of the triage process aid this balancing act.48  
Often utilizing mid-level staff, initial and brief assessments are conducted on 
incoming patients to determine the severity of their issues, which are then 
used to index patients in the hierarchy of workflow for the attending—
supervising—physician.49  This triage process is essential to both the overall 
inflow metrics and quality of care standards of an ER.50  Allowing physicians 
to prioritize which patients to see first provides primary attention to the most 
severe problems and also keeps the throughput of the hospital flowing so that 
patients can be assessed, treated, and discharged in an organized and efficient 
manner.51  There have been important efforts and initiatives made towards 
standardizing this process, so as to expand and promote ER management and 
efficiency uniformly across the country.52  In addition to maintaining an 
efficient ER, physicians also have to simultaneously worry about 
professional metrics, such as patient per hour (“PPH”) rates, which are 
commonplace in ERs around the country as viable metrics to determine the 
efficacy of physician performance.53  Ultimately, this variety of factors and 
pressures places an inordinate burden on emergency physicians to master 
                                                 
47. See AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, supra note 46, at 1. 
48. See id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. See AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, supra note 46, at 1.  
“The Emergency Nurses Association (“ENA”) and the [ACEP] formed a Joint Triage Five 
Level Task Force in 2002 to review the literature and make a recommendation for EDs 
throughout the United States regarding which triage system should be used.”  Id. 
53. Howard Ovens, WTBS 4 — Emergency Physician Speed:  How Fast Is 
Fast Enough?, EMERGENCY MED. CASES (Sept. 22, 2015), 
http://www.emergencymedicinecases.com/emergency-physician-speed-how-fast-is-fast-
enough.  Dr. David Petrie, an emergency physician and trauma team leader, notes in the same 
article: 
[PPH] rates have long been used in Emergency Medicine as a rough guide to 
determine emergency physician (“EP”) “productivity” and to compare individual 
workloads—relative to peers in the same work environment.  Indeed, PPH rates are 
a component of fee-for-service (“FFS”) and other volume-based payment systems.  
While there is a speed versus quality of care trade-off for the individual patient 
being treated—being too fast can compromise patient safety—there is also a speed 
versus quality of care trade-off for the patients waiting:  If I am moving too slowly, 
I am compromising the care of those who are “Waiting to be Seen.”  Ideally, 
individually, we should be aiming for that “Goldilocks” optimized PPH rate—not 
too fast and not too slow. 
Id. 
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their diagnosis and decision-making skills in the face of a consistently 
uncertain patient population.54 
Regarding the difficulties of patient evaluation in an ER setting, 
studies have shown that decision-making processes condense to two primary 
categories, both of which become especially pertinent when confronted with 
traumatic stimulus.55  The first, the intuitive/reflexive approach, is centered 
around pattern recognition, and becomes second nature to the physician over 
years of reflecting on the same patient presentations, though it has a 
proclivity for error in judgment.56  The second is the analytical/problem 
solving approach, which involves higher levels of critical thinking and 
evaluation based on context and permissible alternatives; this method has 
been shown to be far more reliable in terms of preventing medical errors for 
the simple fact that it gives a physician time to work through the problem 
solving method for the issue at hand.57  Both methodologies have their 
benefits and are used in various ER settings.58 
Take, for example, a patient that arrives with a fall injury, 
complaining of arm pain and presenting no other immediate symptoms or 
wounds.  This patient can likely afford the physician taking the 
analytical/problem solving approach.59  Here, the nurse evaluates the patient, 
determines his placement in the pain/triage scale, and hands him off to the 
physician who can then do an initial evaluation, order tests, review the 
results, and prescribe the pertinent treatment to qualify the patient for 
discharge.60  Contrast this with a trauma situation, which is equally likely to 
be presented to an ER physician.61  The same patient enters except now he or 
she arrives in an ambulance, bleeding out from his or her arm, and is not able 
to provide any context or history of the incident, as the patient is 
unconscious.  Here, the physician will likely revert to a combination of both 
the reflexive and problem solving methods, resorting to pattern recognition 
to determine the closest case in his repertoire to create an immediate 
diagnosis plan, while balancing it with the problem solving method to 
determine if that plan of action is best, given the current emergency.62  
                                                 
54. See id. 
55. See Anton Helman, Episode 11:  Cognitive Decision Making and Medical 
Error, EMERGENCY MED. CASES (Feb. 4, 2011), 
http://www.emergencymedicinecases.com/episode-11-cognitive-decision-making-medical-
error/. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. See id. 
59. See id. 
60. See AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, supra note 46, at 1. 
61. Id. at 10. 
62. See Helman, supra note 55. 
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However, given the immediate trauma and circumstances of the presenting 
patient, this decision-making and balancing process must happen in a 
fraction of the time as compared to the first, broken-arm patient scenario.63 
It is important to note that the underlying principal of both the above 
scenarios still relies on the physician’s competence to pull from his or her 
clinical knowledge base.64  Evidence-based diagnostic decision making plays 
a significant role in patient recovery, and is intended to: 
 
[(1)] [m]ake the ethical care of the patient its top priority; [(2)] 
[d]emand [individualized] evidence in a format that clinicians and 
patients can understand; [(3)] [u]se expert [judgment] rather than 
mechanical rule following; [(4)] [s]hare decisions with patients 
through meaningful conversations; [(5)] [c]ommunicate risk whilst 
incorporating the patient’s values; and [(6)] [a]pply these 
principles at the community level for evidence based public 
health.65 
 
These inherently heavy balancing factors are important aspects to 
consider when broaching the subject of emergency medicine malpractice.66  
The discussion must also be premised with the fact that while almost every 
other specialty gets to choose exactly what walks into the door on a given 
day, emergency medicine is unique in that attending physicians have no idea 
what could present itself during a given shift.67  There are no appointments 
made, or rosters of patients that the physician can view before doing rounds 
for the day.68  This lack of patient choice impacts both the clinical decision-
making ability and the care delivery process for emergency physicians.69  
Furthermore, given the nature of emergency care, physicians cannot turn 
patients away from ERs unlike other specialties, which can refuse patients 
                                                 
63. See id. 
64. See id. 
65. Anton Helman, Episode 62: Diagnostic Decision Making in Emergency 
Medicine, EMERGENCY MED. CASES (Apr. 14, 2015), 
http://www.emergencymedicinecases.com/diagnostic-decision-making-in-emergency-
medicine/. 
66. See id.; Walter Kuhn, Malpractice and Emergency Medicine, AUGUSTA 
U., http://www.augusta.edu/mcg/clerkships/em/documents/malpracticeandem.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2017). 
67. Marc Gorelick, Pediatric Primary Care in the ER:  Is It Better Than 
Waiting for an Appointment?, 8 AMA J. ETHICS 717, 718 (2006). 
68. See id. 
69. See id. at 719–20. 
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based on potential malpractice, the evaluated risk, profitability margins, the 
effort of care required, and numerous other metrics of their own choice.70 
C. Impacts and Effects 
Emergency medicine malpractice rates can be as high as 20% of all 
the claims that a hospital faces, second only to surgery and obstetrics.71  In a 
study of malpractice premiums as determinants of high-risk medical 
specialties, emergency medicine was identified as a top five-risk specialty, 
among surgery, obstetrics/gynecology, anesthesiology, and radiology.72  A 
similar study based on defensive medicine in high-risk specialties once again 
identified emergency medicine as a top six contender, only after four other 
surgical specialties and radiology.73  Given the heavy procedural aspects of 
the surgical specialties, one would reasonably expect the margins of error to 
be higher for surgery than a medical specialty such as emergency medicine.74  
However, one can likely account for the similar rates in emergency medicine 
due to the difficult nature of the diagnosis, decision-making, and treatment 
processes discussed above.75 
Furthermore, failure to diagnose, lack of timely diagnosis, or 
improper diagnosis, contributes to a significant portion of the malpractice 
claims, accounting for nearly 57% of emergency medicine claims.76  These 
claims demonstrate the prevalence of malpractice related to the inability of 
the physician to be able to attend to his or her patients in a timely and 
attentive manner—bringing light to the fact that overcrowded ERs somewhat 
                                                 
70. EMTALA, AM. C. EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, http://www.acep.org/news-
media-top-banner/emtala (last visited Apr. 9, 2017).  ERs cannot refuse patients who are in 
need of emergency medical care, per the EMTALA of 1986.  Id.  This Article also discusses 
EMTALA in detail, and the consequences it poses for emergency medicine as a whole.  See 
infra Part III. 
71. Kuhn, supra note 66. 
72. Aaron E. Carroll & Jennifer L. Buddenbaum, High and Low-Risk 
Specialties Experience with the U.S. Medical Malpractice System, 13 BMC HEALTH SERVICES 
RES. 465, 465 (2013). 
73. David M. Studdert et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Specialist 
Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 JAMA 2609, 2610 (2005); see also 
Carroll & Buddenbaum, supra note 72. 
74. See Carroll & Buddenbaum, supra note 72.  Here, the differentiation 
between a surgical specialty and a medical specialty refers to the former involving procedural 
or invasive techniques, while the latter is centered on medication and less-invasive treatment 
methods.  See id. 
75. See supra Section II.B. 
76. THE DOCTORS CO., EMERGENCY MEDICINE: CLOSED CLAIMS STUDY 
(2015), 
http://www.thedoctors.com/ecm/groups/public/@tdc/@web/@kc/@patientsafety/documents/a
rticle/con_id_004776.pdf. 
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contribute to malpractice.77  Claims against emergency physicians are five 
times more likely to occur if the patient waited more than thirty minutes to 
be seen by the physician.78  This systemic issue has no waning in sight, as the 
number of ER visits nationally have increased, while the available resources 
and ERs remain stagnant or slowly decline; from 1990 to 2009, it was found 
that “the number [of] hospital-based ERs in non-rural areas decreased by 
27% . . . [while] the number of ER visits increased [by] 44%.”79  
Understandably, the more crowded an ER gets, the less time the physician 
has available to spend with each patient.80  Given the limited supply of staff, 
this also means less time with mid-level staff per patient.81  In turn, this leads 
to quicker triaging methods and the expediting of an already spontaneous 
decision-making process—all culminating in a higher likelihood of 
misdiagnosis or diagnostic error.82  A report by the Government Accounting 
Office (“GAO”) found that patients in the ER who were designated to the 
sickest triage category—those deemed to be a priority to be seen by the 
physician—were on average waiting twice the recommended length to be 
seen by an attending physician, due to physician and staff unavailability.83  
Further studies by Academic Emergency Medicine correlated overcrowding 
“to increased in-hospital mortality rates and delays in timely treatments for 
conditions such as acute pain and pneumonia,” problems which are likely 
easily resolvable when provided with the full attention and time of an 
experienced attending physician under normal circumstances.84  Related 
studies in Canada showed “that reducing ER length of stay by [one] hour 
could decrease the number of deaths in high-risk patients by 6.5% and by 
almost 13% in lower-risk patients.”85  Hence, the impact of overcrowding on 
patient care is empirically evident.86  In this regard, emergency medicine 
physicians are automatically placed on the lower end of the playing field 
                                                 
77. See AM. COLL. OF EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT 
CROWDING:  HIGH-IMPACT SOLUTIONS 8 (2008). 
78. Id. 
79. Robert A. Barish et al., Emergency Room Crowding:  A Marker of 
Hospital Health, 123 TRANSACTIONS AM. CLINICAL & CLIMATOLOGICAL ASS’N 304, 305 
(2012).  The study found that the number of ER visits increased “from 88 million to 127 
million” per year, while the number of ERs decreased from 2446 to 1779 units.  Id. 
80. See AM. COLL. OF EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, supra note 77, at 8. 
81. See id. 
82. See id.; THE DOCTORS CO., supra note 76. 
83. Barish et al., supra note 79, at 307. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. See id. 
70
Nova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol41/iss2/1
2017] THE IMPACTS OF CURRENT MALPRACTICE FRAMEWORKS 193 
with an unfair advantage as compared to other medical specialties, given 
their inability to control their patient inflow and workload for a given shift.87 
These significant intricacies of emergency physician liability and 
malpractice are further compounded by the fact that there is not one federal 
standard by which these physicians can operate or tailor their care; rather, 
while the practice of medicine stays relatively the same across state lines, 
certain states may have personal injury laws more favorable than others.88  
This means that certain states become higher target locations for physicians 
to practice in.89  For example, a state like Tennessee, where from 1995 to 
2005 physicians saw liability premiums increase from 127% to 212%, would 
not be an attractive location for a physician to move to, knowing well that 
physicians there can expect high insurance premiums and costs.90  
Accordingly, in those same years, Tennessee saw a significant lack of 
providers available in the state’s ninety-five counties:  85% reported not 
having “a residing neurosurgeon in patient care,” 52% reported not having an 
“orthopedic surgeon in patient care,” 49% reported not having an emergency 
physician in patient care, and 44% reported not having an 
obstetrician/gynecologist in patient care.91  This lack of standardized metrics 
across state lines creates disparity in malpractice payments, eventually 
leading to systemic problems in a community’s access to healthcare.92  A 
study by The National Practitioner Data Bank found that the risk of 
malpractice payments ranges anywhere from “0.73% per physician, per year, 
in Alabama to a high 3.7% [for the same metric] in Wyoming.”93 
Due to this lack of accountability and standardization in liability, 
many emergency physicians are forced to practice defensive medicine, or the 
practice of medicine and the execution of medical decisions in fear of 
medical malpractice.94  Surveys indicate that 75% of physicians admit to 
ordering “more tests, procedures, and medicines” than medically relevant, 
purely to ensure protection against malpractice.95  This number is likely 
                                                 
87. See id. 
88. See 21 Reasons Why We Need Tort Reform Now:  The Case for States, 
AM. MED. NEWS (Mar. 20, 2006), 
http://www.amednews.com/article/20060320/opinion/303209987/4/. 
89. See id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Navid Fanaeian & Elizabeth Merwin, Malpractice:  Provider Risk or 
Consumer Protection?, 16 AM. J. MED. QUALITY 43, 43 (2001). 
94. Daniel P. Kessler et al., Impact of Malpractice Reforms on the Supply of 
Physician Services, 293 JAMA 2618, 2623 (2005). 
95. Hal Scherz & Wayne Oliver, Defensive Medicine:  A Cure Worse Than 
the Disease, FORBES (Aug. 27, 2013, 10:52 AM), 
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much higher in ERs, which are often the first points of contact for 
symptomatic patients.96  Accordingly, it was reported that between 2001 and 
2005, 50% of emergency physicians in California “were concerned with . . . 
malpractice litigation.”97  Two studies that were presented to the ACEP 
highlighted this trend of fear-based medical decision-making.98  One study 
concluded that the common driver of admitting cardiac patients through the 
ER was malpractice litigation, while the second study equally corroborated 
this statistic, indicating a significant “increase in admissions for [congestive 
heart failure] over a 14 year period,” which the authors of the study 
concluded was due to the increasing fears of litigation.99 
A noteworthy aspect of the former study by David Newman 
indicated that many emergency physicians accounted for their admissions 
based on legal concerns rather than the actual medical risk indicated by 
presenting coronary symptoms; many of these physicians also reported that 
they would not have chosen to be admitted to the hospital had they been in 
the position of the patients themselves.100  Overall, this fear and malpractice 
driven approach to patient care is “estimated to cost $46 billion annually.”101  
Most of these costs come directly from unnecessary patient admittance and 
hospitalization.102  The cost of defensive medicine extends across to 
increased harm for the patient as well.103  Putting the patient through 
unnecessary and burdensome tests and procedures will likely result in 
psychological and physical harm to the patient in the form of increased 
invasive procedures, the potential for false positives and the resulting 
anxiety, and the general “risk of physical injury to patients” due to the 
increased testing measures.104 
These onerous burdens created by emergency physician liability 
frameworks beg for reform.  It is neither sufficient, nor plausible, to fully 
                                                                                                                   
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/08/27/defensive-medicine-a-cure-worse-than-the-
disease/#16bbc259358f. 
96. See id. 
97. M. Sonal Sekhar & N. Vyas, Defensive Medicine:  A Bane to Healthcare, 
3 ANNALS MED. & HEALTH SCI. RES. 295, 295 (2013). 
98. Alicia Ault, Defensive Medicine a Factor in Cardiac Admissions, AM. C. 
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS (Dec. 2011), 
http://www.acep.org/MobileArticle.aspx?id=82885&coll_id=720&parent. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Michelle M. Mello et al., National Costs of the Medical Liability System, 
29 HEALTH AFF. 1569, 1574 (2010); Michael B. Rothberg et al., The Cost of Defensive 
Medicine on 3 Hospital Medicine Services, 174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1867, 1867 (2014). 
102. Rothberg et al., supra note 101, at 1868. 
103. See Lee Black, Effects of Malpractice Law on the Practice of Medicine, 9 
AMA J. ETHICS 437, 437–38 (2007). 
104. Id. at 438. 
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delegate protection of emergency physicians to the standard of care notion, 
hoping that negligence cases against the physicians will remain equitable and 
just by pursuing an analysis of what another emergency physician would 
have done in a similar situation.105  Proponents of this approach may argue 
that this method provides apt coverage and takes into account all the 
difficulties that these physicians specifically must work with.106  However, 
this method attempts to dismiss the frontline nature of emergency medicine 
and the inherently high burden of risk that practitioners of the field take onto 
themselves, instead of relying on a hindsight, “what should have been done” 
approach.107  The elevated, real-time decision-making and diagnostic burdens 
of emergency medicine make it non-conducive and inequitable for 
retrospective arbitration on the proper standard of care.108  Therefore, given 
these arduous burdens, one must ask:  Why should emergency medicine 
practitioners answer to the same standards of malpractice as every other 
medical specialty, rather than the sweeping, dynamic level of protection 
offered to them?109  What standards should be used to adjudicate on errors 
and mishaps in a field which is inherently centered on instantaneous 
decision-making?110 
D. Potential Solutions 
A sweeping movement towards some type of malpractice 
standardization across the nation is the concept of tort reform.111  Tort reform 
laws are state laws passed which limit the amount of money that can be 
received for non-economic damages as a result of tort actions, and 
sometimes also include limits on punitive damages.112  The purpose of these 
laws is to weed out overly exaggerated tort claims and retain legitimacy in 
negligence actions.113  Namely, many proponents state that tort reform is 
necessary to protect physicians from frivolous lawsuits and vital to keep 
                                                 
105. Id. at 438. 
106. See id. 
107. See id. at 437–39. 
108. See Black, supra note 103, at 437–39. 
109. See id. at 438. 
110. See id. 
111. See Greg Roslund, The Medical Malpractice Rundown:  A State-by-State 
Report Card, EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS MONTHLY (July 21, 2014), 
http://www.epmonthly.com/article/the-medical-malpractice-rundown-a-state-by-state-report-
card/; Andrea Clement Santiago, What is Tort Reform in a Medical Career?, VERYWELL, 
http://www.verywell.com/what-is-tort-reform-1736101 (last updated Aug. 14, 2016). 
112. Roslund, supra note 111; Santiago, supra note 111. 
113. Roslund, supra note 111; Santiago, supra note 111. 
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premiums down for both physicians and healthcare systems.114  Accordingly, 
it was found that states that enacted caps on their tort payouts, such as 
“California, Colorado, Kansas, and Texas” saw a significant decrease in 
malpractice litigation and malpractice premiums for physicians.115  In 
contrast, in places where tort reform was not enacted, such as “New York, 
[Washington] D.C., Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware,” litigation was 
commonplace and malpractice payouts were numerous.116  Texas especially 
has seen tremendous value in adopting this change.117  Since the tort reform 
adoption, litigation, paid claims, and premium prices have been almost cut in 
half in the state, while the demand for medical licenses has surged.118  “The 
Texas Medical Association reported that since 2003, the [year that tort 
reform legislation went into effect], more than 28,000 new physicians” have 
become licensed to practice in Texas.119  This accounts for nearly 3135 new 
physicians annually, over 770 more new physicians than the state saw on 
“average in the nine years prior to” the reform legislation.120  The state also 
boasts the country’s lowest malpractice payout per capita.121  Data indicates 
that since the reform legislation was enacted, “medical malpractice claims 
[and] lawsuits resolved in a [given] year [decreased] by nearly two-thirds” 
and that the “average payout declined [twenty-two] percent to 
[approximately] $199,000.”122  “[A]verage malpractice . . . premiums have 
[also] fallen 46[%]” in the state.123  In addition to payout rates, reforming the 
tort liability system, and limiting the number of frivolous claims, there are 
also significant positive benefits to community healthcare systems.124  
Namely, many physicians accounted for their departure from the practice of 
medicine due to high insurance liabilities; fortunately for Texas, tort reform 
measures helped revive the stamina for many to remain in practice, averting 
a significant healthcare access crisis.125  These effects were no different for 
                                                 
114. Roslund, supra note 111; Santiago, supra note 111. 
115. Roslund, supra note 111. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. 10 Years of Tort Reform in Texas Bring Fewer Suits, Lower Payouts, INS. 
J. (Sept. 3, 2013), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southcentral/2013/09/03/303718.htm. 
120. Id. 
121. Roslund, supra note 111. 
122. 10 Years of Tort Reform in Texas Bring Fewer Suits, Lower Payouts, 
supra note 119. 
123. Id. 
124. See id.; Roslund, supra note 111. 
125. See Crystal Zuzek, Gone to Texas, TEX. MED. ASS’N (Sept. 2013), 
http://www.texmed.org/Template.aspx?id=27834.  Albert Gros, M.D., Chief of Obstetrics and 
Gynecology at an Austin Center, reported that the hospital lost nearly one-third of its 
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emergency physicians, who reported higher confidence that the reform 
measures would “help decrease the cost of medicine over time” due to a 
decline in defensive medicine and decreased overcrowding due to 
unnecessary testing.126 
Other solutions entail increasing the standard of care threshold for 
negligence actions and state-law based tort claims against emergency 
physicians, considering their unique occupational burdens.127  Given the 
onerous decision-making processes explained above, the current threshold 
provides an overly low bar for patients to meet.128  Various increased 
threshold models could be implemented.129  One such model is for wider 
acceptance of the safe harbor method, which proposes that the threshold for 
the standard of care should be defined by established, pre-determined 
guidelines for a given medical situation, eliminating the need for expert 
witnesses, and instead imploring judges and juries to accept unambiguous 
and fixed guidelines as the conclusive standard of care.130  One iteration of 
this method in practice entails that if the physician documents his or her 
“adherence to evidence-based clinical-practice guidelines, [uses the] 
qualified health information-technology systems,” and uses the decision 
support systems, which provide guidelines for providers regarding diagnostic 
procedures and treatment protocols, then the physician would be entitled to 
use the same guidelines as the standard of care in any resulting litigation.131  
The American College of Surgeons notes that ultimately, established 
guidelines such as these could provide numerous benefits, eliminating 
ambiguity for providers and help increase the standardization of care 
provided for patients.132  The College further specifies: 
 
                                                                                                                   
obstetricians prior to reform legislation in 2003, due to the lack of economic feasibility with 
malpractice insurance; he also notes this drain in the physician pool created dire risk of lack of 
healthcare access, and that without the liability protections that tort reform offers, many 
physicians are “less willing to [treat] high-risk, uninsured patients.”  Id. 
126. Id. 
127. See id.; Zeke Emanuel et al., Reducing the Cost of Defensive Medicine, 
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 11, 2013, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/reports/2013/06/11/65941/reducing-the-
cost-of-defensive-medicine/. 
128. Zuzek, supra note 125. 
129. See Maxwell J. Mehlman, Medical Practice Guidelines as Malpractice 
Safe Harbors:  Illusion or Deceit?, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 286, 298–99 (2012); Emanuel et 
al., supra note 127. 
130. Mehlman, supra note 129, at 286, 297–98; see also Cecilia Ong & Allen 
Kachalia, Safe Harbors:  Liability Reform for Patients and Physicians, BULL. AM. C. 
SURGEONS (Mar. 2, 2013), http://bulletin.facs.org/2013/03/safe-harbors/. 
131. Emanuel et al., supra note 127; see also Mehlman, supra note 129, at 298. 
132. Ong & Kachalia, supra note 130. 
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By providing direct guidance for negligence 
determinations, safe harbors may help ameliorate some of the 
current ambiguities in today’s litigation system for both patients 
and providers.  At any stage in litigation, safe harbors can be a 
mechanism to facilitate rapid and accurate evaluation of claims for 
their merit.  Due to the fact that they are described and 
documented in advance of a case, safe harbors may actually help 
patients—and their attorneys—better evaluate whether a claim is 
worth bringing forward.133 
 
The availability of protection against tort claims for following 
approved standards may lead to greater standardization in care and better 
patient outcomes across the states as well.134  This standardization would also 
likely help quell issues of defensive medicine.135  If physicians are provided 
straightforward guidelines and the necessary steps to achieve and meet the 
standard of care required for a given patient, they will be less likely to order 
unnecessary procedures and tests, given the assurance that the guidelines will 
act as a safeguard for any breached standard of care claims.136 
However, an important component of implementing such a safe 
harbor system would have to entail wider latitude for the emergency 
medicine community.137  While established guidelines that dictate procedures 
and expected clinical outcomes work for scheduled patient visits and time-
insensitive medical issues, emergency situations cannot always be based on 
predictable guidelines or outcomes.138  While most other medical specialties 
commonly see atypical symptomatic presentations and pathology in non-
emergent circumstances, emergency medicine is forced to see these 
presentations in an extremely time-sensitive environment.139  Therefore, 
reconciling this unpredictability in clinical presentation with standardized 
diagnostic guidelines would require wide discretion given to the physician; 
otherwise, the guidelines will only stand to mitigate physician discretion and 
will ultimately degrade patient care.140 
One solution, which would maintain standardization while providing 
discretion, could be to create a Most Commonly Seen (“MCS”) system, 
which would entail the establishment of standardized guidelines for the most 
                                                 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. See id.; Emanuel et al., supra note 127; Zuzek, supra note 125. 
137. See Ong & Kachalia, supra note 130; Zuzek, supra note 125. 
138. See Ong & Kachalia, supra note 130. 
139. See Ong & Kachalia, supra note 130; Zuzek, supra note 125. 
140. See Ong & Kachalia, supra note 130. 
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common and typical presentations seen in an ER.141  This could be 
determined per local community standards, which would take into account 
local clinical outcomes and common emergencies that a community faces.142  
While these guidelines would establish the standard of care for a given 
community for a set of common presentations, novel presentations that do 
not fit into the MCS guidelines could remain as discretionary areas for the 
attending physician, providing latitude in the traditional manner for the 
physician to employ his judgment in developing the appropriate patient-
physician relationship and treatment plan.143  Though this may entail some 
form of defensive medicine, it will allow tailor-made solutions for otherwise 
rare presentations of symptoms.144  Implementing this type of safe harbor 
system will require intricate legal frameworks and a dynamic definition of 
the standard of care.145  The frameworks will have to provide increased 
attention to developing guidelines for standard situations, while providing 
physicians the discretion to use their medical judgment in an emergent and 
atypical medical situation.146 
E. Future Prospects 
Ultimately, whether the solution entails a modification of the 
standard of care for emergency medicine physicians, some type of dynamic 
safe harbor policy, or something as expansive as blanket liability protection, 
one thing is certain:  Emergency medicine as a field cannot be sustained so 
long as emergency physicians are forced to perform in environments which 
inherently force substandard cognitive capabilities, while simultaneously 
being offered zero to little elevated levels of liability protection.147  This 
failure to provide extra protection may ultimately create larger systemic 
problems, which will have ripple effects on the larger healthcare industry, 
specifically regarding the already desperate climate that healthcare is facing 
with the shortage of emergency physicians.148  Instead, lawmakers and 
                                                 
141. See Mehlman, supra note 129, at 288–89; Ong & Kachalia, supra note 
130. 
142. See Mehlman, supra note 129, at 288–89. 
143. See id.; Ong & Kachalia, supra note 130; Roslund, supra note 111. 
144. See Mehlman, supra note 129, at 288–89; Ong & Kachalia, supra note 
130. 
145. See Mehlman, supra note 129, at 288–89; Ong & Kachalia, supra note 
130. 
146. See Mehlman, supra note 129, at 288–89; Ong & Kachalia, supra note 
130. 
147. See Mehlman, supra note 129, at 286–87, 298. 
148. See Physician Shortages to Worsen Without Increases in Residency 
Training, ASS’N AM. MED. CS., 
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administrators should view this as a potential opportunity to incentivize the 
entry of more physicians into this field to help curtail some of the overall 
capacity and healthcare access problems. 
III. EMTALA 
A. A Brief History 
The EMTALA was sanctioned in 1986 as a part of a larger and more 
expansive piece of legislation named the Consolidated Omnibus 
Reconciliation Act.149  The intention behind the act was to ensure the 
provision of timely emergency medical services by ERs regardless of a 
patient’s ability to pay, and to mitigate the transferring of patients in need of 
emergency care to other hospitals purely for financial reasons.150  This 
practice of transferring patients quickly gained notoriety and became 
informally known as patient dumping, indicating the refusal of medical 
services to patients simply for financial or economic reasons.151  It was 
repeatedly found that this practice had been on the rise, as prior to 
EMTALA, there was no duty for physicians to treat individuals, and 
hospitals could blatantly refuse patients regardless of condition or status.152  
This blatant refusal policy created situations of extreme desperation and 
despair.153  The bleakest of scenarios ranged from refusing care to nearly 
fatal patients and transferring them to other institutions, to pregnant women 
                                                                                                                   
http://www.aamc.org/download/150584/data/physician_shortages_factsheet.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2017). 
149. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2015); EMTALA, AM. C. EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, 
http://www.acep.org/news-media-top-banner/emtala (last visited Apr. 9, 2017).  The coded 
section for this legislation, Title 42, section 1395dd of the United States Code, is actually 
named: “Examination and treatment for emergency medical conditions and women in labor.”  
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.  However, EMTALA is the short and popular title and the legislation is 
commonly known by and cited with this designation.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. 
150. Joseph Zibulewsky, The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor 
Act (EMTALA):  What It Is and What It Means for Physicians, 14 BAYLOR U. MED. CTR. 
PROC. 339, 339 (2001).  “The law’s initial intent was to ensure patient access to emergency 
medical care and to prevent the practice of patient dumping, in which uninsured patients were 
transferred, solely for financial reasons, from private to public hospitals without consideration 
of their medical condition or stability for the transfer.”  Id. 
151. Ansell & Schiff, supra note 34, at 1500.  Patient dumping specifically 
refers to the transfer from a private to a public hospital.  Id. 
152. Hines v. Adair Cty. Pub. Hosp. Dist. Corp., 827 F. Supp. 426, 432 (W.D. 
Ky. 1993). 
153. Emily Friedman, The Law That Changed Everything—and It Isn’t the One 
You Think, HOSP. & HEALTH NETWORKS (Apr. 5, 2011), 
http://www.hhnmag.com/articles/5010-the-law-that-changed-everything-and-it-isn-t-the-one-
you-think. 
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on the verge of giving birth in hospital parking lots, waiting to be admitted 
into the hospital for care.154  There were also public policy concerns, as a 
good number of the patients being dumped or transferred belonged to 
historically estranged classes, including those of minority races and those 
belonging to lower socio-economic classes.155  Increasing cost pressures on 
hospitals and health systems further exacerbated the situation, which paved 
way for hospitals to continue to take advantage of the right of refusal and 
only accept patients that were fiscally promising for the services provided to 
them.156  Ultimately, however, the hue and cry of the larger public policy 
concerns highlighted the pressing need for legislative changes and was 
instrumental in the eventual passing of EMTALA.157 
Congress intended EMTALA to be the solution to patient dumping 
and believed that the legislation would enforce a duty on physicians and ERs 
to at least provide enough care to stabilize patients in dire conditions, and 
then pursue appropriate transfer protocols if necessary.158  Congress also 
carefully designed the statute to require participation by all hospitals that 
receive federal funding through the Medicare program.159  While seemingly a 
limited condition, it is noteworthy to recognize that nearly 98% of hospitals 
fall under this category.160  Given that significant portions of hospital funding 
come from these federal sources, many hospitals are undoubtedly forced to 
abide by this statute.161 
                                                 
154. Id. 
155. Id.  “It should be added that the disturbing stories about improper transfers 
disproportionately involved patients who were members of minority groups, which raised both 
civil rights concerns and advocacy group ire.”  Id. 
156. See Gatewood v. Wash. Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 
1991).  “Reports of patient dumping rose in the 1980s, as hospitals, generally unencumbered 
by any state law duty to treat, faced new cost containment pressures combined with growing 
numbers of uninsured and underinsured patients.”  Id. 
157. Victoria K. Perez, EMTALA:  Protecting Patients First by Not Deferring 
to the Final Regulations, 4 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 149, 156 (2007) (quoting Cleland v. Health 
Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 268 (6th Cir. 1990)). 
158. Id. at 156–57 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 99-241, pt.1, at 27 (1985), as reprinted 
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 595).  “There have been reports of situations where treatment was 
simply not provided.”  H.R. REP. NO. 99-241, pt.1, at 27.  “In numerous other instances, 
patients in an unstable condition have been transferred improperly, sometimes without the 
consent of the receiving hospital.”  Id. 
159. Zibulewsky, supra note 150, at 340. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
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B. Provisions of the Statute 
The legislation contains a number of important stipulations.162  The 
first provision is the mandate for a medical screening examination (“MSE”), 
which requires that hospital ERs provide individuals an examination to 
determine if an emergency medical condition (“EMC”) exists upon the 
patient’s presentation to the ER, regardless of his or her financial status or 
ability to pay.163  The statute itself does not dictate the exact provisions of 
what an MSE should entail, but only dictates that the screening must be 
conducted under the hospital’s inherent capabilities and as deemed sufficient 
to determine if an EMC exists.164  Generally, practitioners have accepted this 
stipulation to mean that the MSE must be able to identify an EMC and must 
ensure the same standard of care that would be provided to a similarly 
situated patient.165  Therefore, as long as there is no disparity between the 
assessment offered to the EMTALA patient and any other patient, and the 
screening provided is capable of revealing any critical issues, a physician 
would be considered as compliant with the statute.166  The statute does not 
protect patients against misdiagnosis but only against disparate treatment.167  
Instead, courts have deferred any misdiagnosis claims or mistakes during the 
treatment process to traditional state malpractice law.168 
                                                 
162. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2015). 
163. Id. § 1395dd(a). 
164. Id. 
165. Correa v. Hosp. S.F., 69 F.3d 1184, 1192 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing Baber 
Hosp. v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 879 (4th Cir. 1992); Gatewood v. Wash. 
Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). 
A hospital fulfills its statutory duty to screen patients in its [ER] if it provides for a 
screening examination reasonably calculated to identify critical medical conditions 
that may be afflicting symptomatic patients and provides that level of screening 
uniformly to all those who present substantially similar complaints.  The essence of 
this requirement is that there be some screening procedure, and that it be 
administered even-handedly. 
Id. (citations omitted) (citing Barber, 977 F.2d at 879; Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1041). 
166. See Correa, 69 F.3d at 1192 (citing Brooks v. Md. Gen. Hosp., 996 F.2d 
708, 711 (4th Cir. 1993); Barber, 977 F.2d at 879; Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1041). 
167. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd; Vickers v. Nash Gen. Hosp., Inc., 78 F.3d 139, 
141 (4th Cir. 1996). 
168. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd; Vickers, 78 F.3d at 141. 
Upholding appellant’s EMTALA claims would eviscerate any distinction between 
EMTALA actions and state law actions for negligent treatment and misdiagnosis.  
Under appellant’s reasoning, every claim of misdiagnosis could be recast as an 
EMTALA claim, contravening Congress’ intention and this circuit’s repeated 
admonition that EMTALA not be used as a surrogate for traditional state claims of 
medical malpractice. 
Vickers, 78 F.3d at 141; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. 
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The statute also dictates that necessary measures must be taken by 
the hospital to stabilize a patient with an identified EMC.169  This entails that 
the hospital either provide the requisite care to manage the symptoms, or as 
the second part of the statute mentions, to transfer the patient to another 
hospital or facility that can provide the requisite care, after obtaining the 
proper patient consent as dictated by the statute.170  Refusal for treatment is 
also covered:  Hospitals are deemed to be compliant as long as stabilizing 
medical treatment is offered and the hospital takes reasonable measures to 
document the patient’s refusal of care.171 
Expounding on the transfer element, a patient who has not been 
stabilized may not be transferred to another facility without meeting certain 
stipulations.172  These include that either the patient requests the transfer, or a 
provider determines that “based upon the information available at the time of 
transfer, the medical benefits reasonably expected from the provision of 
appropriate medical treatment at another medical facility outweigh the 
increased risks to the individual and, in the case of labor, to the unborn child 
from effecting the transfer.”173  The transfer must also be deemed to be an 
appropriate transfer—meaning that the receiving facility has both available 
space and consents to the transfer of the patient, the receiving facility obtains 
all pertinent medical documentation and test results related to the transferred 
patient from the original facility, and that “the transfer is effected through 
qualified personnel and transportation equipment, as required, including the 
use of necessary and medically appropriate life support measures during the 
transfer.”174  However, there are protections put into place so that the transfer 
provisions do not enable hospitals to revive patient dumping protocols.175  If 
the receiving hospital can provide no additional value to the stabilization of 
the patient, it can determinatively refuse the patient transfer, forcing the 
initial hospital to either treat the patient or find an alternative.176 
The penalties enforced by the statute are also noteworthy.177  
Hospitals and physicians that are in violation of the statutory provisions can 
                                                 
169. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b). 
170. Id.  The statute also includes provisions that dictate when transfer to 
another facility is appropriate and the requisite conditions to do so.  See id. § 1395dd(c). 
171. Id. § 1395dd(b)(2). 
172. Id. 
173. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1)–(2). 
174. Id. 
175. See id. 
176. See Ralph L. Glover II, Hospital’s Duty to Accept Transfers Under 
EMTALA, AM. ACAD. EMERGENCY MED., http://www.aaem.org/em-resources/regulatory-
issues/emtala/transfer (last visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
177. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d). 
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face up to $50,000 per violation.178  Patients can also file civil actions against 
the provider or the hospital for violation of the statute, pursuant to local 
jurisdictional and state personal injury law.179  A key penalty is the risk of 
the hospital losing its Medicare funding agreement.180  Critics maintain that 
this Medicare death penalty is among the most significant motivating and 
driving factors towards compliance.181 
C. The Costs of EMTALA:  Unreimbursed Care 
One of the largest sources of cost from EMTALA is the legislation’s 
promulgation of unreimbursed care.182  Given that the legislation essentially 
mandates emergency care for any patient that arrives at the ED with an 
EMC, physicians and hospitals are on the front lines of collecting the 
payments for the services rendered under EMTALA.183  Ultimately, if that 
patient is uninsured or unable to pay, the hospital may never receive 
compensation, especially since there is little that the provider can do against 
either the federal government or the unpaying patient, besides accepting the 
$50,000 penalty and not treating the patient in the first place.184  Although 
uninsured patients may be covered by Medicaid, the services that hospitals 
provide for the MSEs and the EMCs often go unreimbursed or insufficiently 
reimbursed.185  Even as early as 2000, before the exponential rise in 
healthcare costs, emergency physicians accounted 61% of their bad debt to 
EMTALA mandated care.186  As of 2003, this unreimbursed care accounts 
                                                 
178. Id. § 1395dd(d)(1). 
179. Id. § 1395dd(d)(2). 
180. M. STEVEN LIPTON ET AL., EMTALA — A GUIDE TO PATIENT ANTI-
DUMPING LAWS 1.2 (8th ed. 2012).  Upon a confirmed violation of EMTALA, CMS has the 
authority to notify a hospital of the termination of its Medicare provider agreement.  Id.  To 
retain Medicare provider status, a hospital must submit an acceptable plan of correction and 
pass a follow-up survey.  See id. 
181. Ashley E. Booth, Focus on — The Emergency Medical Treatment and 
Labor Act, ACEP (Aug. 2008), http://www.acep.org/Clinical---Practice-Management/Focus-
on---The-Emergency-Medical-Treatment-and-Labor-Act/. 
182. The Uninsured:  Access to Medical Care Fact Sheet, AM. EMERGENCY 
PHYSICIANS: NEWSROOM, http://newsroom.acep.org/fact_sheets?item=30032 (last visited Apr. 
9, 2017). 
183. See id. 
184. Mark L. Plaster, Who Pays the Tab for Unfunded Care?, EMERGENCY 
PHYSICIANS MONTHLY (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.epmonthly.com/article/who-pays-the-tab/.  
“Of course, the physician can always pursue the patient for payment.  But, if they cannot or 
will not pay, there is very little further recourse for the physician.  And the government that 
mandated the care is deemed exempt from any liability for the bill.”  Id. 
185. The Uninsured:  Access to Medical Care Fact Sheet, supra note 182. 
186. The Impact of Unreimbursed Care on the Emergency Physician, AM. C. 
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, http://www.acep.org/clinical---practice-management/the-impact-of-
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for an average loss of $138,000 each year for approximately a third of 
emergency physicians.187  Accordingly, some of the largest hospital systems 
in the country continue to increase their forecasts and provisions for bad 
debt, accommodating for shortfalls in the hundreds of millions of dollars.188  
With projections indicating that bad debt levels could reach $200 billion by 
2019, hospitals are forced to be proactive in their planning.189  A prime 
example of this is Community Health Systems, which operates 195 hospitals 
and is the second largest for-profit hospital chain in the United States.190  The 
company was forced to revise its 2015 fourth-quarter forecast for bad debt to 
                                                                                                                   
unreimbursed-care-on-the-emergency-physician/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2017).  Bad debt is 
defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as “[a] debt that is uncollectible and that may be 
deductible for tax purposes.”  Bad Debt, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  A 2016 
report by the American Hospital Association determined that “bad debt consists of services for 
which hospitals anticipated but did not receive payment.”  AM. HOSP. ASS’N, 
UNCOMPENSATED HOSPITAL CARE COST FACT SHEET 2 (2016). 
187. The Uninsured:  Access to Medical Care Fact Sheet, supra note 182.  
Referencing an AMA study:  In which the American Medical Association stated that “[m]ore 
than one-third of emergency physicians lose an average of $138,300 each year from 
EMTALA-related bad debt . . . .”  Id. 
188. See id. 
189. Beth Kutscher, Targeting Bad Debt: Hospitals Getting Proactive on 
Billing, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Aug. 17, 2013), 
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20130817/magazine/308179957.  The article also 
notes: 
The number of patients enrolled in high-deductible health plans has been increasing 
since 2005, but has accelerated over the past two years.  At a growing number of 
companies, high-deductible plans are the only option.  A survey from Aon Hewitt 
found that 44% of the employers it surveyed showed they are increasing 
deductibles and/or copayments as a way to manage their healthcare costs.  At 
$2086, the average deductible for a consumer-directed health plan was nearly 
double the average annual deductible of $1097 for all health plans in 2012, 
according to the Kaiser Family Foundation. 
Id.  The Modern Healthcare article mentioned in footnote above also notes that 
hospitals are attempting to change their collection models in hopes of getting 
reimbursed for care from patients who are able to pay.  Id.  The article notes: 
Many hospitals are still using the old system of billing patients after services are 
provided and hoping the checks come in.  But savvy medical centers are taking a 
more proactive approach:  calling patients weeks in advance of service, using 
screening tools to assess their ability to pay and then setting them up with financial 
counselors to work out a payment plan when necessary. . . .  But hospitals seeking 
to improve collections have to be careful, as state regulators have pushed back 
against overly aggressive debt-collection practices—particularly in cases where 
treatment was delayed or family members were denied access to a patient until bills 
were paid. 
Id. 
190. John Lauerman, Bad Debt Is the Pain Hospitals Can’t Heal as Patients 
Don’t Pay, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 23, 2016, 1:48 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-23/bad-debt-is-the-pain-hospitals-can-t-
heal-as-patients-don-t-pay. 
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account for an additional deficit of $169 million.191  In the last sixteen years, 
hospitals have provided more than half a trillion dollars in uncompensated 
care to their patients.192 
These metrics play a substantial role in the vitality of healthcare 
organizations.193  Debt figures are often significant considerations when large 
systems negotiate mergers and acquisitions and contemplate the overall 
financial prospects of a potential acquisition or buyout.194  This aspect 
becomes additionally vital as community and rural hospitals, which 
frequently do not have enough margin to afford significant bad debt, often 
seek to or are forced to merge with larger hospital systems.195  These large 
systems also begin targeting and absorbing smaller systems, perhaps in hopes 
of gaining consumer market share or eliminating a barrier to entry in a 
specific region.196  Either way, these mergers lead to increased consolidation 
of market share and the slow monopolization of macro-scaled segments, 
reducing competition in the healthcare marketplace, and allowing hospitals 
to drive up costs and fees for services.197  When merger or bailout is not 
                                                 
191. Id. 
192. Brooke Murphy, 21 Statistics On High-Deductible Health Plans, 
BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (May 19, 2016), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/21-
statistics-on-high-deductible-health-plans.html.  The report also displays the annual AHA 
survey, illustrating the upward trajectory of uncompensated care costs for the last fifteen 
years.  AM. HOSP. ASS’N, supra note 186, at 2–3.  In 1990, the costs of uncompensated care, 
nationally, were estimated to be around $12.1 billion.  Id. at 3.  This nearly doubled to $21.6 
billion by the year 2000.  Id.  By 2015, this figure grew to $35.7 billion.  Id.  These figures 
exclude underpayments or non-payments on the part of Medicaid or Medicare, which would 
highlight the even deeper financial woes of many hospitals.  See id. 
193. See AM. HOSP. ASS’N, supra note 186, at 3; DIXON HUGHES GOODMAN 
LLP, WHAT HOSPITAL EXECUTIVES SHOULD BE CONSIDERING IN HOSPITAL MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS 8 (2013), 
http://www.dhgllp.com/portals/4/ResourceMedia/publications/HCG_Hospital%20MandA%20
Whitepaper_ThoughtLeadership.pdf. 
194. See DIXON HUGHES GOODMAN LLP, supra note 193, at 4, 8. 
195. See Lauerman, supra note 190.  “‘We have [thirty-nine] hospitals that 
have negative margins and the majority of them are rural,’ . . . ‘They have less of a financial 
cushion to absorb the losses of bad debt.’”  Id. 
196. See Gregory Curfman, Everywhere, Hospitals Are Merging — But Why 
Should You Care?, HARV. HEALTH PUBLICATIONS: HARV. HEALTH BLOG (Apr. 1, 2015, 5:00 
PM), http://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/everywhere-hospitals-are-merging-but-why-should-
you-care-201504017844; DIXON HUGHES GOODMAN LLP, supra note 193, at 4. 
197. See Curfman, supra note 196.  The article also notes that while 
economists are focused on the reduced competition and increased prices that come with large 
hospital system mergers, administrators behind these mergers paint a different picture, citing 
the positive effects of mergers, including improved efficiency, increased quality of care, and 
even the potential for lower costs in the long run due to increased access to care.  Id.  “[W]hen 
a smaller hospital merges with a larger, better-equipped hospital system, patients at the 
smaller hospital may acquire better access to specialists and to advanced medical 
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possible, the hardest hit organizations are forced to shut down, leaving entire 
communities void of immediate healthcare services.198  Further effects of the 
erosion of rural hospital networks beyond the lack of access to critical care 
include job loss, drop in gross domestic product figures, and, accordingly, a 
general decline in the economic fortitude of a community.199 
D. Because It Is Unreimbursed, Is EMTALA Unconstitutional? 
Some treatment has been given to the fact that EMTALA potentially 
violates the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.200  This school of 
thought was first proposed and advocated by E.H. Morreim, who has 
advanced the theory that the lack of just and sufficient compensation for 
medical services provided is no different from a traditional government 
taking.201  That is, the government is taking private services in order to 
promulgate a government objective.202 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that “nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”203  This 
has traditionally been applied to the claiming or diminution of the value of 
private property by the government, including issues of eminent domain, 
seizure of property, and physical invasion of private property.204  The 
purpose behind the original amendment was to ensure that the federal 
government took all steps necessary to protect private property, as a 
                                                                                                                   
technologies, such as high tech imaging procedures and electronic medical record systems.”  
Id. 
198. See Bad Debt Triggers Hospital Closings Around U.S., NBC NEWS, 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/28394340/ns/health-health_care/t/bad-debt=triggers-hospital-
closings-around-us/#.wjtmrrhmzx8 (last updated Dec. 28, 2005, 2:11 PM). 
199. See Michael Wyland & Michelle Lemming, Death by a Thousand Cuts:  
The Flickering Lights of the U.S. Rural Hospital, NONPROFIT QUARTERLY (Feb. 23, 2016), 
http://nonprofitquarterly.org/2016/02/23/death-by-a-thousand-cuts-the-flickering-lights-of-
the-u-s-rural-hospital/ (A study found that closure of 673 vulnerable rural hospitals would 
entail 11.7 million lost in patient encounters, 99,000 healthcare jobs lost, 137,000 community 
jobs lost, and a $277 billion loss to gross domestic product over the course of ten years.) 
200. E.H. Morreim, Dumping the Anti-Dumping Law:  Why EMTALA is 
(Largely) Unconstitutional and Why It Matters, 15 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 211, 217 (2014); 
see also U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
201. Morreim, supra note 200, at 212. 
  
202. Id. 
203. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
204. See id.; Doug Linder, Exploring Constitutional Conflicts:  Takings of 
Private Property, UMKC, http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/takings.htm 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
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fundamental requirement of a legitimate government.205  Proponents of the 
takings argument against EMTALA contend that the legislation creates a 
taking with regards to for-profit hospitals in requiring those hospitals to 
provide emergent and unreimbursed medical care.206  Namely, the 
requirements of a taking are met:  Property, which does not entail a single 
person’s property but instead refers to the hospital itself, including medical 
equipment, pharmaceuticals, and the time of the physicians and staff; the 
actual taking, which comprises of requiring emergency evaluation and 
treatment; public use, as EMTALA entitles any member of the public to 
receive this care; and finally, the lack of just compensation, as EMTALA 
care does not itself receive any reimbursement.207  A notable argument by 
proponents of EMTALA remains that hospitals do indeed receive 
compensation for EMTALA-based care, as the legislation only mandates 
Medicare participating hospitals to provide this care, ergo, giving hospitals 
an opportunity to extend their patient populations to include and collect from 
those covered by the Medicare program.208  The logic behind this school of 
thought reasons that hospitals receive incentives through Medicare payouts, 
and if hospitals do not find it conducive to subscribe to EMTALA, even with 
Medicare payouts, they can simply refuse participation in the Medicare 
program.209  However, for a majority of hospitals in the country, Medicare 
reimbursements represent such a large proportion of compensation and 
profits, that pulling out of the program would be a death sentence.210  Hence, 
this proposition provides a binary choice of assured failure, and, essentially, 
acts as a gun to the head:  Either the hospital decides to drastically reduce its 
margins and income via the refusal of the Medicare program and all 
Medicare patients, or it chooses to provide billions of dollars of 
unreimbursed care.211  This situation creates an unduly coercive choice, 
given that the Medicare program accounts for as much as 30% of many 
hospital systems’ budgets, a figure that has a strong proclivity to rise with the 
                                                 
205. Takings Clause, HERITAGE GUIDE TO CONST., 
http://www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/amendments/5/essays/151/takings-clause (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2017).  The drafter of the original takings clause, James Madison, provided that “[a] 
Government is instituted to protect property of every sort . . . .  This being the end of 
government, that alone is a just government, which impartially secures to every man, 
whatever is his own.”  Id. 
206. Morreim, supra note 200, at 261. 
207. Id. at 211–12. 
208. Id. at 248. 
 209. Id. at 219, 248. 
210. Id. at 220. 
211. Morreim, supra note 200, at 220; see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604–05 (2012) (“In this case, the financial inducement Congress 
has chosen is much more than ‘relatively mild encouragement’—it is a gun to the head.”). 
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aging population, as people above the age of sixty-five now make up more 
than 13% of the entire population—indicating increased Medicare 
participation in the future.212  Therefore, the option to opt out of Medicare is 
not a viable possibility for the majority of hospitals.213 
E. The Costs of EMTALA:  Overcrowding 
An anyone can enter policy has also posed severe capacity problems 
for ERs across the country.214  Namely, given that participating hospitals 
now have an additional responsibility of conducting MSEs—to determine if 
there is an EMC—and provide care accordingly, ER providers have an 
additional patient load.215  Given the guaranteed access that the legislation 
has provided, ERs have essentially become synonymous with a primary care 
physician’s office.216  Patients that cannot afford primary care services such 
as a family clinic or an internist at a local hospital, can now turn to the ER, 
where they can be diagnosed with accuracy and without any real obligation 
of payment.217  Multiple hospital and ER representatives cite EMTALA as 
the cause for overuse of the ED for non-emergency needs, which increases 
both patient load and ER throughput.218  Though physicians are under no 
obligation to treat if there is not an emergency medical condition identified, 
the process of conducting the initial screening and determining the nature of 
the situation still adds a burden to an already overloaded physician and 
hospital.219  This is further exacerbated with the general growing trend of 
                                                 
212. Morreim, supra note 200, at 255.  “As of 2002, the two programs 
comprised just over 47% of hospital revenues—approximately 30% from Medicare and 17% 
from Medicaid.”  Id. at 255 n.246; see also Emily Brandon, 65-and-Older Population Soars, 
U.S. NEWS (Jan. 9, 2012, 9:15 AM), 
http://money.usnews.com/money/retirement/articles/2012/01/09/65-and-older-population-
soars.  “The 65-and-older population jumped 15.1 [%] between 2000 and 2010 . . . .”  
Brandon, supra. 
213. See Tammy Lundstrom, Under-Reimbursement of Medicaid and Medicare 
Hospitalizations as an Unconstitutional Taking of Hospital Services, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1243, 
1248 (2004). 
214. See Peggy Eastman, It’s Official:  EMTALA Contributes to Overcrowding 
Delays in Care, 23 EMERGENCY MED. NEWS 9, 9 (2001). 
215. See Emily Newhook, Healthcare Emergency:  Overcrowding in the ER 
[INFOGRAPHIC], REFERRALMD, http://getreferralmd.com/2015/02/healthcare-emergency-
overcrowding-in-the-er-infographic/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
216. Id. 
217. See Gorelick, supra note 67, at 719–20. 
218. Eastman, supra note 214, at 9. 
219. See id.; Gorelick, supra note 67, at 719. 
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patients preferring the ER to a regular primary care setting, under the belief 
of more available, flexible, acute, and quality oriented care.220 
Overcrowding has deeper impacts on the general state of emergency 
care, as it causes a cyclical and self-propagating issue with large rates of 
patient boarding.221  Specifically, a boarded patient, which the ACEP defines 
as “a patient who remains in the [ED] after the patient has been admitted to 
the facility, but has not been transferred to an inpatient unit,” has been 
empirically proven to cause ripple effects in ER throughput.222  ACEP also 
notes that, 
 
[t]he primary cause of overcrowding is boarding:  the 
practice of holding patients in the [ED] after they have been 
admitted to the hospital, because no inpatient beds are available.  
This practice often results in a number of problems, including 
                                                 
220. Gorelick, supra note 67, at 719–20.  The Academy of Emergency 
Medicine article goes into further detail, stating that the 
findings reveal that the convenience of ED care was a very frequently 
cited reason for using the ED.  Convenience, as defined in our study, includes 
factors related to the hours of operation of the ED, the ease of traveling to the ED 
relative to other health care facilities, and the availability of immediate medical 
attention. 
Deborah Fish Ragin et al., Reasons for Using the Emergency Department:  Results 
of the EMPATH Study, 12 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 1158, 1163 (2005).  It goes on 
to mention that 
the immediate availability of the ED appeals to those who desire care without an 
appointment or who are unwilling to wait for a scheduled appointment.  Very often, 
the ED is chosen because it offers care when needed and wanted, rather than when 
providers choose to make themselves available 
. . . .   
Preference for the ED is also driven by the comprehensive range of 
services available in a single location, a more attractive option than multiple visits 
to varying locations for laboratory tests, imaging studies, and specialty 
consultation.  These findings, along with those regarding the convenience of the 
ED, suggest that structural and operational changes in primary care practices will 
be required to decrease ED utilization . . . . 
Id.  The study concluded that for most people, resorting to the ED was not a calculus 
of last resort, but simply came down to the belief that they had a medical 
emergency.  Id.  In addition to this, the choice to go to an ER over a primary care 
physician is a choice of convenience, flexibility, and the perception of superior 
operational efficiency.  Id.  This refers back to a larger conversation of potential 
solutions to solving ER overload and overcrowding.  Id.  Inherently, in order to 
solve these issues, there will have to be simultaneous attention given to solving the 
issues that mitigate access to other healthcare providers, namely via addressing the 
primary care crisis and making primary care services more accessible and affordable 
to the community.  See infra Section III.C. 
221. See Definition of Boarded Patient, AM. C. EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, 
http://www.acep.org/Clinical---Practice-Management/Definition-of-Boarded-Patient-
2147469010 (last visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
222. Id. 
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ambulance refusals, prolonged patient waiting times, and increased 
suffering for those who wait, lying on gurneys in [ED] corridors 
for hours, and even days, which affects not only their care and 
comfort but also the primary work of the [ED] staff taking care of 
[ED] patients.  When EDs are overwhelmed, their ability to 
respond to community emergencies and disasters may also be 
compromised.223 
 
Ultimately, these issues of overcrowding have significant tangible 
effects:  50% of all ERs report “operat[ing] at or above capacity,” and 
“500,000 ambulances are diverted each year” due to ER overcrowding.224  
This translates to costs of nearly $38 billion wasted annually due to ER 
overuse, $1086 per diverted ambulance, and between $9000 to $13,000 in 
revenue lost daily caused by each hour of ER boarding.225 
F. Potential Solutions 
Specifically addressing the issue of unreimbursed care, some respite 
has been found with the introduction of the Affordable Care Act, which has 
managed to expand insurance coverage across the country.226  Ascension 
Health, another expansive health network, actually saw a reduction in its bad 
debt in 2015.227  Though the figure was still at an exorbitant $1.1 billion, 
Ascension likely saw a slight dip in uncompensated care due to the 
expansion of insurance coverage.228  However, it would be a fallacy to posit 
an exclusively symbiotic relationship between the expansion of insurance 
coverage and its effect on uncompensated care provided through 
EMTALA.229  Although insurance coverage has gone up significantly, there 
                                                 
223. Id. 
224. Newhook, supra note 215.  
225. Id.  The GWU findings also illustrate other impacts of overcrowding.  Id.  
Namely, the studies indicate that patients face a 5% increased chance of dying before being 
discharged, if admitted to the hospital when the ER is overcrowded.  Id.  Additionally, it states 
that due to the overstretching of emergency personnel and staff that often results from ER 
overcrowding, providers may also find it difficult to respond to potential public health crises 
and disasters.  Id. 
226. See Dave Barkholz, Moving Patient Payment Upfront, MOD. HEALTHCARE 
(May 21, 2016), 
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160521/MAGAZINE/305219931. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. 
229. See Impact of Unreimbursed Care on the Emergency Physician, AM. C. 
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, http://www.acep.org/clinical---practice-management/the-impact-of-
unreimbursed-care-on-the-emergency-physician/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
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has been a significant prevalence of high deductible insurance plans.230  
Surveys of employers indicate a 67% increase in deductibles since 2010.231  
A Modern Healthcare finding noted that “24% of people under age [sixty-
five] with private health insurance were enrolled in high-deductible health 
plans and another 13% in high-deductible plans with Health Savings 
Accounts (“HSAs”) to help pay expenses on a pre-tax basis.  That compares 
with 16% and 7%, respectively, in 2009,” citing a study released in 2015 by 
the National Center for Health Statistics.232   
This significant rise in deductibles makes for an interesting situation 
in the payer landscape; though more patients now enter the ER with 
insurance, many still have to take the payment liability on themselves due to 
not meeting the deductible threshold.233  This effectively renders those 
patients back in the initial category of uninsured patients.234  Although 
proponents insisted that high deductibles would encourage consumer 
shopping, and therefore help increase competition between healthcare 
providers, empirical studies proved that this was not the case.235  Instead, the 
inability to pay these high out-of-pocket costs causes a high number of 
patients to delay getting routine and basic medical care, which further 
propagates the use of emergency services, often still at an unaffordable price 
                                                 
230. Barkholz, supra note 226. 
231. RACHEL DOLAN, HIGH-DEDUCTIBLE HEALTH PLANS, HEALTH AFFAIRS 1 
(2016), http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_152.pdf. 
232. Barkholz, supra note 226.  The article also notes:  “The ascendency of 
high-deductible health insurance is challenging hospitals and physicians across the country to 
change the way they prepare for and collect payments from people getting hit with large out-
of-pocket costs for care.”  Id.  Regarding the progress made by some hospitals on debt 
collection, it notes: 
But the rising prevalence of high-deductible plans, both on and off the 
exchanges, threatens to undermine that progress.  Instead of a small number of 
people paying none of their bill, hospitals are starting to see a larger number of 
people struggling to pay the deductibles, which can come to thousands of dollars 
for a single hospital visit. 
Id. 
233. See DOLAN, supra note 231, at 3; Barkholz, supra note 226. 
234. See Deane Waldman, Funding the Unfunded Mandate, AM. THINKER 
(Dec. 8, 2014), 
http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2014/12/funding_the_unfunded_mandate.html. 
235. Anna D. Sinaiko et al., Cost-Sharing Obligations, High-Deductible Health 
Plan Growth, and Shopping for Health:  Enrollees with Skin in the Game, 176 JAMA 
INTERNAL MED. 395, 396 (2016).  “Simply increasing a deductible, which gives enrollees skin 
in the game, appears insufficient to facilitate price shopping.”  Id.  The editor further adds:  “It 
is true that high-deductible health plan enrollees have ‘skin in the game.’  However, these 
enrollees are exposed to substantial out-of-pocket cost risk with little evidence that this risk 
exposure will incentivize higher-value health care decisions.”  Id. at 397–98. 
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point.236  Additionally, given that uncompensated care through EMTALA 
comes via the identification of an emergency medical condition, there is little 
opportunity for patients to indulge in emergency care shopping even if they 
wanted to, due to the immediate need for medical attention.237  In congruence 
with this cyclical logic, polls of emergency medicine physicians in 2015 
indicated that ER visits have increased since the enactment of the Affordable 
Care Act.238  Ultimately, the Affordable Care Act and other insurance 
mechanisms which offer high deductible solutions provide little to no value 
as a solution in specifically addressing reimbursements for uncompensated 
care, as they cannot solve for the millions of dollars lost due to patients that 
fail to meet insurance thresholds and therefore fail to pay.239 
Another important issue to consider is the arena of malpractice, 
specifically regarding patients that receive care under EMTALA.240  Given 
that both providers and hospitals must face the same liability towards the 
standard of care, regardless of whether there is reimbursement or not, 
perhaps there is room for a creative solution to recoup the costs of 
EMTALA-related care through this avenue.241  One such proposition may be 
to make the negligence standard significantly more lenient for providers 
when administering care to EMTALA patients.242  That is, a patient would 
come in, be determined as unable to pay, and be codified as such in the 
medical records.243  If a negligence issue arises later on, a federally mandated 
definition of negligence, one that would be much more lenient than the 
general state standards, would be applied to the physician as a way of 
reducing the number of payouts a hospital would have to make and, 
therefore, provide one way of recouping costs.244  However, this is not a 
viable, ethical, or safe precedent to create, as this could create lack of 
                                                 
236. Murphy, supra note 192.  “When patients delay necessary or preventive 
medical care, they may end up in hospitals’ [ERs] for treatment.”  Id.  “About 80[%] of 
emergency physicians said they are treating insured patients who have sacrificed or delayed 
medical care due to unaffordable out-of-pocket costs, co-insurance or high deductibles . . . .”  
Id. 
237. See Morreim, supra note 200, at 214. 
238. The Uninsured:  Access to Medical Care Fact Sheet, supra note 182 
(noting a significant increase from 2014). 
239. See Barkholz, supra note 226. 
240. The Impact of Unreimbursed Care on the Emergency Physician, supra 
note 229. 
241. See Plaster, supra note 184. 
242. See Black, supra note 103, at 438. 
243. See Impact of Unreimbursed Care on the Emergency Physician, supra 
note 229. 
244. See Bal, supra note 30, at 340; supra Section II.A.  To meet negligence, a 
plaintiff has to prove the same elements discussed:  Duty, breach of that duty, harm, and 
causation.  See Bal, supra note 30, at 340; supra Section II.A. 
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motivation for providers to exercise their best medical judgment when 
confronted with a patient who they know will not be able to pay.  Leniency 
in standards of care or in the breach of duty will only create future issues of 
malpractice and raise important ethical concerns—namely, the concern of 
why patients that cannot afford healthcare or those that must resort to ERs in 
times of desperate need should be provided with substandard levels of 
care.245  Rather, as healthcare can be considered a basic human need, 
physicians should be incentivized to provide their best services and judgment 
in all scenarios, regardless of whether the patient is profitable or not.246  A 
patient receiving intentional substandard care may as well not receive care at 
all. 
Instead, a solution that could actually curtail negligence liability and 
provide cost relief to hospitals through the window of malpractice could be a 
federal mandate providing liability funding for physicians that face 
negligence claims arising out of EMTALA-based treatment.247  Given the 
above discussed cognitive decision-making short-comings that emergency 
physicians already face, attaching the same standards for liability related 
payments across the board, for both paying patients as well as non-paying 
patients that present to the ER, places an unfair burden on hospitals, which 
ultimately have to shoulder the burden of payment regardless of whether 
profit was made off the patient or not.248 Thus, a mandate could be enforced 
that dictates that non-paying patients who utilize EMTALA’s treatment 
procedures be categorized into a different codification in a hospital’s records 
systems, and given any issues of negligence, federal funding will be used to 
cover legal fees or malpractice payments on behalf of the hospital and 
provider.  While this will likely not cover the full extent of unreimbursed 
care by the provider, as federal compensation will be paid out only if there is 
a negligence suit, it may provide some respite to hospitals, which are 
currently forced under the threat of malpractice regardless of whether there is 
any monetary value derived from a patient.  Overall, this would not only 
reduce the amount that hospitals would have to pay out in liability, hence, 
helping to keep their bottom lines and profitability margins stable, but would 
also create strong incentives for hospitals to retain their Medicare 
participation status and continue to see patients under EMTALA. 
Many have also proposed cost-shifting as a viable measure.249  This 
proposed model suggests that in order to recover the costs for unreimbursed 
care due to EMTALA, hospitals simply increase the payments and costs 
                                                 
245. See Fanaeian & Merwin, supra note 93, at 43. 
246. See Santiago, supra note 111. 
247. See Bal, supra note 30, at 340. 
248. See The Uninsured:  Access to Medical Care Fact Sheet, supra note 182. 
249. See Morreim, supra note 200, at 259. 
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required by paying and insured patients.250  However, this model relays back 
to the original contention of EMTALA violating the Takings Clause; that is, 
the fact that the payment for the medical services provided has been shifted 
to a party that can afford it is no less a taking, but has rather just shifted the 
burden of unjust seizure of property to another person, whether through 
higher insurance premiums or lower savings remaining for that other 
payer.251 
Instead, what may be another permanent, viable solution, is a stable 
and guaranteed funding source for hospitals to recoup their costs on lost 
EMTALA funds.252  The most obvious call would be for federal funding of 
the mandate.253  Congressional ability to spearhead a piece of legislation as 
critical as EMTALA should include with it a responsibility to create funding 
mechanisms.254  While traditional routes of funding, such as the opportunity 
to draw from Medicare benefits, exist and can likely provide further benefits, 
declining reimbursement rates and expansion of mandated care is crippling 
providers.255  A more viable mechanism for federally funding the mandate 
may be the creation of mandatory HSAs for all Americans, funded by tax 
dollars and providing tax incentives for those who want to contribute more 
than the pre-allocated amount given by the federal government.256  These 
HSAs could be further mandated as being able to bypass insurance 
requirements and usable solely for emergency care purposes.257 
Alternatively, instead of providing the funds directly to the 
consumer, perhaps the federal funding could come in the form of dynamic 
payments to hospital systems instead.258  This would entail identifying each 
Medicare participating hospital—ergo EMTALA participating hospitals—
and providing a payout specific to that hospital’s unreimbursed care on an 
annual basis.259  Payments would remain dynamic, as the rate of this 
reimbursement would change from year to year.260  This would require that 
                                                 
250. Id. at 259 n.267. 
251. Id. at 260–61.  “The fact that the costs of the initial taking have now been 
diffused onto a broader variety of parties does not render it any less a taking, nor does it mean 
that the death of government compensation has somehow become just.”  Id. at 260. 
252. Waldman, supra note 234. 
253. Id. 
254. See TODD B. TAYLOR, AM. COLL. EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, EMTALA:  
ADVANCED CASES (May 2011), 
http://www.acep.org/uploadedfiles/acep/meetings_and_events/educational_meetings/edda/pha
se_ii/syllabi/emtala.pdf. 
255. See id. 
256. Waldman, supra note 234. 
257. See id. 
258. See Morreim, supra note 200, at 261. 
259. See id. at 267–68. 
260. See id. at 266, 268 n.294. 
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each hospital present to the government their unreimbursed EMTALA-
related costs at the end of a given fiscal year, and then propose a budget for 
the following year.261  Throughout the course of the year, providers would 
have to indicate all of the patients that they see and the respective services 
provided under the parameters of EMTALA, helping to account for the final 
costs at the end of the year.262  Providers and hospitals can work together to 
evaluate the cost per unit of services provided by taking into account the 
pharmaceuticals used, the time value of the provider, and the general cost of 
care to present a composite figure to the authorities without heavy problems 
of proof.263  Instead of simply providing an opportunity to earn money 
through Medicare participation, federal undertaking of these costs would 
allow for hospitals to be justly compensated for the services provided.264  
Though this would ultimately be a government cost, it would help shift the 
burden from hospitals to the federal government, requiring it to provide 
compensated and basic healthcare for the entire population.265  The 
government could utilize many sources to fund these costs.266  Different 
sources could include increasing taxes for insurance carriers that charge high 
premiums or mandating a separate fund from general tax revenue towards 
this purpose.267 
An auxiliary solution, though not a comprehensive one, would be to 
address the issue of the use of ERs for non-emergency uses, or essentially 
mitigating the use of ERs as primary care facilities.268  Uninsured patients 
that turn to the ER as a means to get basic primary and family care add fuel 
to the fire by increasing the burden on hospitals.269  Given that the demand 
for primary care physicians is projected to grow 14% by 2020, the misuse of 
ERs will only continue to grow.270  The sheer lack of access to primary care 
                                                 
261. See id. at 268. 
262. See id. at 263 n.279. 
263. Morreim, supra note 200, at 262; see also Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 437–38 (1982) (pointing out that per se takings tend to 
present fewer problems of proof, compared with regulatory takings). 
264. See Morreim, supra note 200, at 262–63. 
265. Id. at 260; TAYLOR, supra note 254. 
266. See Morreim, supra note 200, at 219–20. 
267. See id. 
268. Low-Income Patients Say ER Is Better Than Primary Care, ROBERT 
WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. (July 9, 2013), http://www.rwjf.org/en/library/articles-and-
news/2013/07/low-income-patients-say-er-is-better-than-primary-care.html. 
269. See id. 
270. See HRSA, PROJECTING THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR PRIMARY CARE 
PRACTITIONERS THROUGH 2020, 2 (Nov. 2013), 
http://www.bhw.hrsa.gov/sites/default/files/bhw/nchwa/projectingprimarycare.pdf. 
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physicians in many areas forces patients to turn to ERs.271  Furthermore, 
excessive barriers to primary care have been cited as the reason why many 
patients prefer a straightforward visit to the ER, including:  convenience 
factors—the lack of flexibility and unavailability of appointments for 
primary care physicians; costs—primary care physicians often promote or 
advise referrals, resulting in multiple high copays for patients as opposed to 
the ER where patients can often get comprehensive care in a single visit; and 
quality—a stronger focus is given to acute care in the ER.272 
G. Future Prospects 
Ultimately, it is uncontested that EMTALA fulfills a basic societal 
requirement:  access to healthcare for those that require it, regardless of their 
ability to pay.273  However, as this requirement is indeed an aspect of 
community welfare, the burdens should not be shouldered by providers and 
hospitals.274  Forcing this extra financial burden will only continue to make 
hospital systems more unsustainable in the years to come.275  Given the 
changing landscape of insurance coverage, an increasing number of people 
will attempt to take advantage of legislation such as this to pass their 
healthcare costs onto ERs, rather than taking the financial responsibility onto 
themselves.276  With increasing rates of financial turmoil and hardship for 
health systems, this carefree attitude by government entities, which mandate 
such legislation upon private systems, will not bode well for the healthcare 
industry in the years to come.277  Rather, it will only translate to increased 
healthcare costs for consumers, as hospitals will be forced to indulge in their 
own methods of cost shifting to maintain their respective positions as 
profitable market players.278 
                                                 
271. Low-Income Patients Say ER Is Better Than Primary Care, supra note 
268. 
272. Id. 
273. CAROL K. KANE, AM. MED. ASS’N, THE IMPACT OF EMTHALA ON 
PHYSICIAN PRACTICES 1 (2003); Perez, supra note 157, at 156; TAYLOR, supra note 254. 
274. See KANE, supra note 273, at 1. 
275. See id. at 4. 
276. See id. at 1. 
277. See The Impact of Unreimbursed Care on the Emergency Physician, supra 
note 229. 
278. See KANE, supra note 273, at 4. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
A. What’s Next for Emergency Medicine? 
Both the larger issues regarding medical malpractice/negligence and 
the impacts created by EMTALA are significant points of contention 
regarding the current state of emergency medicine practice.279  However, 
they are by no means the only issues that need to be addressed.280  
Emergency medicine providers still face many difficult legal battles and are 
riddled with litigation in subject areas ranging from consent based issues, 
against-medical-advice directives, and poor charting practices, just to name a 
few.281  Indeed, the sheer amount of litigation centered on these topics 
provides the legal community with an even stronger reason to develop and 
tailor policies and frameworks for the field, as generic and across-the-board 
policies cannot be reconciled with such an intricate and complicated field of 
medicine.282 
Moreover, the legal community will be forced to remain dynamic 
and on alert in the coming years with regards to the development of 
frameworks suited to emergency medicine, as the field is rapidly evolving.  
As mentioned in the beginning of this Article, given both the growing aging 
population as well as the demand for primary care services, emergency 
medicine will be at the forefront of providing healthcare for the public.283  
Accordingly, EDs and hospitals alike will have to strike a balance between 
cost and quality, ultimately carrying the heavy burden of showing that 
improved quality of care will decrease long-term costs.284  This efficiency 
will be augmented by the continuous growth of healthcare information 
technology, which will provide the valuable information that providers need 
                                                 
279. Black, supra note 103, at 439. 
280. See id. 
281. See Kuhn, supra note 66. 
282. See Black, supra note 103, at 437; Kuhn, supra note 66. 
283. David P. Sklar et al., The Future of Emergency Medicine:  An 
Evolutionary Perspective, 85 ACAD. MED. 490, 490 (2010); see also supra Part I. 
284. Sklar et al., supra note 283, at 493.  The article also states that an 
important premium will be placed on medical research to determine the exact factors that have 
the largest room for improvement in the cost and quality of care debate: 
Research in practice areas that overlap health services and clinical improvement 
will be increasingly important and will warrant funding by EM organizations and 
foundations.  Growth will be in areas of demonstrated quality and cost reduction:  
[T]ime-sensitive conditions, disease-state-specific care pathways, guideline-based 
clinical protocols, checklists, and reductions in the variability of care—as in sepsis 
care and abdominal pain workups.  Observational and short-stay diagnostic 
strategies will flourish to reduce inpatient costs and improve patient satisfaction. 
Id. 
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on a real-time basis, aiding the diagnostic and patient management 
process.285 
Related to the growth of health information technology, telemedicine 
will also heavily affect emergency medicine.286  Telemedicine technology 
has allowed the field of medicine to take advantage of cutting-edge 
telecommunication systems to deliver quality healthcare.287  It was reported 
that nearly fifteen million people received care through this medium in 
2015—a figure which is sharply expected to rise.288  However, this large 
number of users is no surprise, as companies have already developed the 
technology to bring telemedicine to the daily smartphone user via mobile 
applications.289  This healthcare application revolution has increasingly 
allowed consumers to now have access to physician consultations directly 
through their mobile phones, bringing the power of diagnosis and disease 
management to their fingertips.290  It will be interesting to examine the 
effects of these technologies on emergency medicine generally, and their 
impacts on the profitability metrics of EDs around the country in the decades 
to come.  Aside from financial conundrums, this technology poses questions 
of liability that legal experts will be forced to address in the coming years.291  
Should physicians be able to refer their patients to an ER through a mobile 
consultation?292  If so, will the referring mobile app physician share some of 
the liability as a part of the stream of diagnosis, or will the recipient 
physician in the ER still hold ties to all liability, as he or she had the 
opportunity for a physical examination?293 
Furthermore, given the expansive reach of Internet and mobile data, 
telemedicine is not easily controlled by state lines or tangible boundaries.294  
Rather, states will have to continue to collaborate and together develop 
procedures that address the discrepancies in state licensing laws, ultimately 
enacting changes to encourage physicians to practice medicine across state 
                                                 
285. Id. 
286. Id. at 492. 
287. John Donohue, Telemedicine:  What the Future Holds, HEALTHCARE IT 
NEWS (Sept. 6, 2016, 11:06 AM), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/blog/telemedicine-what-
future-holds. 
288. Id. 
289. Id. 
290. See id. 
291. See id. 
292. See Donohue, supra note 287. 
293. See id. 
294. See Matthew Loughran, Telemedicine Cracks Top Ten Health Law Issue 
List for 2016, BLOOMBERG BNA:  HEALTH CARE BLOG (Jan. 11, 2016), 
http://www.bna.com/telemedicine-cracks-top-b57982066002. 
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lines.295  Issues such as these will require heavy involvement of both the 
legal and medical community in developing apt frameworks that will allow 
the efficient use of healthcare technology to benefit society.296 
Ultimately, emergency medicine as a distinct field of medicine still 
remains in its infancy, posing an onerous burden for legal scholars who 
attempt to gauge the exact trajectory the field will pursue in the coming 
generations.297  However, certain elements will remain inherent to this 
medical specialty, such as the need for highly trained and intelligent 
providers; the critical service that ERs provide in fulfilling a basic societal 
need for healthcare services; and the growth potential of the field in terms of 
technology, innovation, and the promise of making healthcare more 
accessible.298  Thus, the legal community must remain cognizant of these 
elements, as it strives to not only protect patients and providers alike, but 
also in order to ensure the continued promulgation of frameworks and 
regulations in a manner that continues to fuel the growth and development of 
this vital field of medicine. 
                                                 
295. See id.  “One of the major hurdles that telemedicine will have to face in 
the coming years is the differences that exist in state physician licensing laws.”  Id. 
296. See id. 
297. See Sklar et al., supra note 283, at 494. 
298. See id. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2009, I published an article which focused on the remarkable lack 
of clarity surrounding the term “limited public forum” in the law of freedom 
of speech.1  I asserted then: 
 
More than twenty-five years after the United States 
Supreme Court, in Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Ass’n, purported to define and elucidate the 
components of its “public forum” doctrine, the meaning—and 
legal significance—of the “limited public forum” concept remains 
startlingly unclear.  Confessions of uncertainty by courts as to the 
meaning of this term—and its relationship to its doctrinal siblings, 
the “designated” public forum and the “non-public forum”—are, in 
fact, surprisingly common in reported judicial decisions.2 
 
“The uncertainty surrounding this body of First Amendment 
doctrine,” I concluded, cries out for resolution.3 
                                                 
* Marc Rohr is a Professor of Law Emeritus at Nova Southeastern 
University, Shepard Broad College of Law. 
1. Marc Rohr, The Ongoing Mystery of the Limited Public Forum, 33 NOVA 
L. REV. 299, 301 (2009). 
2. Id. at 300 (footnote omitted); see also Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–48 (1983). 
3. Rohr, supra note 1, at 355. 
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But the clarity for which I hoped has not been provided by the 
Supreme Court.  Instead, the Court has, since I begged it for clarification in 
2009, amplified the confusion associated with its forum categories, to the 
point that it is no longer even certain how many such categories there are.4 
The modest goal of this Article is simply to try to answer that 
question.5 
II. THE ESSENCE OF THE “PUBLIC FORUM” DOCTRINE, PRIOR TO 2009 
For the sake of the uninitiated, it should be said, without further 
delay, that all of this pertains to the issue of access, for expressive purposes, 
to governmentally-controlled properties or channels of communication that 
have not traditionally been deemed available to the citizenry for such 
purposes.6  Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n,7 in 1983, 
represented the Supreme Court’s first attempt to impose order on the case 
law addressing questions of this kind, which arise continually.8  I 
summarized Perry’s well-known taxonomy in my earlier article, as follows: 
 
Justice White set forth, in this [majority] opinion, the 
tripartite breakdown of governmental “fora” . . . that continues to 
be quoted regularly.  The first category, he stated, consists of 
“places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been 
devoted to assembly and debate,” embracing—at least—“streets 
and parks.”  “In these quintessential public forums, he went on to 
say, restrictions on expression would be evaluated pursuant to the 
tests usually employed to gauge the constitutionality of content-
based or content-neutral regulations of speech.9  A second 
                                                 
4. At least one colleague agrees:  “[T]here is not even agreement as to how 
many levels of forum exist within the public forum doctrine. . . . It is a bad sign if the doctrine 
is so confused that reasonable observers cannot even agree on how many categories of forum 
exist.”  Aaron H. Caplan, Invasion of the Public Forum Doctrine, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 
647, 654 (2010). 
5. See infra Parts II–VII. 
6. Rohr, supra note 1, at 300–01. 
7. 460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
8. See id. at 43–44, 43 n.6, 46. 
9. As Justice White explained, at this point: 
For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its 
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is 
narrowly drawn to achieve that end.  The State may also enforce 
regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression, which are 
content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government 
interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication. 
Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45 (citation omitted).  I will refer to these tests as 
“the higher levels of scrutiny.” 
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category, he continued, “consists of public property which the 
State has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive 
activity . . . .  This second category is important because, [as] 
Justice White instructed us, the First Amendment “forbids a State 
to enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the 
public even if it was not required to create the forum in the first 
place.”  At this point a key point was made in a footnote:  “A 
public forum may be created for a limited purpose such as use by 
certain groups . . . or for the discussion of certain subjects.”  A 
significant caveat was added:  “Although a State is not required to 
indefinitely retain the open character of the facility, as long as it 
does so it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional 
public forum”—thus introducing the term “traditional public 
forum” to describe the first category in this taxonomy.10 
Finally, he addressed the third category, described simply 
as “[p]ublic property which is not by tradition or designation a 
forum for public communication.”  In such locations, . . . “the 
State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, 
communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is 
reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because 
public officials oppose the speaker’s view.”  Oddly, it was not 
until later in his opinion that Justice White gave this third type of 
governmental property a name, and he did so only in passing: . . . 
“Implicit in the concept of the non-public forum,” he wrote, “is the 
right to make distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter 
and speaker identity.”11 
 
At that point in my earlier article, still discussing Justice White’s 
opinion in Perry, I began my critique: 
But with respect to the concept of the “limited” public 
forum, the opinion was distinctly unhelpful.  First, as with the term 
“non-public forum,” Justice White used the term “limited public 
forum” only in passing, never defining it . . . ; readers of the 
opinion were thus left to infer that the “limited public forum” was 
the aforementioned forum “created for a limited purpose such as 
use by certain groups . . . or for the discussion of certain subjects.”
 Second, and most inexcusably, the legal significance of 
the label was never made explicit in Justice White’s opinion.  He 
stated that the designated public forum would be treated as if it 
were a traditional public forum, but said nothing, in general terms, 
as to how the constitutionality of an exclusion of a particular 
                                                 
10. Rohr, supra note 1, at 304. 
11. Id. at 306; see also Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45, 46 n.7, 49. 
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speaker from a designated public forum limited for “use by certain 
groups” would be assessed.12 
I argued then—based on what I deemed to be clues lurking in the 
remainder of Justice White’s Perry opinion,13 along with the Court’s earlier 
ruling in Widmar v. Vincent14—that this was the proper understanding of the 
legal significance of the limited public forum concept: 
In a limited public forum, we must first identify the speakers to 
whom the forum has been opened—the favored class of speakers, 
if you will—and then ask whether the speaker who seeks access to 
the forum—the challenger—is an “entit[y] of similar character” to 
those to whom the forum has been opened.  In other words, we 
must ask whether the challenger falls within the favored class of 
speakers.  If the answer is “yes,” then that challenger enjoys a 
“right of access” to the forum.  To put it another way, a limited 
public forum would be “open” to speakers who fall into the same 
class as those to whom the forum has already been opened. . . .  So 
it would appear, from the totality of the Perry decision, that a 
limited public forum will be treated as either a traditional public 
forum or a non-public forum, depending on whether the challenger 
does or does not fall within the favored class of speakers.15 
To my knowledge, this was the only understanding of the limited 
public forum concept that gave it real meaning, as a category distinct from 
all the others.16  And I was not alone in drawing this inference from Perry 
and Widmar; along with dictum in 1992’s International Society for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee17 decision,18 several federal appellate courts 
embraced the same approach.19 
                                                 
12. Rohr, supra note 1, at 306; see also Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7, 
47–48. 
13. Rohr, supra note 1, at 306–08; see also Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46 
n.7, 47–48. 
14. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
15. Rohr, supra note 1, at 307–08 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted); 
see also Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7, 47–48; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269–70. 
16. Rohr, supra note 1, at 306–09. 
17. 505 U.S. 672 (1992). 
18. Id. at 678–79. 
19. See Rohr, supra note 1, at 332–34.  Remarkably, this theory has continued 
to be put forth by one of those courts of appeals, albeit inconsistently and in dictum.  See 
Children First Found., Inc. v. Fiala, 790 F.3d 328, 340 (2d Cir.), reh’g granted, 611 F. App’x 
741 (2d Cir. 2015); Zalaski v. City of Bridgeport Police Dep’t, 613 F.3d 336, 342 (2d Cir. 
2010) (per curiam).  But see Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 650 F.3d 30, 36 (2d 
Cir. 2011); Ochshorn ex rel. R.O. v. Ithaca City Sch. Dist., 645 F.3d 533, 540 (2d Cir. 2011).  
I say “remarkably” because this understanding was pretty clearly repudiated by the Supreme 
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But the actual holding of Perry,20 along with the Court’s other public 
forum cases decided between 1985 and 1998,21 provided little or no support 
for that theory.22  Then, in 2001, in Good News Club v. Milford Central 
School,23 the Court, speaking through Justice Thomas, administered the coup 
de grace: 
When the State establishes a limited public forum, the 
State is not required to and does not allow persons to engage in 
every type of speech.  The State may be justified “in reserving [its 
forum] for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.” 
The State’s power to restrict speech, however, is not without 
limits.  The restriction must not discriminate against speech on the 
basis of viewpoint, and the restriction must be “reasonable in light 
of the purpose served by the forum.”24 
Intentionally or not, Justice Thomas thereby equated, for purposes of 
First Amendment analysis, the category of the limited public forum with that 
of the non-public forum—with no explanation, or even any explicit 
acknowledgment, whatsoever, that he was doing so.25  But, of course, lower 
courts took the hint.26  Writing in 2009, I concluded: 
The federal courts of appeals remain strikingly divided 
with respect to their understanding of what it means to pin the 
                                                                                                                   
Court in 2001.  Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1232 (11th Cir. 2011); infra text 
accompanying notes 18–19. 
20. See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 55; Rohr, supra note 1, at 309–12. 
21. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 669 (1998); 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995); United States v. 
Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 724 (1990); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 
U.S. 788, 796 (1985).  Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Forbes, however, did arguably 
lend some support to the limited public forum theory which I have advocated, but too 
ambiguously to cite, with any confidence, as supportive thereof.  See Rohr, supra note 1, at 
320–25. 
22. See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 55. 
23. 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
24. Id. at 106–07 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
25. Rohr, supra note 1 at 320; see also Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 102, 
106, 120, 131.  That important doctrinal development had been strongly implied, six years 
earlier, by Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of 
University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995).  I criticized the Rosenberger 
pronouncement as well.  Rohr, supra note 1, at 325; see also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–
30.  With regard to both decisions, I pointed out that, because each of them found 
impermissible viewpoint discrimination, no categorizing of the relevant forum was even 
necessary.  Rohr, supra note 1, at 325; see also Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106–07; 
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–30. 
26. See Rohr, supra note 1 at 332. 
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label “limited public forum” upon a governmentally controlled 
property or channel of communication.  At the risk of over-
simplification, these courts can essentially be placed into one of 
two groups:  Those who, like your humble author, are guided by 
the implications of Perry and Forbes, and those who have been 
influenced primarily by the misleading statements made in the 
Rosenberger [v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia] and 
Good News Club decisions.27 
III. SUBSEQUENT SUPREME COURT PRONOUNCEMENTS 
As unhelpful as the Court was, in cases prior to 2009, in elucidating 
its public forum doctrine, it did, at least, faithfully list the three dominant 
categories of First Amendment fora:  traditional, designated, and “non.”28  
That changed in 2009, in Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Pleasant Grove 
City v. Summum.29  Because the Court found the Ten Commandments 
monument at issue therein to be, in the context of the case, a species of 
government speech,30 Justice Alito’s discussion of public forum principles 
was entirely dictum; nonetheless, any statement made in a Supreme Court 
majority opinion obviously carries weight.  So what did he say that has 
influenced the presentation of public forum concepts in lower courts?  He 
listed the categories of traditional and designated public fora, and then added 
this:  “The Court has also held that a government entity may create a forum 
that is limited to use by certain groups or dedicated solely to the discussion 
of certain subjects.  In such a forum, a government entity may impose 
restrictions on speech that are reasonable and viewpoint neutral.”31 
For the first time, the non-public forum received no mention.32  
While Alito did not use the term “limited public forum,” had he effectively 
replaced the non-public forum category with the limited public forum 
category?  The Court had already—in dictum in Good News Club—equated 
those two categories for analytical purposes, but were we now supposed to 
conflate them completely—despite the fact that some “non-public” fora are 
                                                 
27. Id.; see also Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 120; Ark. Educ. Television 
Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 683 (1998); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 846; Perry Educ. 
Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 55. 
28. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677; Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. 
Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726 (1990); Cornelius 
v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). 
29. 555 U.S. 460 (2009). 
30. Id. at 472–73. 
31. Id. at 469–70 (citation omitted) (citing Good News Club v. Milford Cent. 
Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001). 
32. See id. at 464, 469; Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. at 
106–07. 
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closed to all private expressive activity33—and abandon the “non-public 
forum” label?  No explanation was provided. 
All that Alito said about First Amendment fora in Summum was 
repeated the following year, in Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in 
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez,34 and this time it was not dictum.35 
But, in 2015, in Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate 
Veterans, Inc.,36 the non-public forum reappeared!37  The Court held that the 
words or symbols on a specialty license plate were government speech.38  
For the majority, Justice Breyer rejected the argument that a specialty plate 
was some kind of “forum for private speech.”39  In doing so, he bypassed the 
usual practice of setting out the forum categories, instead simply rejecting, in 
turn, the applicability of each category of forum—traditional, designated, 
limited, and non-public.40 
Had order, such as it was, thereby been restored?  Perhaps, but one’s 
confidence is further weakened by the fact that, the following year, Justice 
Thomas, joined by Justice Alito in dissenting from a denial of certiorari, 
made reference to “a limited public forum, also called a nonpublic forum.”41 
So a legitimate question remains:  How many forum categories are 
there? 
 
                                                 
33. E.g., Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. at 672; 
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47, 52 (1966) (Adderley pre-dated the Perry terminology, 
but provides a clear example of a government property that had been opened to no one for 
expressive purposes). 
34. 561 U.S. 661 (2010). 
35. See id. at 679 n.11. 
36. 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015). 
37. See id. at 2252. 
38. Id. at 2246–47. 
39. Id. at 2250. 
40. Id. at 2250–51.  Writing for four Justices in dissent, Justice Alito said: 
What Texas has done by selling space on its license plates is to create 
what we have called a limited public forum.  It has allowed state property . . . to be 
used by private speakers according to rules that the State prescribes.  Under the 
First Amendment, however, those rules cannot discriminate on the basis of 
viewpoint.  But that is exactly what Texas did here. 
Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2262 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
41. Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. King Cty., 136 S. Ct. 1022, 1022 (2016) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting).  Thomas observed that “[d]istinguishing between designated and 
limited public forums has proved difficult,” and that the guidance provided by the Supreme 
Court on this point “has bedeviled federal courts.”  Id. 
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IV. THEORETICAL DISARRAY IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS 
Since 2010, federal appellate courts have remarkably, but 
understandably, exhibited considerable confusion regarding the number of 
public forum categories.42  In some circuits, panels continued to adhere to the 
pre-Summum list of three categories—traditional, designated, and non-
public43—as though the Supreme Court had said nothing that mattered in 
Summum or Christian Legal Society.44  Opinions from other circuits, 
variously and inconsistently, set forth either those three categories;45 all four 
categories;46 the three categories identified in Summum and Christian Legal 
Society;47 or those three categories, specifically said to be public fora, along 
with a separately-identifiedapparently sui generistype of government 
property, the “non-public forum.”48 
                                                 
42. See id. 
43. Hodge v. Talkin, 799 F.3d 1145, 1157–58 (D.C. Cir. 2015) cert. denied, 
136 S.Ct. 2009 (2016) (decided post-Walker, but not citing it); Sons of Confederate Veterans, 
Va. Div. v. City of Lexington, 722 F.3d 224, 229–30 (4th Cir. 2013); Am. Freedom Def. 
Initiative v. Suburban Mobility Auth. for Reg’l Transp., 698 F.3d 885, 890 (6th Cir. 2012); 
Satawa v. Macomb Cty. Rd. Comm’n, 689 F.3d 506, 517–18 (6th Cir. 2012); McGlone v. 
Bell, 681 F.3d 718, 732 (6th Cir. 2012);, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2009 (2016); Oberwetter v. 
Hilliard, 639 F.3d 545, 551 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Mass. 
Bay Transp. Auth., 781 F.3d 571, 578 (1st Cir. 2015); Minn. Majority v. Mansky, 708 F.3d 
1051, 1057 (8th Cir. 2013) (each asking whether a transportation authority’s advertising 
program was a designated or non-public forum).  Opinions in which the term “non-public 
forum” is used, without any list of categories, include International Society for Krishna 
Consciousness of California, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 764 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2014); 
United States v. Szabo, 760 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 2014); and K.A. ex rel. Ayers v. Pocono 
Mountain School District, 710 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2013). 
44. See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. Hastings Coll. of 
the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 669 (2010); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 
460, 481 (2009). 
45. Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 871 (11th Cir. 2011); 
Pittsburgh League of Young Voters Educ. Fund v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cty., 653 F.3d 
290, 295 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Martinez, 561 U.S. at 679 n.11). 
46. Wright v. Incline Vill. Gen. Improvement Dist., 665 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (citing Martinez, 561 U.S. at 679 n.11; Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 
523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998)). 
47. Galena v. Leone, 638 F.3d 186, 197 (3d Cir. 2011); Bloedorn v. Grube, 
631 F.3d 1218, 1230 (11th Cir. 2011); see also Newton v. LePage, 700 F.3d 595, 602 (1st Cir. 
2012) (rejecting the applicability of those three categories, with no mention of the non-public 
forum). 
48. Kaahumanu v. Hawaii, 682 F.3d 789, 799 (9th Cir. 2012); Miller v. City 
of Cincinnati, 622 F.3d 524, 535 n.1 (6th Cir. 2010).  In Kaahumanu, the court actually said 
this:  “The Supreme Court has divided public forums into three categories:  ‘[T]raditional 
public forums,’ ‘designated public forums,’ and ‘limited public forums.’  The rest of 
government property is either a non-public forum or no forum at all.”  Kaahumanu, 682 F.3d 
at 799 (citing Martinez, 561 U.S. at 679 n.11); see also Forbes, 523 U.S. at 678. 
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The Second Circuit has consistently identified four categories.49  The 
Tenth Circuit has also done so, but, somewhat oddly, has listed the original 
three major Perry categories first, adding that the Supreme Court “has since 
identified a separate category—the ‘limited public forum’—although the 
Court’s use of this term has been inconsistent,”50 despite the fact that the 
limited public forum made its first appearance in Perry.51  Even more oddly, 
the same court went on to observe that “‘the boundary between a designated 
public forum for a limited purpose . . . and a limited public forum . . . is far 
from clear.’”52  The Seventh Circuit has also treated the limited public forum 
as less than a full-fledged member of the family of forum categories, listing 
the three established categories and then adding: “Some decisions recognize 
a fourth category, variously called a ‘limited designated public forum’ . . . a 
‘limited public forum,’ or a ‘limited forum.’”53 
A different Seventh Circuit panel had earlier equated the limited and 
non-public categories, asserting that “[a] limited public forum—sometimes 
called a ‘non-public forum’—is a place the government has opened only for 
specific purposes or subjects. . . .”54  Other circuits have also equated the two 
concepts.55  In the Third,56 Eighth,57 and Ninth58 Circuits, there are, 
                                                 
49. Children First Found., Inc. v. Fiala, 790 F.3d 328, 339 (2d Cir.), reh’g 
granted, 611 F. App’x 741 (2d Cir. 2015); Ochshorn ex rel. R.O. v. Ithaca City Sch. Dist., 645 
F.3d 533, 539 (2d Cir. 2011); Zalaski v. City of Bridgeport Police Dep’t, 613 F.3d 336, 341–
42 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam); see also Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 650 F.3d 
30, 36 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding a public school to be a limited public forum, with no reference 
to any other categories). 
50. Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111, 1128 (10th Cir. 2012) 
(emphasis added); see also Verlo v. Martinez, 820 F.3d 1113, 1129 n.6 (10th Cir. 2016). 
51. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 
(1983); Miller v. City of Cincinnati, 622 F.3d 524, 535 n.1 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing the 
Summum decision as having “resolve[d] the confusion over terminology . . . after the Supreme 
Court first articulated the concept of a ‘limited public forum’ in Good News Club”). 
52. Doe, 667 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 916 
n.14 (10th Cir. 1997)). 
53. Women’s Health Link, Inc. v. Fort Wayne Pub. Transp. Corp., 826 F.3d 
947, 951 (7th Cir. 2016).  Judge Posner provided no citations supporting the use of the first or 
third of those terms, which this author has never encountered anywhere else.  See id. 
54. Milestone v. City of Monroe, 665 F.3d 774, 783 n.3 (7th Cir. 2011).  But 
in his later Women’s Health Link opinion, Judge Posner defined “designated public forum” as 
“a facility that the government has created to be, or has subsequently opened for use as, a site 
for expressive activity.  Usually, . . . ‘designated forums’ are available for specified forms of 
private expressive activity or at specified times . . . .  Such limitations are permitted.”  
Women’s Health Link, Inc., 826 F.3d at 951. 
55. See NAACP v. City of Phila., 834 F.3d 435, 441 (3d Cir. 2016); Powell v. 
Noble, 798 F.3d 690, 699 (8th Cir. 2015); Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign v. King Cty., 
781 F.3d 489, 496 n.2 (9th Cir. 2015); Victory Through Jesus Sports Ministry Found. v. Lee’s 
Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 640 F.3d 329, 334 (8th Cir. 2011). 
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accordingly, only three forum categories, because the “limited” and “non-
public” fora are viewed—albeit a bit tentatively—as one and the same.59  
The Third Circuit’s pronouncement on the point is worth quoting: 
 
There appears to be some inconsistency in federal courts’ 
opinions, even those of the Supreme Court, as to whether a limited 
public forum is a separate category or a subset of a designated 
public forum with a third category of forums being “non-public 
forums.”  Recently, the Court has used the term “limited public 
forum” interchangeably with “non-public forum,” thus suggesting 
that these categories of forums are the same.  Because the 
continued existence vel non of a “non-public forum” category has 
no bearing in this case, we need not dwell on the possible 
distinction between limited public forums and nonpublic forums.60 
 
Similarly the Ninth Circuit, guided by Christian Legal Society, set 
forth the traditional, designated, and limited categories, observing, with 
respect to limited public fora, that “in past cases they’ve sometimes been 
labeled ‘non-public’ forums.”61 
But less than a month later, a Ninth Circuit panel stated that, in light 
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Walker, “the proper term likely is ‘non-
                                                                                                                   
56. See City of Phila., 834 F.3d at 441.  “The final category is sometimes 
called a limited public forum and other times labeled a non-public forum.”  Id.  The court 
went on to “assume, without deciding, that the [district] [c]ourt was correct” in “conclud[ing] 
that the advertising space [at issue was] a limited public/non-public forum.”  Id. at 442 
(citation omitted). 
57. See Powell, 798 F.3d at 699; Victory Through Jesus Sports Ministry 
Found., 640 F.3d at 334.  “A limited public forum, like a non-public forum, may be ‘limited to 
use by certain groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of certain subjects,’ and the public 
entity ‘may impose restrictions on speech that are reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.’”  Victory 
Through Jesus Sports Ministry Found., 640 F.3d at 334–35 (quoting Christian Legal Soc’y 
Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 n.11 
(2010)). 
58. See Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign, 781 F.3d at 496 n.2. 
59. See City of Phila., 834 F.3d at 441; Powell, 798 F.3d at 699; Seattle 
Mideast Awareness Campaign, 781 F.3d at 496 n.2; Victory Through Jesus Sports Ministry 
Found., 640 F.3d at 334. 
60. Galena v. Leone, 638 F.3d 186, 197 n.8 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).  
The court added, “[w]e have stated that ‘we have generally applied to limited public fora the 
constitutional requirements applicable to designated public fora.’  In light of Pleasant Grove, 
this statement may no longer be good law.”  Id. at 198 n.9 (citations omitted); see also 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 461, 469–70 (2009). 
61. Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign, 781 F.3d at 496 n.2.  The Court 
added that “[t]he label doesn’t matter, because the same level of First Amendment scrutiny 
applies to all forums that aren’t traditional or designated public forums.”  Id. 
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public forum.’”62  Indeed, one might reasonably expect that, given Justice 
Breyer’s recognition of four categories of forum in Walker,63 all prior 
semantic confusion will be dispelled.64  But a few months later, yet another 
Ninth Circuit panel reverted, without explanation, to a list of three categories 
that included the limited public forum—but not the non-public forum.65  
Given the fact that some courts appeared to be uninfluenced by the language 
used by the Court in Summum and Christian Legal Society,66 along with the 
propensity of courts to keep quoting from their own precedents, Walker will 
probably not signal the end of judicial inconsistency in the listing of forum 
categories. 
V. MAKING SENSE OF THE CATEGORIES 
In a very recent Seventh Circuit opinion, Judge Posner made this 
surprising and somewhat cryptic comment:  “[I]t is rather difficult to see 
what work ‘forum analysis’ in general does.”67  Is he right?68  I would 
suggest, more modestly, that it is difficult to see what is accomplished by 
having three or four forum categories, particularly if, as it now appears, two 
of them are deemed to be essentially synonymous.69 
Let us first consider, then, whether it makes any sense to evaluate a 
speech restriction in a limited public forum just as we would evaluate such a 
restriction in a non-public forum.  Start by recognizing that, stray judicial 
pronouncements to the contrary notwithstanding70, the boundaries of the two 
                                                 
62. Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. King Cty., 796 F.3d 1165, 1169 n.1 (9th 
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1022 (2016). 
63. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 
2248–51 (2015). 
64. See id. 
65. See Reza v. Pearce, 806 F.3d 497, 502 (9th Cir.), reh’g denied, 2015 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 20118 (9th Cir. 2015). 
66. See supra text accompanying note 43. 
67. Women’s Health Link, Inc. v. Fort Wayne Pub. Transp. Corp., 826 F.3d 
947, 951 (7th Cir. 2016). 
68. I took the position, earlier, that the doctrine made presumptive sense.  
Rohr, supra note 1, at 34950. 
69. In my earlier article, I boldly asked, “how any reasonable jurist could 
believe that, in a scheme apparently comprising four categories, two of them—one labeled 
‘limited’ and one labeled ‘non’—are to be treated as exactly the same.”  Rohr, supra note 1, at 
334. 
70.  See supra text accompanying notes 54–61.  Consider also judicial 
definitions of “non-public forum” that tend to conflate the two categories, such as this: “The 
third category–the “nonpublic forum”–consists of government-owned facilities . . . that could 
be and sometimes are used for private expressive activities but are not primarily intended for 
such use.”  Women’s Health Link, Inc. v. Fort Wayne Pub. Transp. Corp., 826 F.3d 947, 951 
(7th Cir. 2016).  But Judge Posner clearly meant to distinguish this third category from a 
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categories are not precisely coterminous—which is why it made sense to 
identify them originally as two different categories.71  Courts—including the 
Supreme Court—have often applied the “non-public” label to government 
properties that were, in fact, opened to some speakers for expressive 
activity,72 but a non-public forum might also be a venue that had never been 
so opened.73 
Still, might it make sense to treat them similarly?  It might.  Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Arkansas Educational Television Commission 
v. Forbes74 paves the way toward this conclusion.  While that opinion 
perpetuated existing doctrinal confusion in some respects,75 it provided some 
helpful guidelines as well.  Kennedy never used the term “limited public 
forum” in this opinion, instead describing a non-public forum—by way of 
distinguishing it from a designated public forum—as if it were a limited 
forum.76  His key statement, made after discussing some earlier precedents, 
was this: 
 
These cases illustrate the distinction between “general 
access,” which indicates the property is a designated public forum, 
and “selective access,” which indicates the property is a non-
public forum. . . .  [T]he government does not create a designated 
public forum when it does no more than reserve eligibility for 
access to the forum to a particular class of speakers, whose 
members must then, as individuals, “obtain permission” to use it.77 
 
The “non-public forum” label was thus correlated with “selective 
access,” despite the facts that:  (a) the non-public category was originally 
described as encompassing venues that were not intended as First 
Amendment fora at all,78 and (b) selective access would seem to be an 
intrinsic feature of a limited forum.79  Now that the Supreme Court has 
                                                                                                                   
fourth, the “limited public forum.” 
71. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990); Perry Educ. 
Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). 
72. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730; Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. 
73. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 
(1992); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 41–42 (1966). 
74. 523 U.S. 666 (1998). 
75. See Rohr, supra note 1, at 320–25. 
76. See id. at 693 n.18; Rohr, supra note 1, at 327. 
77. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 679 (citations omitted). 
78. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 
(1983).  Justice White, in Perry Educucation Association, introduced the third category—soon 
known as the non-public forum—as “[p]ublic property which is not by tradition or designation 
a forum for public communication.”  Id. 
79. See id. at 46 n.7, 48. 
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repeatedly stated that both labels lead to the same judicial analysis,80 whether 
the forum is closed to all (for expressive purposes) or open to some (on a 
selective basis with permission still required) the merger appears complete. 
Given that the existence of a designated public forum has always 
been all about the government’s intent to make it so,81 this arguably makes 
sense; neither “no access for any speakers,” nor “access for some speakers 
with permission required” is consistent with an intent to open the forum to 
speakers.82  Justice Kennedy went on, in Forbes, to supply a policy reason 
for making “general” versus “selective” access the governing distinction.83  
By taking this approach, he wrote, “we encourage the government to open its 
property to some expressive activity in cases where, if faced with an all-or-
nothing choice, it might not open the property at all.”84 
The “mystery of the limited public forum,” of which I complained 
several years ago, is thus solved, albeit without the help of a clear 
explanation by the Supreme Court:  Rather than being a sub-set of the 
designated public forum, as first appeared,85 the limited public forum turns 
out to be a non-identical twin of the non-public forum.86  But why continue 
to use two different labels? 
                                                 
80. See supra text accompanying notes 31 and 34.  The two-part test—
reasonableness and the absence of viewpoint discrimination—linked, in Summum and 
Martinez, to the limited public forum is of course the same test that applied to non-public fora 
from the outset.  Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law 
v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679, 679 n.11 (2010); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 
460, 469–70 (2009). 
81. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 
(1985). 
82. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802; Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 52–53.  
This understanding is consistent with, and helps explain, this otherwise odd statement made 
by Justice O’Connor in her plurality opinion in Kokinda, referring to a post office sidewalk to 
which some speakers had been granted access: “Even conceding that the forum here has been 
dedicated to some First Amendment uses, and thus is not a purely nonpublic forum, under 
Perry, regulation . . . would still require application of the reasonableness test.”  Kokinda, 497 
U.S. at 730. 
83. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 680. 
84. Id. 
85. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802; Perry Educ. Ass’n 460 U.S. at 46 n.7; 
Rohr, supra note 1, at 306.  What appears to be Justice White’s definition of a limited public 
forum, presented for the first time in Perry Educ. Ass’n, was set forth in a footnote that sprang 
from his discussion of the category that soon came to be known as “the public forum created 
by government designation,” thereby suggesting that “limited” was a subset of “designated.”  
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802; Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7.  See also this statement, in 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in International Society for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc.:  “The second category of public property is the designated public forum, 
whether of a limited or unlimited character . . . .”  Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. 
v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992). 
86. Rohr, supra note 1, at 300. 
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VI. THE RIGHT TERMINOLOGY 
If the two categories were to be consolidated as one, what should 
that category be called?  One could simply do what several courts have 
recently done—namely, to use one of the two terms and quickly add that it is 
sometimes called the other,87 but that is an unsatisfying solution because, 
again, the two terms are really not synonymous.88  Is there a better phrase 
that accurately includes:  (a) government properties that are not open to any 
speakers and (b) those that are open only to some?  Quite frankly, I cannot 
think of one. 
But the phrase “non-public forum,” while awkward and misleading 
from the very beginning,89 might be serviceable—preferably with two 
hyphens—i.e., “non-public-forum”—if understood as denoting that a 
government property, having been consistently off limits to all private 
expression, is not a “forum” at all.90  And that might be expanded to include 
“selective-access” fora that, legally, do not trigger the higher levels of 
judicial scrutiny that apply in “traditional” public fora.  The “limited public 
forum” label could thus be eliminated.  Limited and non-public fora would 
therefore be lumped together, and defined simply by what they are not. 
Meanwhile, at the other end of the spectrum, are there really two 
categories of general-access fora?  Specifically, does the designated public 
forum—consistently acknowledged by the Supreme Court, and on every 
court’s list of categories—truly exist?  One can argue that, logically, it does 
not, because it is defined as a government property that has been 
intentionally opened for general access by private speakers;91 as long as that 
                                                 
87. Milestone v. City of Monroe, 665 F.3d 774, 783 n.3 (7th Cir. 2011); see 
also NAACP v. City of Phila., 834 F.3d 435, 441 (3d Cir. 2016); Powell v. Noble, 798 F.3d 
690, 699 (8th Cir. 2015); Victory Through Jesus Sports Ministry Found. v. Lee’s Summit R-7 
Sch. Dist., 640 F.3d 329, 334 (8th Cir. 2011). 
88. See supra text accompanying notes 71–73. 
89. See Rohr, supra note 1, at 302.  As I observed in my earlier article:  
“Because we are dealing, by definition, with publicand not privateproperty, the term 
[‘non-public forum’] is something of a misnomer.  It would be more accurate to speak, in such 
a case, of a ‘public non-forum’ . . . .”  Id. at 302 n.10. 
90. See Powell, 798 F.3d at 699; Milestone, 665 F.3d at 783 n.3.  Concededly, 
I cannot confidently cite any judicial decision as clearly supporting this understanding.  Note, 
too, that Justice Kennedy, in his majority opinion in the Forbes case, cryptically introduced 
the third forum category thusly:  “Other government properties are either non-public fora or 
not fora at all.”  Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998).  That 
statement was quoted, still without any explanation, in Kaahumanu v. Hawaii, 682 F.3d 789, 
800 (9th Cir. 2012).  I point this out simply to show that the concept of “not [a] forum at all” 
has been taken seriouslybut (a) apparently conceived of as something other than a non-
public forum, yet (b) never explained. 
91. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 679. 
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description fits the property, speech restrictions are subject to strict or 
intermediate judicial scrutiny.92  But the government actor in charge of the 
property is not obligated to maintain its general-access policy, and as soon as 
it denies a speaker access to the property, has it not switched to a policy of 
selective access, thereby throwing the venue into the non-public forum 
category?93  The designated forum would therefore seem capable of existing, 
but only as a utopian place in which, by definition, no occasion for litigation 
would ever arise; conflict immediately ends the property’s “designated” 
status.  The category could therefore be eliminated. 
But, notwithstanding this logic, courtsother than the Supreme 
Courthave held government properties to be designated public fora.94  The 
unspoken explanation of such a holding, which would seem necessary to 
render it consistent with prevailing forum theory, is that the government’s 
primary intention is to allow general access to speakers, the exclusion of the 
challenger thereby being viewed as somehow aberrational.95 
Could the “traditional” and “designated” categories be usefully 
combined into one?  In fact, that consolidation was suggested by Justice 
White’s initial identification of (what quickly came to be known as) the 
traditional public forum, back in 1983 in Perry; that “first” category was 
described as comprising “places which by long tradition or by government 
fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate . . . .”96  The coupling of 
tradition and government fiat, however, did not last long; “traditional” public 
fora have been defined largely by historical practice,97 without regard for the 
                                                 
92. See supra note 9. 
93. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 
825 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  My argument corresponds to that put forth by Justice 
Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion—which was highly critical of 
the Court’s emerging public forum rules—in Cornelius.  Id.  Notably, Blackmun, throughout 
this opinion, referred to the “limited public forum” rather than the “designated public forum,” 
clearly viewing a “limited” forum as presumptively open to speakers.  See id. 
94. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Va. Div. v. City of Lexington, 722 F.3d 
224, 230 (4th Cir. 2013); Doe, 667 F.3d at 1128–30; Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1234 
(11th Cir. 2011); Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 979 (8th Cir. 2006); Justice for All v. 
Faulkner, 410 F.3d 760, 769 (5th Cir. 2005); Giebel v. Sylvester, 244 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th 
Cir. 2001). 
95. In the words of Professor Post, criticizing Cornelius in 1987:  “There is 
only one way out of this vicious circle, and it is not very satisfactory.  It would require the 
Court to distinguish between the intent to include the class of speakers or subjects of which 
the plaintiff is the representative, and the intent to exclude the plaintiff.”  Robert C. Post, 
Between Governance and Management:  The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 
UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1757 (1987). 
96. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 
(1983). 
97. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 
678–79 (1992).  “These precedents foreclose the conclusion that airport terminals are public 
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government’s intent, while “government fiat” seems pretty clearly to 
correlate with the governmental intent needed to establish a “designated” 
forum.  But the fact that the two concepts did make their debut in tandem 
supports the possibility of reuniting them, under the singular heading of the 
“open” public forum—the openness of which could be established either by 
historical practice or governmental intent.  But the availability—at least in 
theory—of two separate paths to openness leads to the conclusion that the 
two separate labels—“traditional” and “designated”—might as well be 
retained. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
So how many public forum categories do we really have?  From a 
practical standpoint, there are really only two options:  Either the forum is 
open—by virtue of either tradition or designation—in which case the higher 
levels of judicial scrutiny apply, or it is not, in which case the more 
deferential judicial analysis is employed.98  But four labels remain in use, 
although the growing and prevailing view seems to be that two of those 
labels—“limited” and “non”—are now synonymous.  It truly appeared, two 
or three decades ago, that the “limited” forum was a viable, non-redundant 
category of its own, but there has been scant support for that understanding 
in recent years.  For the sake of clarity, that label should now be abandoned, 
preferably via a clear and explicit judicial pronouncement that will make 
speculative queries such as this little essay unnecessary. 
                                                                                                                   
fora. . . .  [T]he tradition of airport activity does not demonstrate that airports have historically 
been made available for speech activity.”  Id. at 680. 
The standard pronouncement is that streets, sidewalks, and parks are traditional 
public fora, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726–27 (1990), and the implication 
appears to be that those are the only properties worthy of inclusion in the category, but courts 
have at times stretched to pin the “traditional” label on other kinds of government property 
that are seen as sufficiently similar to streets, sidewalks, and parks.  E.g., ACLU of Nev. v. 
City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (publicly-owned pedestrian 
mall); Pouillon v. City of Owosso, 206 F.3d 711, 715–17 (6th Cir. 2000) (city hall steps). 
98. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. at 678–79 (1992); 
Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 726; Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45–46. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“‘Critical eyes are sizing you up right now.  Keep your face fresh, 
firm, fit,’ threatened the manufacturers of Williams’ Shaving Cream.”1  Such 
holds true in the streets of today’s society, as technology advances with 
incredible speed.2  A recent article emphasizes the danger of a new Russian 
mobile application, FindFace, which allows a stranger to snap a photo of 
another and, within seconds, learn of that person’s intimate information.3  A 
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1. SAMANTHA BARBAS, LAWS OF IMAGE: PRIVACY AND PUBLICITY IN 
AMERICA 91 (2015). 
2. See Ben Guarino, Russia’s New FindFace App Identifies Strangers in a 
Crowd with 70 Percent Accuracy, WASH. POST (May 18, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/05/18/russias-new-findface-
app-identifies-strangers-in-a-crowd-with-70-percent-accuracy/. 
3. Id. (The Russian identification application, FindFace, was created by 
Alexander Kabakov, 29, and Artem Kukharenko, 26, in February of 2016); Shaun Walker, 
Face Recognition App Taking Russia by Storm May Bring End to Public Anonymity, 
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series of photographs by Russian photographer, Yegor Tsvetkov, titled 
“‘Your Face is Big Data’ . . . shows how powerful facial recognition 
software has become; . . . a complete stranger can find you [with] the click of 
a button.”4  Even more alarming than the danger posed by the application is 
the creators’ inability to control its use.5 
Jurisprudence revolving around the topic of invasion of privacy in 
public spaces generally recognizes that, under most circumstances, one who 
reveals himself in public does not hold a reasonable expectation of privacy.6  
This reasoning is applied to general surveillance systems, such as 
videotaping; and artistic mediums, such as street photography.7  “But facial 
recognition [is] more fraught because, like DNA sequencing, it measures and 
                                                                                                                             
GUARDIAN (May 17, 2016, 4:39 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/may/17/findface-face-recognition-app-end-
public-anonymity-vkontakte. 
[FindFace] works by comparing photographs to profile pictures on 
Vkontakte, a social network popular in Russia and the former Soviet Union, with 
more than [two hundred] million accounts. . . . In the short time since the launch, 
FindFace has amassed 500,000 users and processed nearly [three million] searches, 
according to its founders . . . . 
Walker, supra.   
[T]he Russian developers say their facial recognition software could be 
used by authorities to fight crime—and, just as easily, score dates with attractive 
strangers. . . . FindFace can identify random passersby with about [seventy] percent 
accuracy, given two conditions:  You need to snap a photo of them, and they need 
to have a social media profile.   
Guarino, supra note 2. 
4. Elena Cresci, Russian Photographer Identifies Strangers with Facial 
Recognition App, GUARDIAN (Apr. 14, 2016, 10:27 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/14/russian-photographer-yegor-tsvetkov-
identifies-strangers-facial-recognition-app (“One girl in the project texted [Yegor Tsvetkov] 
after the publication and said that it was a bad feeling when she saw herself . . . but she fully 
understood [his] idea.”). 
5. See Alex Heath, This Russian Technology Can Identify You with Just a 
Picture of Your Face, BUS. INSIDER (June 21, 2016, 5:33 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/findface-facial-recognition-can-identify-you-with-just-a-
picture-of-your-face-2016-6 (“‘We see that the advantages for society from our technology are 
more helpful [than harmful],’ said Kabakov.  ‘We can[not] stop this process, but we should 
make it public.’”) (alteration in original). 
6. Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet:  A Tort 
Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989, 1003–04 (1995).  
“Intrusion is limited in some jurisdictions by the requirement of a physical trespass, and in 
virtually all jurisdictions by the rule that no intrusion can occur in a public place.”  Id. 
(footnote omitted). 
7. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of 
Public Space:  Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World That Tracks Image and Identity, 82 
TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1377, 1384 (2004); Nancy Danforth Zeronda, Note, Street Shootings:  
Covert Photography and Public Privacy, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1131, 1133, 1135 (2010). 
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records biological patterns unique to individuals.” 8   When asked about 
invasion of privacy and loss of anonymity concerns the application’s creator, 
Alexander Kabakov, responded: “A person should understand that, in the 
modern world, he is under the spotlight of technology.  You just have to live 
with that.”9 
The courts have addressed street photographythe capturing of 
another’s image in public spacesas a generally permitted intrusion.10  Part 
of the reasoning behind the legality of street photography is that the 
photographer is merely sharing information—an image—that was already in 
plain sight. 11   Such interpretation lacks the presence of more recent 
technology and needs revision.12  Face recognition not only shares an already 
visible image but also uses that image to share what is not in plain sight—
personal information. 13   Mobile applications that use facial recognition 
technology, such as FindFace, potentially offer strangers an advanced 
platform to begin persecution: 
Kabakov says the app[lication] could revolutioni[z]e 
dating:  “If you see someone you like, you can photograph them, 
find their identity, and then send them a friend request.”  The 
interaction [does not] always have to involve the rather creepy 
opening gambit of clandestine street photography, he added:  “It 
also looks for similar people.  So you could just upload a photo of 
a movie star you like, or your ex[-girlfriend], and then find [ten] 
girls who look similar to her and send them messages.”14 
“In [the] future, the designers imagine a world where people walking past 
you on the street could find your social network profile by sneaking a 
photograph of you, and shops, advertisers, and the police could pick your 
face out of crowds and track you down via social networks.”15  Today, this 
                                                     
8. Natasha Singer, When No One Is Just a Face in the Crowd, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/02/technology/when-no-one-is-just-a-face-
in-the-crowd.html. 
9. Walker, supra note 3. 
10. Zeronda, supra note 7, at 1131 n.1, 1140. 
11. Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 477–78 (Ala. 1964); 
Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 538 (2006) (“This 
reasoning was based on the secrecy paradigm—that once something is disclosed to the public, 
it is no longer secret.”). 
12. See Derek J. Sarafa et al., Use of Biometric Information as a Basis for 
Civil Liability, LAW360 (May 20, 2015, 10:14 AM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/654052/use-of-biometric-information-as-a-basis-for-civil-
liability. 
13. See Walker, supra note 3. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
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invasive technology is available to everyone, not just law enforcement 
agencies, and thus requires regulation.16  Facial recognition technology must 
be regulated for one fundamental distinction, the right to be seen versus the 
right to be recognized.17  While one cannot reasonably expect to not be seen 
in public, it is likely that a majority of people do in fact have a reasonable 
expectation of not being recognized.18   As such, the United States must 
amend its current laws to reflect the growing danger of extreme invasion and 
severe crime.19 
Part II begins by providing a brief legal history of street 
photography, addressing the issue of invasion of privacy.20  Part III continues 
with a discussion of the complex relationship between privacy rights and 
freedom of speech, focusing on the paradox of invasion of privacy in public 
spaces. 21   Part IV describes face recognitionhighlighting the scarce 
attention it receives in the United States and the risks resulting from the 
inaccuracy of face recognition technology. 22   Part V, using street 
photography case law as a starting point, proposes a line of reasoning that 
will help guide litigation dealing with the misuse of facial recognition 
technology in an effort to protect citizens from invasion of privacy. 23  
Finally, Part VI concludes by urging legal reform in order to arrive at a more 
encompassing scheme of privacy laws.24 
                                                     
16. Sarafa et al., supra note 12 (“Despite the proliferation of the use of 
biometrics, there are very few state statutes—and no federal statutes—that create civil 
remedies based on the capture and disclosure of biometric data by private businesses.”). 
17. See Russell Brandon, Someone’s Trying to Gut America’s Strongest 
Biometric Privacy Law, VERGE (May 27, 2016, 8:27 AM), 
http://www.theverge.com/2016/5/27/11794512/facial-recognition-law-illinois-facebook-
google-snapchat. 
18. See Solove, supra note 11, at 496. 
19. See Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1007 (N.H. 2003). 
 Public concern about stalking has compelled all fifty States to pass some 
form of legislation criminalizing stalking.  Approximately one million women and 
371,000 men are stalked annually in the United States.  Stalking is a crime that 
causes serious psychological harm to the victims, and often results in the victim 
experiencing post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, sleeplessness, and sometimes, 
suicidal ideations.  Not only is stalking itself a crime, but it can lead to more violent 
crimes, including assault, rape, or homicide. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
20. See infra Part II. 
21. See infra Part III. 
22. See infra Part IV. 
23. See infra Part V. 
24. See infra Part VI. 
118
Nova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol41/iss2/1
2017] FROM STREET PHOTOGRAPHY TO FACE RECOGNITION 241 
II. STREET PHOTOGRAPHY AND UNWANTED NOTORIETY 
In 1890, The Right to Privacy, a law review article by Supreme 
Court Justice Louis Brandeis and Professor Samuel Warren, revolutionized 
privacy law.25  In the article, the law is recognized to be an ever-evolving 
product of society’s “[p]olitical, social, and economic changes [which] entail 
the recognition of new rights.”26  They remind us that “common law [too], in 
its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society.”27  The piece was 
inspired, in part, by new privacy concerns sparked by developments in 
photographic technology:   
 
“Prior to 1884, cameras were large, expensive, . . . 
minimally portable, and they required subjects to sit still for 
extended periods of time to have their photograph taken.”  “In 
1884, the Eastman Kodak Company introduced the snap camera, 
an inexpensive, handheld camera that could take instantaneous 
photographs of people in public.”   “With the [arrival] of this 
technology and the growing popularity of print media, Warren and 
Brandeis . . . [anticipated that covertly] taken photographs would 
threaten the ‘right to be let alone’ . . . .”28   
 
Just as developments in photographic technology stimulated 
groundbreaking scholarly discussion regarding the laws of privacy, facial 
recognition technology is doing the same in the twentieth century.29 
“Street photography is a tradition nearly as old as photography 
itself.”30  In the early 1880s, as cameras and processing techniques became 
“portable and practical enough to leave the confines of the studio, . . . 
photographers began documenting the world around them” and unlocking 
new levels of privacy concerns.31  In particular, they photographed “urban 
areas where life moved quickly and the urge to record and document change 
and progress was instinctive.”32  In order to fully comprehend the connection 
                                                     
25. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890); Zeronda, supra note 7, at 1135. 
26. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 25, at 193. 
27. Id. 
28. Zeronda, supra note 7, at 1135; see also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 
25, at 193. 
29. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 25, at 196. 
30. Emily Airton, London Street Photography Festival, UNDO.NET (June 30, 
2011), http://1995-2015.undo.net/it/mostra/122873. 
31. Id.; see also Zeronda, supra note 7, at 1135–37. 
32. Airton, supra note 30; see also Charles Hagen, What Walker Evans Saw 
on His Subway Rides, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 1991), 
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between street photography and the law, and for purposes of clarity 
throughout this piece, it is important to offer a clear definition.33  According 
to the London Street Photography Festival, “[s]treet photography captures 
people and places within the public domain.”34  More specifically, it is an 
“un-posed, un-staged photography [that] captures, explores, or questions 
contemporary society and the relationships between individuals and their 
surroundings.”35  The essential element in this method of photographing is 
that the scene being captured is unplanned, and, consequentially, un-
consented.36   Thus, with the advent of street photography, the twentieth 
century saw the creation of the “law[s] of public image, and the phenomenon 
of personal image litigation,” a set of cases that address the issue of being 
photographed, and, more importantly, the use of those photographs without 
one’s consent.37 
Walker Evans’ renowned Subway Passengers photography series 
remains one of the earliest examples of street photography during the Great 
Depression era. 38   Using a hidden camera, Evans snapped photos of 
unsuspecting passengers traveling around New York City:  “‘He had the 
camera around his neck, resting on his chest, and a long cable going down 
his sleeve to his hand,’ said Helen Levitt, [ninety-one], . . . who accompanied 
Evans as he took many of the subway portraits.  ‘So he just pointed his chest 
at whomever he wanted to shoot . . . .’”39  The series of photos contains 
people of both genders, all races, and all ages.40  Particularly, in one of the 
portraits, an approximately seven-year-old girl is photographed.41  None of 
the subjects were asked for permission before having their photo taken, 
                                                                                                                             
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/31/arts/review-photography-what-walker-evans-saw-on-his-
subway-rides.html. 
33. See Airton, supra note 30; Zeronda, supra note 7, at 1131 n.1, 1133. 
34. Airton, supra note 30. 
35. Id. 
36. See id.; Philip Gefter, Street Photography:  A Right or Invasion?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 17, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/17/arts/street-photography-a-right-
or-invasion.html?_r=0; Zeronda, supra note 7, at 1132, 1140. 
37. BARBAS, supra note 1, at 1–2, 4, 190–91 (“The laws of image protect the 
right to control one’s public image, to defend one’s image, and to feel good about one’s image 
and public presentation of self.”). 
38. See Gefter, supra note 36; Hagen, supra note 32; Sewell Chan, Want 
Shots Like This?  Get a Permit, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/07/nyregion/want-shots-like-this-get-a-permit.html. 
39. Chan, supra note 38. 
40. Hagen, supra note 32; see also The Streets of New York: American 
Photographs from the Collection, 1938-1958, NAT’L GALLERY ART, 
http://www.nga.gov/content/ngaweb/features/slideshows/the-streets-of-new-york-american-
photographs-from-the-collectio.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
41. See Hagen, supra note 32; The Streets of New York: American 
Photographs from the Collection, 1938-1958, supra note 40. 
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manipulated, or sold.42  Moreover, no personal information of the subjects 
was presented.43 
Walker Evans influenced many other artists to record and document 
America in similar ways.44  Andrew Bush’s Vector Portraits series, from 
1989 through 1996, mimics the notion behind Subway Passengers.45  For 
about seven years, Bush would photograph people driving on the highway.46  
In an interview regarding his photographs, he described the series as 
“pictures of people as they were driving on freeways, . . . the notion of 
making a very still image of a person moving at a great velocity, . . . [the] 
notion of movement with a direction.”47  Bush created a moving tripod out of 
his car, “[w]here [he] attached a camera to . . . the passenger side and fixed a 
light so [he] could drive and look through [his] window and get an idea of 
what the framing . . . was.”48  According to Bush, several of his subjects, 
upon noticing that their picture had been taken, chased him, “wanting to 
know whether or not [he] was a detective involved with their divorce.”49  In 
this series, like with most street photography, the subjects were left 
unidentified.50 
Finally, Philip-Lorca DiCorcia, recognized as one of the most 
influential and innovative photographers working today,51 “set up his camera 
on a tripod in Times Square, attached strobe lights to scaffolding across the 
                                                     
42. See Chan, supra note 38; Hagen, supra note 32; The Streets of New York: 
American Photographs from the Collection, 1938-1958, supra note 40. 
43. See Chan, supra note 38; The Streets of New York: American Photographs 
from the Collection, 1938-1958, supra note 40. 
44. See Chan, supra note 38; Hagen, supra note 32. 
45. Charles Hagen, Review/Photography; People in Their Cars, Driving 
Along, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/27/news/review-
photography-people-in-their-cars-driving-along.html; see also Gefter, supra note 36. 
46. Hagen, supra note 45. 
47. See VernissageTV, Andrew Bush:  Vector Portraits.  Car Fetish, Museum 
Tinguely at 00:38-00:59, YOUTUBE (July 21, 2011), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=09as_OM5i-s. 
48. Id. at 1:37–1:53. 
49. Id. at 2:44–2:52. 
50. See Airton, supra note 30; Chan, supra note 38; Hagen, supra note 45 
(Although the photographs do not identify the subjects by their personal names or addresses, 
Bush recorded “where and when each photograph was taken, but also how fast the car was 
going, what the weather was like and so on.”). 
51. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Nussenzweig v. DiCorcia, No. 108446/05, 
2006 WL 304832, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 8, 2006) 
Defendant DiCorcia is a professional photographer for over [twenty-five] years.  
His body of work has drawn international artistic acclaim and has been exhibited in 
fine art museums around the world, including but not limited to, the Museum of 
Modern Art . . . , The Whitney Museum of Art . . . , the Museo National Centrio de 
Arte Reina Sofia . . . , and Art Space Gizo . . . . 
Id. 
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street, and in the time-honored tradition of street photography, took a random 
series of pictures of strangers passing under his lights.” 52   “The project 
continued for two years, [concluding] in an exhibition of a [series of 
seventeen] photographs called Heads at the Pace/MacGill Gallery in New 
York City.”53   DiCorcia was taken to court years later, after one of the 
subjects included in the series filed a lawsuit claiming that his right to 
privacy had been violated.54  Surely, it must have been striking to see his 
image printed in the catalogue, seeing as it was more than just a regular 
photograph:  “They are . . . more intimate, the paradox of standing farther 
away being enhanced intimacy.” 55   Indeed, Mr. Erno Nussenzweig, after 
seeing his photograph in a copy of the exhibition catalogue, was horrified to 
discover that his image had been commodified, exhibited, and sold without 
his knowledge. 56   In Nussenzweig v. DiCorcia, 57  the plaintiff filed a 
complaint arguing that not only was DiCorcia’s process of making art, and 
the subsequent exhibition and sale of it, a violation of his personal right to 
privacy, but that these actions also violated his religious beliefs. 58   The 
plaintiff is an Orthodox Hasidic Jew, and for him, the dissemination of his 
representation violated Orthodox religious views, namely the second 
commandment prohibition of graven images. 59   Nussenzweig considered 
DiCorcia’s photograph to be a type of graven image, and such a thing could 
have profound spiritual consequences—all the more so because it was 
                                                     
52. Gefter, supra note 36. 
53. Id.; see also Nussenzweig, 2006 WL 304832, at *3 (None of the seventeen 
subjects included in Heads consented to having their photographs taken or exhibited.)  “Pace 
[Gallery] is a photographic and picture gallery that exhibits and sells photographic art . . . .  It 
considers itself one of the nation’s leading art galleries specializing in art photography.”  
Nussenzweig, 2006 WL 304832, at *3. 
54. Id. at *1. 
55. Michael Kimmelman, Art in Review; Philip-Lorca diCorcia — ‘Heads’, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/14/arts/art-in-review-philip-
lorca-dicorcia-heads.html; see Nussenzweig, 2006 WL 304832, at *3. 
56. Nussenzweig, 2006 WL 304832, at *3–4; BARBAS, supra note 1, at 190 
(“Public figures had no privacy, said some courts, having waived it by pursuing a career in the 
spotlight.  Celebrities assumed the risk of having their privacy invaded when they embarked 
on a path towards public recognition and fame.”); Gefter, supra note 36 (It is important to 
note, for purposes of the law, that Nussenzweig was not famous, or in any way a public 
figure.). 
57. No. 108446/05, 2006 WL 304832 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 8, 2006). 
58. Id. at *3–4; Gefter, supra note 36 (“The suit sought an injunction to halt 
sales and publication of the photograph, as well as $500,000 in compensatory damages and 
$1.5 million in punitive damages.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
59. Nussenzweig, 2006 WL 304832, at *4; Exodus 20:4–5 (King James) 
(“Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or [a] likeness of any thing that is in 
heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth.  Thou shalt 
not bow down thyself to them, or serve them . . . .”). 
122
Nova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol41/iss2/1
2017] FROM STREET PHOTOGRAPHY TO FACE RECOGNITION 245 
reproduced countless times. 60   According to the Supreme Court of New 
York’s ruling, laws were in place to address Nussenzweig’s claim that 
DiCorcia had violated his right to privacy.61  As “[r]ight of privacy laws are 
intended to defend the average person from unwanted public exposure and 
the potential emotional damage thereby inflected,”62 it appears that the court 
would have ruled in favor of the plaintiff, for he certainly suffered from 
unwanted exposure that resulted in emotional harm and psychological 
distress.63  But the court did not.64  Instead, on February 8, 2006, the court 
entered summary judgment dismissing Nussenzweig’s complaint and 
articulated the tension that exists between experiencing a violation of one’s 
right to privacy in the legal sense, and experiencing such a violation in the 
personal sense. 65   Moreover, it rejected the claim on First Amendment 
grounds that the possibility of such a photograph is simply “the price every 
person must be prepared to pay for . . . [in] a society in which information 
and opinion flow freely.” 66   The court expressed its sympathy for the 
plaintiff, but dismissed his case nonetheless: 
 
Clearly, [the] plaintiff finds the use of the photograph 
bearing his likeness deeply and spiritually offensive.  The sincerity 
of his beliefs is not questioned by defendants or this court.  While 
sensitive to plaintiff’s distress, it is not redressable in the courts of 
civil law.  In this regard, the courts have uniformly upheld 
Constitutional [First] Amendment protections, even in the face of a 
deeply offensive use of someone’s likeness.67 
III. PRIVACY AND LOCATION 
“[C]ourts often view privacy as a binary status—information is 
either completely private or completely public,” with much middle ground to 
                                                     
60. Nussenzweig, 2006 WL 304832, at *34 (“A catalogue was published to 
coincide with the exhibition and the catalogue contained . . . the photograph of plaintiff.  
According to defendant, a substantial number of catalogues were distributed to the public 
during the period of September through October 2001.”). 
61. Id. at *5; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
62. Id. 
63. See id. at *4–5; Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 476 
(Ala. 1964) (discussing “[e]vidence offered by [subject of an unconsented photograph] during 
the trial tended to show that the [plaintiff], as a result of the publication of the picture, became 
embarrassed, self-conscious, upset, and was known to cry on occasions.”). 
64. Nussenzweig, 2006 WL 304832, at *8. 
65. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
66. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
67. Id. 
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be desired.68  Ironically, in Katz v. United States,69 the Supreme Court of the 
United States discussed that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not 
places.”70  Later in the discussion, however, it reiterated the common view 
that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of 
Fourth Amendment protection.”71  An article published by Professor of Law 
Daniel J. Solove attempts to reconcile these complex notions of privacy, 
acknowledging its elusive role in the legal sphere, stating that “[p]rivacy is 
far too vague a concept to guide adjudication and lawmaking, as abstract 
incantations of the importance of privacy do not fare well when pitted 
against more concretely stated countervailing interests.”72  In Nussenzweig, 
the laws of invasion of privacy proved to be deficient in protecting citizens 
from inquisitive lenses in public spaces.73 
Prima facie, the invasion caused by street photography seems 
instinctually threatening to our notions of privacy. 74   Individuals are 
photographed and then exhibited in famous museums, national media, and 
circulated in catalogues all around the world without their consent.75  Their 
images bring fortune to the photographer, for these photographs are often 
sold for thousands of dollars to the interested consumer, and today, they are 
further published on the Internet for all to see—posing new privacy concerns 
altogether.76  The ruling in Nussenzweig begs the public to assuage their 
                                                     
68. Solove, supra note 11, at 540; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 351 (1967); McClurg, supra note 6, at 1003–04, 1025. 
69. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
70. Id. at 351; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
71. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
72. Solove, supra note 11, at 478; see also Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 
162 So. 2d 474, 476 (Ala. 1964); Zeronda, supra note 7, at 1156 (This notion of freedom of 
expression as being upheld over a person’s right to privacy is seen uniformly throughout case 
law). 
 There is a fertile medium in this field of torts for the production of 
conflicts between the right of the individual to be let alone, and the right of the 
public to know—the latter concept being crystalized in our age old concept of 
freedom of speech and of the press.  The right of action for invasion of privacy has 
had to give way to the interest of the public to be informed . . . . 
Daily Times Democrat, 162 So. 2d at 476; Nussenzweig, 2006 WL 304832, at *8 (“Plaintiff 
argues that the use of [his] photograph interferes with his constitutional right to practice his 
religion.  The free exercise clause, however, restricts state action.”). 
73. See Nussenzweig, 2006 WL 304832, at *8. 
74. See McClurg, supra note 6, at 1041; Hagen, supra note 45 (“One driver 
was so incensed that he chased Mr. Bush for miles, and when he caught up with him at a 
stoplight, grabbed the keys of his car and demanded that he hand over the film.”). 
75. See Nussenzweig, 2006 WL 304832, at *3; Gefter, supra note 36. 
76. Nussenzweig, 2006 WL 304832, at *4 (“[The] Pace [Gallery] sold all [ten] 
edition prints of the [plaintiff’s] photograph, which were priced between $20,000 and $30,000 
a piece.”); BARBAS, supra note 1, at 210 (“The permanence of online information—the 
inability of online material to ever be fully deleted—is said to pose a profound threat to an 
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intuitions and accept an undoubtedly undesirable outcome, as the court 
emphasizes that this case is just one of many “examples illustra[ting] the 
extent to which the constitutional exceptions to privacy will be 
upheldnotwithstanding that the speech or art may have unintended, 
devastating consequences on the subject, or may even be repugnant.” 77  
Currently, the law addresses surveillance but generally does so by focusing 
on where surveillance takes place, rather than on the problematic effects it 
has on its subjects.78  Solove discusses the privacy dilemma when the debate 
involves locationi.e., private versus public areasbecause, “for the tort of 
public disclosure, ‘there is no liability when the defendant merely gives 
further publicity to information about the plaintiff that is already public.’”79   
Such seems to be the case in the aforementioned instances of street 
photography:  All subjects were captured in an already public area, and, thus, 
because there was no extra personal information added to the series of 
photos, the artists released no new information: 
On the public street, or in any other public place, the 
plaintiff has no right to be alone, and it is no invasion of his 
privacy to do no more than follow him about.  Neither is it such an 
invasion to take his photograph in such a place, since this amounts 
to nothing more than making a record, not differing essentially 
from a full written description of a public sight which anyone 
present would be free to see.80 
However, the issue is not so black and white and fails to account for 
the broader truth. 81   Once a photograph is made public, it is made a 
permanent record, and, thus, duplicates the impact that it has on the victim.82  
To hold that nothing new is disclosed when a photograph is disseminated is a 
                                                                                                                             
important aspect of our image rights:  our right to be forgotten.”) (emphasis added); Brian 
Fung, You Could Be in This FBI Facial-Recognition System and Not Even Know It, WASH. 
POST (June 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/06/16/you-
could-be-in-this-fbi-facial-recognition-system-and-not-even-know-it/ (explaining that not 
surprisingly, Americans are highly concerned about who has access to their personal 
information and the kinds of decisions that are made about them with that information).  
“[People do not] expect that their faces will become part of a permanent digital line-up.”  
Fung, supra. 
77. Nussenzweig, 2006 WL 304832, at *8. 
78. See Solove, supra note 11, at 549 (“The harm, then, is an impingement on 
the victim’s freedom in the authorship of [his or] her self-narrative, not merely her loss of 
profits.”). 
79. Id. at 540 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (AM. 
LAW INST. 1977)). 
80. Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 478 (Ala. 1964). 
81. See McClurg, supra note 6, at 1042. 
82. Id. 
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misstatement. 83   Each series of photographs discussed above created a 
compilation of information. 84   Although each subject was captured in a 
public place, by making his or her image part of a collage intended for 
publication, each subject suffered from exposure to increased accessibility.85  
Solove recommends considering the extent to which the information is made 
more accessible: 
 In United States Department of Justice v. Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press, the Supreme Court 
recognized the problem of increased accessibility. . . .  In addition 
to concluding that there was a difference between scattered pieces 
of information and a fully assembled dossier, the Court recognized 
that “there is a vast difference between the public records that 
might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files . . . and a 
computerized summary located in a single clearinghouse of 
information.”86 
The notion that “visual observation is not a search because the eyes 
cannot be guilty of trespass,” is devastating to our anonymity.87  Fortunately, 
in some narrow instances, courts have reconciled the holding of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy while being physically present in a public space: 
[I]n Nader v. General Motors Corp., Ralph Nader [claimed] that 
General Motors’ automobiles were unsafe.  General Motors [then] 
undertook a massive investigation seeking information discrediting 
Nader.  Among other things, General Motors wiretapped his 
telephone [conversations] and placed him under extensive 
surveillance while in public.  The court recognized that certain 
kinds of public surveillance might amount to an invasion of 
privacy; although observation “in a public place does not amount 
to an invasion of . . . privacy,” in certain instances, “surveillance 
may [also] be so overzealous as to render it actionable.”  The court 
noted:  “A person does not automatically make public everything 
he does merely by being in a public place, and the mere fact that 
                                                     
83. Id. 
84. See Nussenzweig v. DiCorcia, No. 108446/05, 2006 WL 304832, at *3–8 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 8, 2006); The Streets of New York: American Photographs from the 
Collection, 1938-1958, supra note 42; VernissageTV, supra note 47, at 1:00. 
85. See Nussenzweig, 2006 WL 304832, at *3. 
86. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 
U.S. 749, 764 (1989); Solove, supra note 11, at 541. 
87. See Susan McCoy, Comment, O’Big Brother Where Art Thou?:  The 
Constitutional Use of Facial-Recognition Technology, 20 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. 
L. 471, 481 (2002). 
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Nader was in a bank did not give anyone the right to try to 
discover the amount of money he was withdrawing.”88 
Therefore, it is clear that although the law focuses on whether 
surveillance occurs in a public or private place, surveillance may be harmful 
in all settings, not just private.89  In Bush’s Vector Portraits, it is not so 
obvious that the photographs captured people in an evidently public space.90  
In fact, all of the subjects were within the confines of their automobiles, and 
“[n]ot surprisingly, some people [felt] threatened by this invasion of the 
semipublic-semiprivate space of their cars.” 91   In 1985, United States v. 
Karo, 92  the Supreme Court of the United States compared invasion of 
privacy as it applied to private and public places:  the home versus an 
automobile.93  While the Court held that a tracking device placed inside a 
person’s home violated the Fourth Amendment, it looked to another case by 
the Supreme Court of the United States in which the police placed an 
electronic tracking device was placed in the plaintiff’s car to track the 
location of the vehicle.94  The Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment 
did not apply to the automobile because “[a] person traveling in an 
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy,” since it, “could have been observed by the naked eye.”95  Despite 
this holding and the fact that each of the Vector Portraits were taken in the 
streets of Los Angeles, California, the notion of a person’s car as semipublic-
semiprivate property should hold true.96  Like a housethe ultimate symbol 
of private propertyan automobile should also be considered private 
property in which one holds a reasonable expectation of privacy.97  It is easy 
                                                     
88. Solove, supra note 11, at 498; see also Nader v. General Motors Corp., 
255 N.E.2d 765, 771 (N.Y. 1970). 
89. See Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 477–78 (Ala. 
1964). 
90. See Hagen, supra note 45. 
91. Id. (emphasis added). 
92. 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
93. See id. at 709–12. 
94. Id. at 713 (citing to United States. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983)); see 
also U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
95. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281; Karo, 468 U.S. at 714; see also U.S. CONST. 
amend. IV. 
96. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392–94 (1985); Knotts, 460 U.S. 
at 281–82; Hagen, supra note 45. 
97. See Carney, 471 U.S. at 390–94; Karo, 468 U.S. at 714, 734 (“[P]rivate 
residences are places in which the individual normally expects privacy free of governmental 
intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is 
prepared to recognize as justifiable.”); Solove, supra note 11, at 496 (“[T]he Fourth 
Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance of the house.”) (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001)). 
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to imagine instances of people engaging in activities inside of their cars that 
they would otherwise not do in public spaces, such as apply make-up, talk 
loudly on the phone, play loud music, or pick their nose.98  This phenomenon 
is due to the perception of being within a protected private area.99  Certainly, 
this is not the case in public streets.100  People walking in Times Square for 
instance, surrounded by others and unprotected by their car windows and 
doors, will likely not take part in these behaviors.101  This is evident in the 
two series themselves.102  Bush’s automobile portraits seem instantly more 
humorous, since they depict people engaging in acts not normally seen in 
public.103  DiCorcia’s, on the other hand, is more solemn for people are 
aware of their surroundings and knowingly restrain their emotions and 
actions.104  Furthermore, simply because the cars featured were in public 
placesi.e., a freewayit should not be the case that the artist is authorized 
to take the photo.105  One cannot say that just because a person’s house is not 
located within a gated community others are free to take photos of the person 
through his or her window.106  Here, it is important to reference Solove’s 
distinction between exposure and disclosure: 
Exposure is related to disclosure in that concealed information is 
revealed to others, but the information is not revealing of anything 
we typically use to judge people’s character.  Unlike disclosure, 
exposure rarely reveals any significant new information that can be 
used in the assessment of a person’s character or personality.  
Exposure creates injury because we have developed social 
                                                     
98. Solove, supra note 11, at 493–95. 
99. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 735; The Streets of New York: American 
Photographs from the Collection, 1938-1958, supra note 42 (“Aware that people would 
inevitably compose themselves and alter their expressions if they knew they were being 
photographed, [Walker Evans] did not raise the camera to his eye to look through [his] 
viewfinder, nor did he adjust its focus or exposure, or use a flash.”). 
100. See Solove, supra note 11, at 493, 495–96, 498 (explaining that being 
aware of the general possibility of being watched, without certainty, can cause similar 
phenomenon.  “[B]ased on Jeremy Bentham’s 1791 architectural design for a prison called . . . 
Panopticon,” the Panoptic effect describes this very scenario). 
101. See id. at 493–95. 
102. See Hagen, supra note 45; Kimmelman, supra note 55. 
103. Hagen, supra note 45 (“A pouty blonde in a purple sweater . . . [a] beefy 
tattooed man in ridiculous sunglasses drives a canary-yellow car with delicate racing 
stripes.”). 
104. See Kimmelman, supra note 55. 
105. See Hagen, supra note 45; McClurg, supra note 6, at 991, 995, 1043. 
106. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 735 (1984); Hagen, supra note 
45. 
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practices to conceal aspects of life that we find animal-like or 
disgusting.107 
This distinction is relevant to our photographers:  In Heads, 
DiCorcia discloses information about peoplenamely their faces as they 
walk down the streetand in Vector Portraits, Bush oftentimes exposes the 
individuals by showing them in vulnerable situations.108  One may argue that 
yawning, kissing, or singing in one’s car is hardly animal-like or disgusting 
behavior and is surely different from nudity or sexual acts.109  Nonetheless, 
these examples constitute a set of behaviors that we are often taught to avoid 
in public spaces.110  It is likely that the man would have covered his mouth 
had he known he was being watched, that the couple would not have kissed 
so intimately, and that the girl would not have sang aloud.111  The court 
supported this notion in Daily Times Democrat v. Graham,112 in which air 
jets blew up a woman’s dress while she was in a country fair, exposing her 
underwear.113  At that very moment, a photographer for the local newspaper 
took her photograph, and the picture was printed on the front page of the 
paper.114  The newspaper contended that the picture was taken in public, and 
that, accordingly, there was no privacy interest. 115   “However, the court 
concluded that the woman still had a right to be protected from ‘an indecent 
and vulgar’ violation of privacy . . . .”116 
“Understood broadly, these actions are all forms of intrusion.  
Intrusion involves invasions or incursions into one’s life.  It disturbs the 
victim’s daily . . . [life and] solitude . . . .”117  As we have noted, courts 
throughout the United States have not held uniformly in regards to privacy 
laws.118  In some cases, they have ruled solely based on the location of said 
invasion: 
 
[G]iven . . . the increasing presence of cameras in public, people 
were said to assume the risk of unwanted publicity whenever they 
went outside their homes.  While a person might have a cause of 
                                                     
107. Solove, supra note 11, at 536 (emphasis added). 
108. See Hagen, supra note 45; Kimmelman, supra note 55. 
109. Solove, supra note 11, at 536–37. 
110. See id.; VernissageTV, supra note 47, at 2:20–2:53. 
111. See Solove, supra note 11, at 495. 
112. 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964). 
113. Id. at 476. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 477–78. 
116. Solove, supra note 11, at 538 (quoting Daily Times Democrat, 162 So. 2d 
at 478). 
117. Id. at 553; see also Daily Times Democrat, 162 So. 2d at 476. 
118. See Solove, supra note 11, at 498. 
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action for intrusion upon seclusion if a paparazzo broke down his 
door to get a picture, an individual in a public place was fair game.  
The dominant rule was that ‘photographers on public property may 
take pictures of anyone they want to, objection or not.’119 
 
In other cases, the court ruled based on the harms that the said 
invasion caused to the victim. 120   Location should not, under any 
circumstances, be the sole factor in making a decision in cases dealing with 
privacy laws.121  As the court in Daily Times Democrat stated, “a purely 
mechanical application of legal principles should not be permitted to create 
an illogical conclusion.”122  There are more significant factors involvedin 
particular, the injury resulting from the invasion and the revelation of new 
private information.123  Especially today, as privacy seems to lose popularity 
with the development of more complex technological systems, anonymity 
must be safeguarded and privacy laws reviewed with modern glasses.124 
IV. FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY 
“Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise[s] have 
invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous 
mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that ‘what is 
whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.’” 125  
Although Professor Warren and Justice Brandeis were referring to the 
advances in photographic technology, the same statement applies today, 
perhaps more appropriately than it did a century ago:  “In the past hundred 
years, in increasing numbers, Americans have turned to the law to help them 
defend and control their public images.”126  Street photography announced its 
sequel, one that is more covert, more sophisticated, and vastly more 
intrusive:  face recognition.127  “Face recognition is a subset of biometrics, a 
                                                     
119. BARBAS, supra note 1, at 191. 
120. See Daily Times Democrat, 162 So. 2d at 476, 478. 
121. See id. at 478. 
122. Id. 
123. See Nussenzweig v. DiCorcia, No. 108446/05, 2006 WL 304832, at *8 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 8, 2006). 
124. See Walker, supra note 3. 
125. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 25, at 195. 
126. BARBAS, supra note 1, at 1; see also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 25, at 
195. 
127. See Blitz, supra note 7, at 1383; Natasha Singer, Consumer Groups Back 
Out of Federal Talks on Face Recognition, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (June 16, 2015, 12:10 AM), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/consumer-groups-back-out-of-federal-talks-on-face-
recognition/?_r=o. 
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technology that involves recording and analyzing people’s unique 
physiological characteristics, like their fingerprint ridges or facial features, to 
learn or confirm their identities.” 128   Today, people seek to defend and 
control not only their public images, but also the way in which their personal 
information is acquired and used. 129   Although “[f]acial recognition 
technology was first developed in the 1960s, . . . [it] only recently became 
accurate enough for widespread use.” 130   Facial recognition has indeed 
become widespread—becoming one of the most powerful tracking tools in 
modern technology: 
Face recognition technology works by scanning a photo or video 
still of an unknown face and comparing its unique topography 
against a facial-scan database of people whose names are already 
known.  Because the technology can be used covertly, civil 
liberties advocates say its popularization has the potential to 
undermine people’s ability to conduct their personal business 
anonymously in . . . public spaces.131 
The technology “became famous when it was [used as an experiment 
during] the 2001 Super Bowl in Tampa.”132  Facial recognition technology 
has the power to “link a person’s online persona with his or her actual offline 
self at a specific public location,” thus becoming a threat to our ability to 
                                                                                                                             
Whatever one thinks of these impressive technological advances in . . . surveillance, 
they are not accurately described as a mere automated equivalent of human vision 
that captures nothing more than “what any passerby would easily have been able to 
observe.”  Rather, they change public space into something it would not otherwise 
be, something which in a sense preserves and processes records of people’s 
movements and activities in a way that primitive cameras . . . have not done before. 
Blitz, supra note 7, at 1383 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 1269, 1281 (10th Cir. 
2000)). 
128. Singer, supra note 127. 
129. See BARBAS, supra note 1, at 209–10; Singer, supra note 8.  “Facebook in 
2011 introduced Sponsored Stories, a system that enabled advertisers to use Facebook users’ 
likes as product endorsements.  If you liked Coca-Cola on Facebook, for example, Coke could 
then use your name and image in an advertisement. . . .  The company settled with the users 
for [twenty] million.”  BARBAS, supra note 1, at 209–10.  This is similar to the issue of facial 
recognition and mobile apps—i.e., what differentiates these circumstances, where a person 
voluntarily reveals their likes, to that person’s image being published and shared with a larger 
audience?  See id. 
130. Timothy Williams, Facial Recognition Software Moves from Overseas 
Wars to Local Police, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/13/us/facial-recognition-software-moves-from-overseas-
wars-to-local-police.html. 
131. Singer, supra note 127; see also Fung, supra note 76. 
132. McCoy, supra note 87, at 476. 
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remain anonymous in public.133  Although the need for a stronger right to 
privacy in the digital world has been the subject of a good deal of 
campaigning and discussion, there is still much work left to be done.134 
A. Comparing the Law 
At common law, “a set of tort rights . . . protect[s] against four types 
of invasion of privacy: . . . (1) intrusion upon one’s seclusion; (2) public 
disclosure of private facts; (3) publicity that places one in a false light before 
the public; and (4) appropriation of one’s name or likeness without 
permission.” 135   As technology advances, however, our current world 
becomes less common, and the common law of invasion of privacy becomes 
less useful in protecting our images.136  As Paul M. Schwartz, Professor of 
Law, notes, “[v]arious limitations that the common law places on each of 
these four branches eliminate their usefulness in responding to violations of 
                                                     
133. Singer, supra note 8 (“[F]acial recognition technology has the potential to 
provide important benefits and to support a new wave of technological innovation, . . . but it 
also poses consumer privacy challenges.”). 
134. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; BARBAS, supra note 1, at 210; Singer, supra 
note 127. 
135. Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig’s Code for Internet Privacy:  
Cyberspace Filters, Privacy Control, and Fair Information Practices, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 743, 
777 (2000) (citing to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652A (AM LAW. INST. 1977)). 
General Principle:  (1) One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to 
liability for the resulting harm to the interests of the other.  (2) The right to privacy 
is invaded by[:]  (a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, as stated 
in § 652B; or (b) appropriation of the other’s name or likeness, as stated in § 652C; 
or (c) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life, as stated in § 652D; or 
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public, as 
stated in § 652E. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652A–D.  “[E]ach [of the four torts] involves 
interference with the interest of the individual in leading, to some reasonable extent, a 
secluded and private life, free from the prying eyes, ears, and publications of others.”  Id. § 
652A. 
136. Schwartz, supra note 135, at 777–78; see also McClurg, supra note 6, at 
1008 (citing to Jackson v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 10, 11 (S.D. Ohio 1983)). 
 Consider the case of the three boys who were photographed without 
their consent while they spoke with a policewoman on a public sidewalk.  The 
photo subsequently appeared in Playboy magazine next to nude photos of the 
policewoman, and the three boys sued the magazine for invasion of privacy.  Their 
position evokes sympathy.  It seems wrong for one to secretly photograph a person 
without his consent and then to disseminate the photo to a wide audience, 
particularly in a manner and publication many would find objectionable.  However, 
the court held that the facts fell short of satisfying the requirements of any of the 
four invasion of privacy torts and dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint.  The court 
ruled that no intrusion occurred because the photo was taken on a public sidewalk 
‘in plain view of the public eye.’ 
McClurg, supra note 6, at 1008. 
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privacy in cyberspace.”137  To further illustrate the weakness of current laws, 
it is useful to contrast American jurisprudence regarding privacy against that 
of other countries: 
American laws do not protect the right to one’s public image and 
persona as extensively as in other parts of the world.  In some 
European countries, under certain conditions, newspapers or 
websites can be forbidden from publishing ostensibly newsworthy 
pictures of people, or facts in public record, without the subject’s 
authorization.  This broad protection of public image would be 
unimaginable in the United States.  Since the 1940s, the image 
torts have been substantially constrained by freedom of speech and 
press, and it is difficult to recover under them.  Despite this, the 
laws of image remain alive, not only on court dockets but in legal 
culture—in Americans’ beliefs about the law, the legal system, and 
their legal rights and entitlements.138 
In Karo, the Supreme Court of the United States held that, “[i]t is the 
exploitation of technological advances that implicates the Fourth 
Amendment, not their mere existence.” 139   Facial recognition does not 
merely exist; rather, it is being used rather aggressively and “remains largely 
unregulated in the United States.” 140   Further, the majority reasoning in 
Nader noted that “extensive public surveillance can reveal hidden details that 
would not ordinarily be observed by others. . . .  The court did not recognize 
the surveillance as a harm itself—only surveillance that destroyed secrecy 
represented an actionable harm.”141  The sole function of facial recognition is 
destroying people’s secrecy.142  Advocates of privacy, amidst the growing 
danger of invasion, are aware of these risks and have begun to propose 
necessary regulations.143  During an event organized by the White House in 
which technology industry experts and consumer advocates confronted the 
issue of facial recognition, “[p]articipants . . . agreed to endorse notices that 
app[lication]s could display before they were downloaded, alerting users if 
                                                     
137. Schwartz, supra note 135, at 777–78. 
138. BARBAS, supra note 1, at 5. 
139. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984); see also U.S. CONST. 
amend. IV. 
140. Jeff John Roberts, Facebook and Google Really Want to Kill This Face-
Scanning Law, FORTUNE (June 30, 2016, 10:17 AM), 
http://www.fortune.com/2016/06/30/facebook-google-facial-recognition-lawsuits/. 
141. Solove, supra note 11, at 498–99 (citing Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 
N.E.2d 765, 769, 771 (N.Y. 1970)). 
142. See Singer, supra note 8; Singer, supra note 127. 
143. See Singer, supra note 8; Singer, supra note 127. 
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an app[lication] collected material, like photos or contact lists, from their 
phones.”144  Further: 
 
In 2012, the Obama administration [announced] a plan for a 
consumer privacy bill of rights.  Among other things, the report 
called for the Commerce Department to [organize] a series of 
multi-stakeholder processes in which trade and advocacy groups 
were to create industry codes of conduct for the use of drones, 
data-mining by mobile apps, and other consumer-tracking 
technologies.145   
 
Few of their efforts, however, have been successful, as companies 
like Google and Facebook make it difficult for legal reform by pouring 
money into lobbying and litigation: 
In the last [sixteen] months, the two sides had been 
meeting periodically under the auspices of the National 
Telecommunications & Information Administration, a division of 
the Commerce Department.  But the privacy advocates said they 
were giving up on talks because they could not achieve what they 
consider minimum rights for consumers—the idea that companies 
should seek and obtain permission before employing face 
recognition to identify individual people on the street.  ‘At a base 
minimum, people should be able to walk down a public street 
without fear that companies [they have] never heard of are 
tracking their every movement—and identifying them by name—
using facial recognition technology . . . .  Unfortunately, we have 
been unable to obtain agreement even with that basic, specific 
premise.’146 
The state of California, the mecca of technology development and 
the place “where many businesses that use [facial] recognition technology 
are located,” has failed to enact any pertinent regulation;  “the most recent 
attempt to pass a biometric information law died in committee.” 147  
Fortunately, several states like Texas and Illinois continue to fight for 
reform, enacting laws to allow citizens some degree of control over their 
images by requiring companies to notify people and obtain their permission 
before taking facial scans or sharing their biometric information.148  Illinois’ 
                                                     
144. Singer, supra note 8. 
145. Singer, supra note 127. 
146. Id.; see also Roberts, supra note 140. 
147. Sarafa et al., supra note 12. 
148. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b) (2015); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 
503.001 (West 2015); see also Russell Brandom, Someone’s Trying to Gut America’s 
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Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”) is “a simple law, requiring a 
person’s explicit consent before” his biometric information is taken.149  Its 
strength, however, is the fact that it allows for a private right of action.150  
“[S]ince the law was first passed, [facial recognition technology has] become 
a central part of products like Google Photos, Snapchat filters, and 
Facebook’s photo-tagging system.” 151   Under Illinois law, “[a]ll three 
companies are currently facing lawsuits for allegedly violating [BIPA], 
producing biometric face prints without notifying Illinois citizens.” 152  
Consequently, the law has proven to be a nuisance for technology giants like 
Google and Facebook. 153   According to a recent article, under BIPA, 
“companies that collect biometric identifiers without consent can be forced 
to pay $1,000 or $5,000 for each violation,” or, if the class action lawsuits 
were to succeed, “they could force the companies to pay millions of dollars 
in damages and, in what would likely be a greater nuisance, force them to 
change their policies around how they use faces.”154 
                                                                                                                             
Strongest Biometric Privacy Law, VERGE (May 27, 2016, 8:27 AM), 
http://www.theverge.com/2016/5/27/11794512/facial-recognition-law-illinois-facebook-
google-snapchat; Sarafa et al., supra note 12 (“Texas has statutory provisions addressing 
biometric data, but only the Texas attorney general can bring an action to enforce the statute 
and collect a civil penalty.”). 
149. Brandom, supra note 148. 
 No private entity may collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, 
or otherwise obtain a person’s or a customer’s biometric identifier or biometric 
information, unless it first:  (1) informs the subject or the subject’s legally 
authorized representative in writing that a biometric identifier or biometric 
information is being collected or stored; (2) informs the subject or the subject’s 
legally authorized representative in writing of the specific purpose and length of 
term for which a biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected, 
stored, and used; and (3) receives a written release executed by the subject of the 
biometric identifier or biometric information or the subject’s legally authorized 
representative. 
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b). 
150. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 (2015); Sarafa et al., supra note 12. 
151. Brandom, supra note 148. 
152. Id.; see also 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b)(1)–(3). 
153. Roberts, supra note 140; see also 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b). 
[O]n April 1, 2015, a class action was filed against Facebook Inc. in the Circuit 
Court of Cook County, Illinois, seeking to extend the reach of the BIPA.  The 
plaintiff claims that Facebook’s Photo Tag Suggest function—which analyzes 
photos uploaded by users and suggests which of the user’s Facebook friends is 
pictured—runs afoul of the act because it relies on facial recognition software to 
scan uploaded photos and extract and compare unique biometric facial 
characteristics.  This claim is made despite the fact that this technology is not being 
used for financial transactions or security screenings and does not collect biometric 
information directly—it does so only through photos. 
Sarafa et al., supra note 12. 
154. Roberts, supra note 140 (“Earlier this year, the online scrapbook company 
Shutterfly . . . quietly settled a case that alleged its face-scanning violated the law.”); see also 
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15, 20. 
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In Germany, where online privacy enjoys much more protection than 
in other countries, facial recognition technology has faced many legal 
challenges.155   In 2011, German officials responded with legal action to 
privacy threats posed by facial recognition technology employed by 
Facebook.156  Johannes Caspar, a Hamburg data protection official, stated: 
The legal situation is clear in my opinion . . . .  If the data were to 
get into the wrong hands, then someone with a picture taken on a 
mobile phone could use biometrics to compare the pictures and 
make an identification . . . .  Such a system could be used by 
undemocratic governments to spy on the opposition or by security 
services around the world.  The right to anonymity is in danger . . . 
.157 
According to Caspar, “[t]he software offered potential for 
considerable abuse and was illegal.”158  Although Facebook responded in 
opposition, saying that users can easily disable its facial recognition feature, 
it failed to capture the essence of German data protection law:  express 
consent.159  Caspar, in a different interview, discussed an essential aspect of 
Facebook’s policy that made its use of the intruding technology more 
troublesome:  The inability for a user to expressly consent to storage of their 
personal data.160  “[W]e have demanded that biometric data be stored with 
the subject’s express consent.  At first any company has to ask whether the 
user wants his or her data stored or not.  Facebook just gives [users] the 
possibly to opt-out.  If you [do not] opt-out, [you are] not consenting.”161  
This policy of express consent by users remains at the core of German data 
protection laws and should be mirrored in the United States.162  People want 
                                                     
155. Helen Pidd, Facebook Facial Recognition Software Violates Privacy 
Laws, Says Germany, GUARDIAN (Aug. 3, 2011, 10:08 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/aug/03/facebook-facial-recognition-privacy-
germany. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. Id.; see also Cyrus Farivar, Facebook Violates German Law, Hamburg 
Data Protection Official Says, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Feb. 8, 2011), 
http://www.dw.com/en/facebook-violates-german-law-hamburg-data-protection-official-
says/a-15290120 [http://dw.com/p/129eq] (“Germany has among some of the strictest data 
protection and privacy laws in the European Union, largely created in the wake of 
informational abuses perpetrated by the Nazis and the Stasi, the East German secret police.”). 
159. Farivar, supra note 158. 
160. See id. 
161. Id. 
162. See id.; Roberts, supra note 140. 
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to protect information that makes them vulnerable to potential violent 
crimes.163   
In Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc.,164 the defendant was seemingly 
obsessed with Amy Lynn Boyer.165  He purchased Boyer’s social security 
number and employment address, among other information, from a database 
company called Docusearch.166  The man went to Boyer’s workplace, waited 
for her to leave, and murdered her.167  The court concluded that, “threats 
posed by stalking and identity theft lead us to conclude that the risk of 
criminal misconduct is sufficiently foreseeable so that an investigator has a 
duty to exercise reasonable care in disclosing a third person’s personal 
information to a client.”168  While it may be feasible to expect an individual 
investigator to exercise reasonable care in sharing one’s personal 
information, expecting multi-million dollar companies to adhere to this 
standard is not.169  The only foreseeable solution is requiring express consent 
from users before these companies can sell and distribute their intimate 
information.170 
B. Inaccuracy and Risks 
Although street photography is intrusive, especially if the image is 
later published and distributed, it does not run the risk of inaccuracy.171  
Courts have held that street photography, despite its possible negative 
                                                     
163. See Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1007 (N.H. 2003). 
164. 816 A.2d 1001 (N.H. 2003). 
165. See id. at 1005–06. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 1006. 
 On October 15, 1999, [the defendant] drove to Boyer’s workplace and 
fatally shot her as she left work.  [The defendant] then shot and killed himself.  A 
subsequent police investigation revealed that [he] kept firearms and ammunition in 
his bedroom, and maintained a website containing references to stalking and killing 
Boyer as well as other information and statements related to violence and killing. 
Id. 
168. Remsburg, 816 A.2d at 1008. 
169. See id.; Roberts, supra note 140. 
170. See FLA. STAT. § 540.08(1) (1997) (“No person shall publish, print, 
display or otherwise publicly use for purposes of trade or for any commercial or advertising 
purpose the name, portrait, photograph, or other likeness of any natural person without the 
express written or oral consent to such use . . . .”) (emphasis added); Roberts, supra note 140. 
171. See Airton, supra note 30; McClurg, supra note 6, at 1041–43; Mike 
Orcutt, Are Face Recognition Systems Accurate?  Depends on Your Race, MIT TECH. REV. 
(July 6, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601786/are-face-recognition-systems-
accurate-depends-on-your-race/.  It is important to note that the term inaccurate, as used in 
this section, only refers to those photographs that are left untouched after shooting; in other 
words, photographs that have not later been altered or distorted.  Airton, supra note 30; 
Orcutt, supra. 
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consequences, simply reflects “a public sight which any one present would 
be free to see.”172  Moreover, they have noted that these photographs run 
parallel with the traditional notion that they “do not reveal anything 
private.”173  Although this Comment has suggested that, in some instances, 
street photography does have the ability to reveal intimate details, it does not 
stand for the proposition that the new details can be erroneous.174  Facial 
recognition technology, on the other hand, often presents mistaken 
information.175  Unlike Evans, Bush, and DiCorcia, whose photography did 
not reveal the identity of its subjects, facial recognition does.176  As of June 
2016, “the Government Accountability Office issued a report saying that the 
FBI has not properly tested the accuracy of its face matching system, nor that 
of the massive network of state-level face matching databases it can 
access.”177  Facial recognition not only reveals intimate, personal information 
that is not visible to the naked eye, but it also does so at the risk of being 
wrong, as “people who are not criminal suspects are included in the database, 
and the error rate for the software is as high as [twenty] percent—meaning 
the authorities could misidentify millions of people.” 178   The risk of 
misidentification is even more rampant among minority groups. 179  
According to Anil Jain, head of the biometrics research group at Michigan 
State University: 
The algorithms can also be biased due to the way they are trained . 
. . .  If a gender, age group, or race is underrepresented in the 
training data, that will be reflected in the algorithm’s performance 
. . . .  [After] examin[ing] the performance of several commercially 
available face recognition systems . . . .  The algorithms were 
consistently less accurate on women, African-Americans, and 
younger people.  Apparently they were trained on data that was not 
representative enough of those groups . . . .180 
                                                     
172. Zeronda, supra note 7, at 1139; see also McClurg, supra note 6, at 1008. 
173. Zeronda, supra note 7, at 1140. 
174. Id. at 1149–50.  By new information, this section refers to photography 
that is, for example, presented in a different angle or captured under different lighting, which 
would otherwise not be seen by the average person walking on the street.  Id. at 1136 n.32, 
1149. 
175. Blitz, supra note 7, at 1390 (“[T]est in 2002 showed that even the most 
effective current systems had difficulty identifying faces outdoors—the best recognition rate 
was only [fifty percent] . . . .”). 
176. Cresci, supra note 4; Guarino, supra note 2; Singer, supra note 8; Walker, 
supra note 3. 
177. Orcutt, supra note 171. 
178. Blitz, supra note 7, at 1390; Williams, supra note 130. 
179. See Orcutt, supra note 171. 
180. Id. 
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Other factors can affect the risk of misidentification, such as poor 
image quality, unusual poses or facial expressions, and the age of the 
photograph; the more images a database has, “the greater the chance of such 
errors—either incorrect matches or failure to match photos of people already 
in the database.”181  Advocates of facial recognition technology claim that it 
“is necessary to prevent further terrorist attacks, and it should not be 
dismissed because of a mere potential for abuse.”182  Evidently, the risk is 
more than just the mere potential.183  Facial recognition, despite its chilling 
capacity, receives little attention from federal agencies.184  The technology 
goes beyond that of making a vulgar image public—it can place criminal 
liability on an innocent person.185  In such scenarios, the negative emotional 
consequences on its victim are virtually doubled, as few things can compare 
to the stripping of one’s freedom.186 
V. RECOMMENDATION 
In molding the current laws to encompass modern trends in 
technology, a specific court ruling provides helpful insight. 187   In Daily 
Times Democrat, the court stated that “[t]o hold that one who is involuntarily 
and instantaneously enmeshed in an embarrassing pose forfeits her right of 
privacy merely because she happened at the moment to be part of a public 
scene would be illogical, wrong, and unjust.” 188   This line of reasoning, 
although intuitive, only applies to photographs showing subjects in 
embarrassing pose[s].189  In other words, the court’s holdings surrounding 
invasion of privacy generally seem to be more sensitive to the protection of 
people’s physical presence, striving to bury obscene images, or those that 
may seem “offensive to modesty or decency,” more willingly than those 
sharing and publishing the one’s personal information.190   Although this 
Comment would not go as far as proposing face scans as a battery, or a 
                                                     
181. Mike Orcutt, As It Searches for Suspects, the FBI May Be Looking at You, 
MIT TECH. REV. (June 23, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601738/as-it-searches-
for-suspects-the-fbi-may-be-looking-at-you/; Orcutt, supra note 171. 
182. McCoy, supra note 87, at 483. 
183. See Orcutt, supra note 171; Walker, supra note 3. 
184. See Williams, supra note 130 (“There is very little oversight on the local 
level, and little concern from the federal agencies providing the grants.”). 
185. See Orcutt, supra note 181; Williams, supra note 130; Zeronda, supra 
note 7, at 1150. 
186. See Williams, supra note 130; Zeronda, supra note 7, at 1154. 
187. See Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 478 (Ala. 1964). 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. at 477–78. 
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complete ban on facial recognition technology, civil law must provide a 
means to place liability on those who, without consent, take a scan of one’s 
image or body. 191   It is crucial that facial recognition technology is 
recognized as able to capture information that is just as intimate as an image 
of our physical bodies, and thus considered a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.192 
In an article by The New York Times, some regulators expressed that 
“Congress [should] pass a law giving consumers basic rights to control how 
intimate details about them are collected and used, no matter the 
technology.”193  Terms like unique topography, DNA, and genetic data, are 
just a few of the descriptors of the sort of information captured by facial 
recognition technology.194  It would be illogical, wrong, and unjust to treat 
the threat of facial recognition technology different from the threat of being 
physically exposed in an image.195  Equally as important as recognizing its 
capabilities is understanding that the technology is still quite new—“so new 
that experts say they are unaware of major legal challenges.”196  To say that 
the use of facial recognition technology is not a violation “because there are 
no reasonable expectations of privacy in public places and facial-recognition 
technology is used in public places,” fails to see the second part of the issue,  
the revelation of secret information that is not, in fact, visible to the naked 
eye.197 
To further claim that “[f]acial-recognition technology is . . . similar 
to fingerprinting,” also fails to acknowledge a key difference:  Fingerprinting 
is rarely done without the person’s consent, whereas facial recognition asks 
for no permission.198  The executive director of the Center on Privacy and 
Technology at Georgetown Law expressed this same notion of innate 
wrongness surrounding facial recognition technology:  “What the FBI is 
doing may be legal, but it [is not] right.”199  He added, “I know what I touch, 
and I certainly know if I give fingerprints for a background check . . . [but] I 
                                                     
191. See McCoy, supra note 87, at 483; Zeronda, supra note 7, at 1156 (“While 
the First Amendment could still serve as a defense against a battery claim, characterizing 
street shootings as battery might mitigate the problems that result when privacy rights are 
pitted against the right to freedom of expression.”). 
192. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; e.g., Roberto Iraola, New Detection 
Technologies and the Fourth Amendment, 47 S.D. L. REV. 8, 30 (2002); Singer, supra note 8; 
Singer, supra note 127. 
193. Singer, supra note 8 (emphasis added). 
194. See Singer, supra note 127; Singer, supra note 8. 
195. Daily Times Democrat, 162 So. 2d at 478. 
196. Williams, supra note 130. 
197. McCoy, supra note 87, at 487. 
198. Id. at 489. 
199. Fung, supra note 76. 
140
Nova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol41/iss2/1
2017] FROM STREET PHOTOGRAPHY TO FACE RECOGNITION 263 
[do not] think [there is] anyone who keeps track of every surveillance or 
smartphone camera.”200  In 2013, Boston authorities tested facial recognition 
technology but felt that an instinctual wrong would be done to its citizens if 
they adopted it as a tool in their investigations;  “‘I [do not] want people to 
think [we are] always spying on them,’ said William B. Evans, Boston’s 
police commissioner.”201  Ultimately, they decided not to use it, “saying it 
crossed an ethical line.”202  Since there is no feasible way for the average 
citizen to know where all surveillance cameras are located, express consent 
must be required.203 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A Wall Street Journal poll in 1999 asked individuals what concerned 
them most about the next century from a list of options.204  “Threats to 
personal privacy came in at the top of the list—ahead of terrorism, the 
destruction of the environment, and overpopulation.” 205   The same poll 
showed that “[n]inety-five percent of Americans would be uncomfortable 
about a [w]ebsite creating a profile that included [their] real name as well as 
additional personal information.”206  Their fears are now a reality, and the 
technology behind it is virtually unstoppable.207  In trying to explain the 
severity of disclosure, this Comment does not undermine freedom of speech 
as another detriment:  “Although protecting against disclosure does limit 
freedom of speech, [unconsented] disclosure . . . inhibit[s] the very interests 
[that] free speech protects.208  Protection from disclosure, like free speech, 
promotes individual autonomy.”209  It is imperative that the law recognizes 
technological advances and adapts to their changes as it has done throughout 
history.210 
                                                     
200. Orcutt, supra note 181. 
201. Williams, supra note 130. 
202. Id. 
203. See id. 
204. Christy Harvey, Optimism Outduels Pessimism: Breakthroughs in 
Medicine, Technology Are Forecast; But the Auto Is Still Here, WALL STREET J., Sept. 16, 
1999, at A10; see also Schwartz, supra note 135, at 744 n.2. 
205. Schwartz, supra note 135, at 744 n.2. 
206. Id.; see also Harvey, supra note 209. 
207. Heath, supra note 5. 
208. Solove, supra note 11, at 532–33. 
209. Id. at 532–33 (pointing to several consequences suffered by victims of 
disclosure, such as preventing them from engaging in activities that further their own self-
development, threatening their security, and making them a prisoner of their recorded past). 
210. See McClurg, supra note 6, at 1074. 
As technology progressed, the law took cognizance of the fact that new forms of 
communication such as radio and television could cause harm as great or greater 
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According to the company behind the technology in FindFace, 
NTechLab, “widespread facial recognition [is] an inevitable reality—for 
better or for worse.”211  The company hopes that “everyone [will] have the 
ability to find someone online, not just governments and big tech[nology] 
companies.”212  When NTechLab reaches its objective, it is crucial that the 
appropriate laws are in place to protect the citizens of the United States and 
preserve their ever diminishing right to privacy.213 
                                                                                                                             
than written words.  The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts recognized 
this development by defining libel broadly to include, in addition to written words, 
“any . . . form of communication that has the potentially harmful qualities 
characteristic of written or printed words.” 
Id. (alteration in original). 
211. Heath, supra note 5. 
212. Id. 
213. Schwartz, supra note 135, at 761 (“‘[P]rivacy is not only a personal 
predilection, though it may be that, too.  It is a requirement of social systems.’  Information 
privacy does not derive from the state of nature or an inborn capacity of autonomy, but 
depends on its essential relation to the health of a democratic society.”). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Young athletes often dream of becoming the next star in their 
respective sports.1  A select few go on to realize that dream and become 
professional athletes.2  Within this group of superb athletes, there are a rare 
few who almost seem as though they were meant for the game, showing 
flashes of greatness at a young age.3  National Basketball Association 
(“NBA”) superstar, LeBron James, was being touted as an elite player, 
drawing comparisons to the all-time greatKobe Bryantdespite still being 
a high school junior.4  Although the NBA has since amended its draft 
eligibility, the delay in going professional after high school is limited to one 
year.5  There still remains the possibility of basketball players profiting 
financially from their abilities immediately after high school graduation 
while foregoing college.6 
Baseball prospects are afforded an opportunity to enter the 
professional ranks, becoming draft eligible, immediately upon high school 
graduation.7  Similarly, the National Hockey League (“NHL”) allows 
players, age eighteen or older, to enter the draft.8 
Unlike these sports leagues, the National Football League (“NFL”) 
imposes a draft eligibility requirement stipulating that a prospective player 
                                                 
1. See John Underwood, Does Herschel Have Georgia on His Mind?, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 1, 1982, at 22, 22; NCAA RESEARCH, ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF 
COMPETING IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS (2016), 
http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2016RES_probability-chart-web-pdf_20160502.pdf. 
2. See Underwood, supra note 1, at 22; NCAA RESEARCH, supra note 1. 
3. See Grant Wahl, Ahead of His Class, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 18, 2002, 
at 62, 64. 
4. Id. 
5. See NBA Draft Rules, DRAFTSITE.COM, 
http://www.draftsite.com/nba/rules/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
6. See Pete Thamel, At 19, Plotting New Path to N.B.A., Via Europe, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008, at 1. 
7. MLB Draft Rules, DRAFTSITE.COM, http://www.draftsite.com/mlb/rules/ 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
8. NHL Draft Rules, DRAFTSITE.COM, http://www.draftsite.com/nhl/rules/ 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
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be at least three years removed from high school.9  Furthermore, these 
prospects are not afforded a realistic interim alternative to college that 
produces a monetary benefit.10  Essentially, the only legitimate path to 
becoming a professional football player begins by playing at the collegiate 
level.11  The problem arising from the disparity between the NFL draft 
eligibility requirements in comparison to the other Big Four American sports 
leagues is magnified by the average career spans of each sport’s athletes.12  
Professional football players in the NFL have the shortest career spans in 
comparison to players in the NBA, NHL, and Major League Baseball 
(“MLB”).13  As of 2013, NFL players average a full year less than the 
average NBA player, and two years less than NHL and MLB players.14  
Additionally, the NFL provides the lowest average player salary of the four 
major sports.15  This results in the lowest average potential earnings in what 
has been documented as an extremely violent sport that could potentially 
have dangerous long-term health effects.16 
Due to these draft eligibility restrictions, football prospects are 
forced to attend college in an attempt to showcase their talents to prospective 
employers in the NFL.17  Under the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(“NCAA”) guidelines, these colleges essentially operate as a de facto farm 
system that guarantees the maturation and development of players at no cost 
to the NFL.18  There are some players that have been viewed as NFL-ready 
once they have graduated from high school.19  However, these players are 
                                                 
9. NFL Draft Rules, DRAFTSITE.COM, http://www.draftsite.com/nfl/rules/ 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
10. Underwood, supra note 1, at 24; see also CFL Adjusts Eligibility Rules for 
Draft, CANADIAN FOOTBALL LEAGUE (Sept. 06, 2013), http://www.cfl.ca/2013/09/06/cfl-
adjusts-eligibility-rules-for-draft/.  The CFL has more stringent eligibility standards than the 
NFL, requiring players to be from a Canadian school—CIS is the Canadian equivalent of 
NCAA—or having non-import status.  Id. 
11. Underwood, supra note 1, at 22. 
12. See Nick Schwartz, The Average Career Earnings of Athletes Across 
America’s Major Sports Will Shock You, USA TODAY (Oct. 24, 2013, 10:07 AM), 
http://ftw.usatoday.com/2013/10/average-career-earnings-nfl-nba-mlb-nhl-mls. 
13. See id. 
14. See id. 
15. See id. 
16. See id.; Jason M. Breslow, New:  87 Deceased NFL Players Test Positive 
for Brain Disease, PBS: FRONTLINE (Sept. 18, 2015), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/new-87-deceased-nfl-players-test-positive-for-
brain-disease/.  In a recent study about 87 out of 91 players tested positive for brain disease 
CTE.  Id. 
17. See NFL Draft Rules, supra note 9. 
18. Underwood, supra note 1, at 24, 26. 
19. Skip Bayless, Clarett Belonged in the NFL, ESPN.COM (Aug. 11, 2006), 
http://www.espn.com/espn/page2/story?page=bayless/060811; Jeff Legwold, Adrian Peterson 
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subjected to the threat of an injury that could negatively affect, or entirely 
eliminate, their earning potential due to the restrictive practices instituted by 
the NFL and NCAA.20  Despite the talents of a top prospect, an injury could 
potentially shrink the market for their services, as teams will be less willing 
to invest millions into a player who may never fully recover.21 
While in college, a football player is considered an amateur student-
athlete.22  The NCAA operates as a non-profit organization that promotes the 
academic and overall well-being of the student-athlete.23  Notwithstanding 
the threat of injury, a college football player must submit to the strict 
compensation restrictions imposed by the NCAA.24  A player who receives 
compensation for their athletic abilities or violates other provisions within 
the bylaws may be deemed ineligible to participate in all collegiate sports.25  
Since playing college football serves as the sole realistic option to obtaining 
employment for their athletic abilities, athletes are forced to accept a free 
education as compensation without protest.26  Furthermore, they must refrain 
from receiving any compensation that may be attributed to their athletic 
abilities.27  This restriction enables only the conference and school that the 
player attends to benefit financially from his or her talents.28  Although the 
NCAA prides itself on protecting the student aspect of the student-athlete 
label for college football players, it has hypocritically committed an act that 
the organization was originally founded to protect against:  exploitive athletic 
                                                                                                                   
Among Few Who Could Make Leap from High School to NFL, ESPN.COM: NFL NATION (Oct. 
2, 2015), http://www.espn.go.com/blog/nflnation/post/_/id/182078/adrian-peterson-among-
few-who-could-make-leap-from-high-school-to-nfl. 
20. See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2009-10 NCAA DIVISION I 
MANUAL art. 12.1.2.1 (2009); John Harris, 2016 NFL Draft:  Injury Crushes Draft Stock of 
Notre Dame LB Jaylon Smith, WASH. POST (Feb. 29, 2016), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2016/02/29/2016-nfl-draft-injury-crushes-
draft-stock-of-notre-dame-lb-jaylon-smith/; Mark Viera, Rutgers Player Is Paralyzed Below 
the Neck, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2010, at D1. 
21. See Harris, supra note 20. 
22. See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 20, at art. 12.01, 
12.1. 
23. Finances, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/finances (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
24. See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 20, at art. 12.1. 
25. Id. 
26. See id. at art. 12.1.2.1, 15.1. 
27. Id. at art. 12.1. 
28. See id.; Kristi Dosh, College Football Playoff:  Conference Payouts, BUS. 
C. SPORTS (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.businessofcollegesports.com/2014/12/08/college-
football-playoff-conference-payouts/.  Over $50 million in revenue was distributed to each 
Power 5 conference for the 2014 through 2015 bowl season.  Dosh, supra. 
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practices.29  It is no secret that college football is a massive source of 
revenue for schools.30  However, these schools are operating under the guise 
of the NCAA’s core values, enabling them to use unfair bargaining power to 
obtain the services of football players without fair compensation.31  On 
average, college football players are less prepared academically to succeed in 
the classroom.32  If they are not able to maintain a certain grade point 
average, they may not only lose their scholarship, but also their ability to 
obtain employment in the NFL.33  There are similarities between a 
development league like the MLB minor league system and the college ranks 
of football.34  The most notable is the ability to develop talent to play at a 
professional level.35  However, a minor league prospect is able to 
simultaneously hone his or her skills while benefitting financially from these 
same talents, whereas a college football player must endure at least three 
years of schooling prior to receiving an opportunity to be compensated 
financially for his or her athletic prowess.36  Some student-athletes benefit 
from the education received from this arrangement.37  However, a substantial 
amount of college football players enter college with the sole intention of 
going to the NFL without obtaining a college degree.38 
                                                 
29. See Dosh, supra note 28; History, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 
http://www.web.archive.org/web/20110807060521/http://www.ncaa.org:80/wps/wcm/connect
/public/ncaa/about+the+ncaa/who+we+are/about+the+ncaa+history (last visited Apr. 19, 
2017). 
30. See Steve Berkowitz et al., NCAA Finances: 2014-15 Finances, USA 
TODAY, http://www.sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/finances/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2017); Dosh, 
supra note 28. 
31. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1058–59 
(9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016). 
32. Doug Lederman, The Admissions Gap for Big-Time Athletes, INSIDE 
HIGHER ED (Dec. 29, 2008, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/12/29/admit.  “[C]ritics tend to argue that the 
colleges are doing a disservice to athletes who come in underprepared, and suggest that 
colleges may be achieving those higher graduation rates, in part, by directing athletes into less 
demanding academic programs . . . .”  Id. 
33. See Seth Soffian, College Sports:  Scholarships Not Four-Year 
Guarantees, NEWS-PRESS.COM (Oct. 17, 2015, 5:59 PM), http://www.news-
press.com/story/sports/college/fgcu/2015/10/16/college-sports-scholarships-not-four-year-
guarantees/74009542/. 
34. See Legwold, supra note 19; MLB Draft Rules, supra note 7. 
35. See Legwold, supra note 19; MLB Draft Rules, supra note 7. 
36. See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 20, at art. 12.1.2.1; 
MLB Draft Rules, supra note 7; NFL Draft Rules, supra note 9. 
37. See Christopher Bogan, 41% in NFL Graduate from College:  Rate in 
Pacific 10 Conference Only 38%, Report Shows, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 27, 1986), 
http://articles.latimes.com/print/1986-01-27/sports/sp-719_1_graduation-rate; Lederman, 
supra note 32. 
38. Bogan, supra note 37; see also Lederman, supra note 32. 
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This Comment will explain how the application of antitrust laws has 
affected previous sports related litigation.39  Furthermore, it will explain the 
rule of reason, a test courts have used to determine whether certain conduct 
falls within the purview of antitrust scrutiny.40  Subsequently, this Comment 
will apply the rule of reason to the deceptive practices engaged by the NFL 
and NCAA, revealing unreasonable labor market restrictions whilst 
debunking the previous litigation defenses used by both entities.41 
II. ANTITRUST LAWS 
The Sherman Act states that “[e]very contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is [hereby] declared to be 
illegal.”42  While the broad language of the Sherman Act may encompass 
almost any contract, the Supreme Court of the United States has consistently 
recognized that the Act is “intended to prohibit only unreasonable restraints 
of trade.”43 
A. Labor Exemption 
The National Labor Relations Act was enacted primarily to “promote 
collective bargaining and to protect . . . concerted employee” efforts 
including unionizing.44  Unfortunately, unions are inherently anticompetitive, 
as the “Court has recognized that a legitimate aim of any national labor 
organization is to obtain uniformity of labor standards and that a 
consequence of such union activity may be to eliminate competition based on 
differences in such standards.”45  By relinquishing individual rights to obtain 
an employment contract, employees are able to collectively benefit as a 
group in negotiations based on their strength in numbers.46  A sacrifice for 
the greater good can certainly be identified as anticompetitive.47  Labor 
                                                 
39. See infra Part II. 
40. See infra Section II.B. 
41. See infra Part III. 
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
43. Id.; Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of 
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984). 
44. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012); Robert A. McCormick & Matthew C. 
McKinnon, Professional Football’s Draft Eligibility Rule:  The Labor Exemption and the 
Antitrust Laws, 33 EMORY L.J. 375, 383 (1984). 
45. McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 44, at 383–84; see also United 
Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 666 (1965). 
46. See McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 44, at 384–85. 
47. See id. at 383–85. 
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negotiations such as standard wages may benefit some workers, but may be 
detrimental for others who may be able to command a higher wage based on 
experience or other factors.48  This ultimately leads to the conflict regarding 
whether agreements between employers and unions fall under antitrust 
scrutiny due to their inherent anticompetitive nature.49  After all, the 
Sherman Act was created “to promote freedom of competition in the 
marketplace.”50  Although agreements between employers and unions are 
considered to be restraints on trade, a “[[n]on-statutory exemption] generally 
applies when a union, acting with a non-labor party, seeks to attain goals 
which are mandatory or permissive subjects of bargaining under the National 
Labor Relations Act, unless the Union acts with a predatory anti-competitive 
purpose.”51  Mandatory subjects of bargaining have been defined as “wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.”52 
B. Rule of Reason 
Since sports leagues consist of numerous competing teams, mutual 
agreements to have restraints on competition are necessary to maintain the 
integrity of the product.53  Therefore, it is likely that, while the rules of these 
leagues may constitute a per se violation, the appropriate rule to apply would 
be the rule of reason.54  The rule of reason test is comprised of three steps.55  
In the first step, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct has a 
substantial adverse effect on competition within a market.56  Second, the 
defendant must provide evidence that the challenged conduct promotes 
competition.57  Third, the plaintiff must demonstrate that there are 
substantially less restrictive means to achieve the procompetitive 
justifications provided by the defendant.58  After each side has presented its 
arguments on the issue, the court will apply a balancing test to determine 
whether the conduct presents an unreasonable restraint.59 
                                                 
48. Id. at 384–85. 
49. See id. at 385. 
50. Id. at 383. 
51. Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 139 n.17 (2d Cir. 2004). 
52. Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004); see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012). 
53. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1069 (9th 
Cir. 2015), cert denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016). 
54. Id. at 1064. 
55. Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1062–63 (9th Cir. 2001). 
56. Id. at 1063. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 1062. 
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C. Litigation History Based on Labor Market Restraint in Sports 
Leagues 
1. The Spencer Haywood Rule 
Spencer Haywood was a tremendous basketball prospect hailing 
from Detroit, Michigan.60  During his prep years, he won several prestigious 
accolades, including All-Detroit, All-Michigan, and All-American honors.61  
His success would continue after his graduation from high school in 1967.62  
At the collegiate level, he earned All-American honors during his lone 
seasons at Trinidad Junior College and the University of Detroit.63  More 
impressive was the fact that he was named Outstanding Player at the 
Olympic basketball games64 at the age of nineteen.65  At the age of twenty, 
he entered into a contract with the Denver Rockets of the American 
Basketball Association (“ABA”).66  His talents clearly transcended across 
every level of competition, as he would go on to be “named ‘Rookie of the 
Year,’ and ‘Most Valuable Player in the ABA’ for the 1969-70 [s]eason.”67 
After his rookie season, he signed a new contract with the Rockets 
but would later refuse to render services due to its fraudulent terms.68  Later 
that year, he signed with a NBA team, the Seattle Supersonics, despite a 
provision in the NBA bylaws that would deem him ineligible to play.69  
Haywood would then file claims against the NBA and its member teams for 
                                                 
60. See Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1052 
(C.D. Cal. 1971). 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1052; Scoop Jackson, It’s Time to Honor 
Spencer Haywood’s Impact on Hoops and History, ESPN.COM (Sept. 10, 2015), 
http://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/13627349/spencer-haywood-impact-hoops-history. 
One thing that will probably be overlooked in Spencer Haywood’s induction into 
the Basketball Hall of Fame . . . is the gift God gave him to play the game.  How, as 
a [twenty-one] year-old playing in the NBA, Haywood was a rarity.  How, at 
[nineteen] years old, he became the youngest American to make an Olympic 
basketball team. 
Jackson, supra. 
66. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1052. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 1053–54.  “The contract does not provide for compensation for 
Haywood’s services for six years in the amount of $1,900,000.  Compensation in excess of 
$394,000 is illusory and indefinite.”  Id. at 1053. 
69. Id. at 1054.  “At the time that Haywood contracted to play professional 
basketball for Denver, the ABA had a four-year rule similar to that provided for in By-Law 
2.05 of NBA.  The ABA found that its four-year rule was a hardship on Haywood and waived 
it.”  Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1054. 
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engaging in an “unlawful conspiracy to monopolize and restrain trade in 
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2.”70  Shortly following a decision by the 
Supreme Court of the United States to lift a stay on an injunction allowing 
him to play for his team,71 the NBA and Haywood would reach an out-of-
court settlement that allowed him to play for the Supersonics.72 
The argument in Haywood’s favor was that, as the sole wage 
earner in his struggling family, he was a hardship case and 
therefore had a right to begin earning his living. . . .  Beginning in 
1971, underclassmen were allowed to enter the NBA Draft 
provided they could give evidence of hardship to the NBA office.  
In 1976, the hardship requirement was eliminated in favor of the 
current Early Entry procedure, whereby any athlete with remaining 
college eligibility can enter the NBA Draft on the condition that he 
notifies the league office at least [forty-five] days before the 
draft.73 
Although the court did not ultimately rule on the draft eligibility 
rule, it provided insight into the court’s view on the restraint it created.74  The 
NBA provision at the time provided that: 
A person who has not completed high school or who has 
completed high school but has not entered college, shall not be 
eligible to be drafted or to be a Player [in the NBA] until four 
years after he has been graduated or four years after his original 
high school class has been graduated . . . .75 
The court determined that without an injunction, the rule would 
eliminate Haywood’s chances of playing basketball, at any level, for an 
                                                 
70. Id. at 1054. 
71. Haywood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1207 (1971); see also 
William C. Rhoden, Early Entry?  One and Done?  Thank Spencer Haywood for the 
Privilege, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/30/sports/basketball/spencer-haywood-rule-nba-draft-
underclassmen.html. 
72. Rhoden, supra note 71. 
73. Spencer Haywood, NBA.COM, 
http://www.nba.com/history/players/haywood_bio.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
74. See Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1056.  “There is a substantial 
probability in light of all the evidence presented to this [c]ourt that the so-called college draft . 
. . constitutes an arbitrary and unreasonable restraint upon the rights of Haywood and other 
potential NBA players to negotiate freely for the rendition of their services to NBA teams.”  
Id. 
75. Id. at 1055, 1058 (alteration in original) (stating that the conduct by the 
NBA “[was] in furtherance of . . . violations of the antitrust laws”). 
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entire year, because it would deem him ineligible to play in the NBA.76  
Furthermore, he was already ineligible to participate at the collegiate level.77  
This would certainly be a travesty, given the fact that Haywood had already 
proven that he could compete and dominate in the professional ranks.78  The 
court found that “[a] professional basketball player [had] a very limited 
career.”79 
If Haywood is unable to continue to play professional 
basketball for Seattle, he will suffer irreparable injury in that a 
substantial part of his playing career will have been dissipated, his 
physical condition, skills and coordination will deteriorate from 
lack of high-level competition, his public acceptance as a super 
star will diminish to the detriment of his career, his self-esteem 
and his pride will have been injured and a great injustice will be 
perpetrated on him.80 
The impact of this case can be felt still today, as underclassmen 
entering the draft has become commonplace.81  Although the NBA argued 
that the influx of young players would destroy the league and college 
basketball by “siphoning . . . talent from college basketball teams . . . 
[effectively] ruin[ing] the NBA’s pool of talent,”82 both entities are 
thriving.83 
                                                 
76. See id. at 1057, 1060. 
77. Id. at 1056.  Due to NCAA amateurism rules, Haywood would be 
considered ineligible as he already signed and played for a professional team.  See Denver 
Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1060–61. 
78. See Spencer Haywood, supra note 73.  Haywood led the league in scoring, 
averaging 30 points a game and rebounding 19.5 rebounds per game while also winning the 
league’s Most Valuable Player.  Id. 
79. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1057. 
80. Id. 
81. See Rhoden, supra note 71. 
82. Id. 
83. Id.; see also Total NBA League Revenue from 2001/02 to 2014/15 (in 
Billion U.S. Dollars), STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/193467/total-league-
revenue-of-the-nba-since-2005/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2017).  During the 2014–15 season the 
NBA posted revenue of 5.18 billion.  Total NBA League Revenue from 2001/02 to 2014/15 (in 
Billion U.S. Dollars), supra; Chris Isidore, Most Profitable NCAA Teams, CNN: MONEY 
(Mar. 16, 2015, 10:13 AM), http://www.money.cnn.com/2015/03/16/news/companies/ncaa-
most-profitable/.  The Louisville Cardinals “posted $24 million in profits on [college 
basketball] revenue of about $40 million during the 2013–14 school year . . . .”  Isidore, supra. 
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2. Maurice Clarett 
Before his legal troubles, Maurice Clarett was a star in the making.84  
To this day, he is still arguably one of the best prep football players in Ohio’s 
prep football history.85  During his high school senior season, he amassed 
2194 rushing yards, a mind-blowing thirty-eight touchdowns, and was on his 
way to being named “USA Today National Offensive Player of the Year and 
Mr. Football.”86  In 2002, he would enroll at Ohio State University, 
becoming the first freshman running back to start for the school since 1943.87  
Standing at six feet tall and weighing two hundred and thirty pounds, he was 
already bigger than some of the NFL’s all-time great running backs.88  
During his freshman campaign, he set freshman rushing and touchdown 
records, while also providing an influential performance that resulted in Ohio 
State emerging victorious in the National Championship over favored 
Miami.89 
Close friend LeBron James was just finishing his senior season at St. 
Vincent-St. Mary when this was transpiring.90  After all the glory Clarett had 
brought to Ohio State, he still had to wait two more years to be draft-
eligible.91  To add insult to injury, James called Clarett to inform him of a 
massive, seven-year, $93 million deal with Nike before he had even been 
drafted.92  Being immersed in the luxuries that accompany a professional 
                                                 
84. See Timeline:  The Rise and Fall of Maurice Clarett, ESPN.COM (Sept. 
18, 2006), http://www.espn.com/nfl/news/story?id=2545204. 
85. Eric Frantz, Ohio’s Top 50 Athletes of the Decade:  No. 36 Maurice 
Clarett, JJHUDDLE.COM (Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.jjhuddle.com/2010/02/05/ohios-top-50-
athletes-of-the-decade-no-36-maurice-clarett/.  To cap his senior season, Clarett rushed for 
785 yards and eight touchdowns in the playoffs—in three games.  Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Timeline:  The Rise and Fall of Maurice Clarett, supra note 84. 
88. Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004).  “Clarett . . . is taller and heavier than some of the NFL’s all-time greatest running 
backs, including Walter Payton—5’10”, 200, Barry Sanders—5’8”, 203, and Emmitt Smith—
5’9”, 207.”  Id. 
89. See Frantz, supra note 85; Timeline:  The Rise and Fall of Maurice 
Clarett, supra note 84. 
90. See Pablo S. Torre, Lost Stories of Lebron, Part 2, ESPN.COM, 
http://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/9825057/lebron-james-maurice-clarett-were-fellow-ohio-
natives-drastically-different-futures-espn-magazine (last updated October 19, 2013, 10:13 
AM).  The Ohioans were “born one year and [fifty] miles of I-76 apart”—James hailing from 
Akron, and Clarett from Youngstown.  Id. 
91. See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 2004); 
Torre, supra note 90. 
92. Torre, supra note 90.  Clarett was often with James during James’ rise to 
fame.  Id.  This included meeting numerous celebrities.  Id.  (“There was the time they hung 
out with Jay Z backstage.  There was the time they attended a party in Cleveland and Biz 
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career, Clarett fell victim to wanting compensation for his athletic 
achievements as well.93  “Clarett sa[id] he was intoxicated by being a 
somebody.  And, if [you are] a somebody, you want to be around another 
somebody.”94  NFL executives commenting about Clarett’s status as a NFL 
caliber player, despite not being eligible, certainly boosted his ego as well.95  
Before his sophomore season, Clarett was suspended for the entire season 
“for accepting thousands of dollars in illicit extra benefits,” coupled with 
allegations of academic fraud.96  Unable to play at the collegiate level for a 
year and not wanting his skills to diminish from inactivity, Clarett decided to 
challenge the NFL’s draft eligibility rule that mandated a player be three 
years removed from high school.97 
a. Clarett:  Circuit Court of Appeals Reversal 
A district court ruled in Maurice Clarett’s favor in Clarett v. 
National Football League (“Clarett I”),98 holding that the NFL’s eligibility 
rules were an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of antitrust laws.99  
On appeal, the court reversed the ruling.100  The stark difference between 
these two rulings was that the appellate court found that the eligibility rule 
was afforded non-statutory exemption status from antitrust scrutiny, whereas 
the district court did not.101  In Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,102 the Supreme 
Court of the United States provided that although a collectively bargained 
provision may be a mandatory bargaining subject, it should be examined by 
                                                                                                                   
Markie deejayed.  There was the time Clarett traded numbers with Snoop Dogg, who knew the 
tailback from controlling him on PlayStation.”).  Id. 
93. See id. 
94. Torre, supra note 90. 
95. See Bob Glauber, Clarett Sues NFL for Right to Enter Draft, NEWSDAY 
(Sept. 23, 2003, 8:00 PM), http://www.newsday.com/sports/clarett-sues-nfl-for-right-to-enter-
draft-1.399287.  “If Clarett is deemed eligible for the draft, it [is] likely he would be a first-
round choice, according to several league executives . . . .  ‘I [am] sure someone would take a 
chance on him,’ one NFL personnel director said.”  Id. 
96. Rusty Miller, Clarett Suspended for 2003 Season for 16 NCAA Violations, 
USA TODAY (Sept. 10, 2003, 2:36 PM), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/bigten/2003-09-10-clarett-
suspension_x.htm; see also Mike Freeman, When Values Collide:  Clarett Got Unusual Aid in 
Ohio State Class, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2003, at SP1. 
97. See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004). 
98. 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  
99. Id. at 410–11. 
100. Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 143 (2d Cir. 2004). 
101. Compare Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 138, with Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 
397. 
102. 518 U.S. 231 (1996). 
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balancing the “interests of union members” served by the restraint against 
“its relative impact on the product market,” before being granted exemption 
status.103 
The court reasoned: 
[T]o permit antitrust suits against sports leagues on the ground that 
their concerted action imposed a restraint upon the labor market 
would seriously undermine many of the policies embodied by 
these [federal] labor laws, including the congressional policy 
favoring collective bargaining, the bargaining parties’ freedom of 
contract, and the widespread use of multi-employer bargaining 
units.104 
Rather than determine the impact on the product market in 
accordance with the test formulated by Justice White, the court provided 
support for the power of unions and their importance in the labor law 
relations.105  Additionally, they found that “the eligibility rules constitute a 
mandatory bargaining subject because they have tangible effects on the 
wages and working conditions of current NFL players.”106  This Comment 
will further examine those tangible effects in Part B.107 
3. O’Bannon Case 
Ed O’Bannon was a former All-American basketball player at the 
University of California, Los Angeles (“UCLA”) who was informed by a 
friend that his likeness was being used in a video game.108  In 2009, 
O’Bannon sued the NCAA and the Collegiate Licensing Company (“CLC”) 
in O’Bannon v. NCAA (“O’Bannon I”),109 claiming “that the NCAA’s 
amateurism rules [prohibited] . . . student-athletes from [receiving] 
                                                 
103. Id. at 261.  The court agreed with Justice White’s approach “[w]hen 
confronted with allegations that agreements between labor and employers damaged 
competition in the business or product market, we have previously regarded Justice White’s 
decision in Jewel Tea as setting forth the ‘classic formulation’ of the non-statutory 
exemption.”  Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 132 n.12 (citing Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated 
Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689–90 (1965)). 
104. Id. at 135. 
105. See id. at 132, 138–39.  “The players union’s representative possesses 
‘powers comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both to create and restrict the 
rights of those whom it represents.’”  Id. at 139. 
106. Id. at 140. 
107. See infra Section III.B.2. 
108. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th 
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 277 (2016). 
109. 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).   
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compensat[ion] for the use of their [name, image, and likeness].”110  
Meanwhile, Sam Keller, a former college quarterback filed a separate suit 
against the NCAA, CLC, and Electronic Arts (“EA”), “a software company 
that produced video games based on college football and men’s basketball 
from the late 1990s until around 2013.”111  The two cases were consolidated, 
receiving class certification.112  After the plaintiffs settled their claims with 
EA and CLC, the cases were deconsolidated, and in 2014, the antitrust 
claims against the NCAA went to trial before the district court.113  The 
district court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, holding that the NCAA’s rules 
prohibiting student-athletes from receiving compensation for their name, 
image, and likeness violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.114  On appeal, the 
NCAA asserted that because the NCAA court held amateur rules valid, any 
challenge to them must fail.115  Rather than categorically approving all 
amateurism rules, the NCAA explained why its rules should be analyzed 
under the rule of reason.116  Although the opinion on amateurism served as 
mere dicta, the O’Bannon I court held high regard for its contents.117  
Summarily, despite amateurism rules serving a procompetitive purpose, it 
“can . . . be invalid[ated] under the rule of reason if a substantially less 
restrictive rule would further the same objectives equally well.”118  The 
appellate court’s decision “reaffirm[ed] that NCAA regulations are subject to 
antitrust scrutiny and must be tested in the crucible of the [r]ule of 
[r]eason.”119 
                                                 
110. Id. at 1055. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 1056. 
114. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1056; see also O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
115. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1061; see also Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. 
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984). 
116. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1062–63; see also Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 
468 U.S. at 113–20. 
117. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1063.  “To be sure, ‘[w]e do not treat considered 
dicta from the Supreme Court lightly;’ such dicta should be accorded appropriate deference.”  
Id. (alteration in original). 
118. Id. at 1063–64. 
119. Id. at 1079.  “[T]he NCAA is not above the antitrust laws, and courts 
cannot and must not shy away from requiring the NCAA to play by the Sherman Act’s rules.”  
Id. 
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III. NFL AND NCAA RESTRAINT ON LABOR MARKET 
It can be argued that football, and not baseball, is America’s true 
national pastime.120  Despite the violence of the sport, its media appeal has 
helped the sport grow tremendously.121  Colleges and NFL teams profit from 
the services of a distinct individuala football player.122  The demarcation 
of college football players and professional football players are monotonous 
when the horrifying possibility of permanent injury is a common threat faced 
on any play.123  Yet, these college football players subject their bodies to this 
threat for a hopeful financial reward.124  Given the rise in player contract 
values,125 or the huge investments into athletic facilities by colleges to lure 
recruits,126 the market for football players’ services is ever-growing.  As 
fans’ demands grow, so too does the supply.127  In 2008, ESPN agreed to pay 
the Southeastern Conference (“SEC”) “a staggering $2.25 billion over the 
                                                 
120. See Lucy McCalmont, Football Has Taken Over Baseball as the True 
National Pastime, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 16, 2015, 11:35 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/16/football-national-pastime_n_7078660.html. 
121. Id. 
It has been a long, long time since baseball was truly America’s pastime, 
and it has nothing to do with anything baseball has done wrong.  It has been since . 
. . television. . . .  The NFL is terrific to watch on television in a way baseball [is 
not] and never was, and we are a nation of television watchers.  The minute people 
realized how easy football was to follow on television—even if it really tells you 
very little of [what is] actually going on—was the minute baseball stopped being 
America’s pastime. 
Id. 
122. See Will Hobson & Steven Rich, Colleges Spend Fortunes on Lavish 
Athletic Facilities, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 23, 2015, 6:40 AM), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/college/ct-athletic-facilities-expenses-20151222-
story.html. 
123. See Viera, supra note 20, at D1. 
124. See id.; Adam Schefter & Jeff Legwold, Broncos Sign Von Miller for 6 
Years; Deal Worth $114.5M, Sources Say, ESPN.COM (July 15, 2016), 
http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/17084231/denver-broncos-von-miller-agree-6-year-1145-
million-deal. 
125. See Schefter & Legwold, supra note 123. 
126. Hobson & Rich, supra note 121. 
Big-time college athletic departments are taking in more money than 
ever—and spending it just as fast.  A decade of rampant athletics construction 
across the country has redefined what it takes to field a competitive top-tier college 
sports program.  Football stadiums and basketball arenas now must be 
complemented by practice facilities, professional-quality locker rooms, players’ 
lounges with high-definition televisions and video game systems, and luxury suites 
to coax more money from boosters. 
Id. 
127. See ACC, ESPN Partner for New Conference Channel, ESPN.COM (July 
18, 2016), http://www.espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/17102933/acc-espn-agree-20-
year-rights-deal-lead-2019-launch-acc-network. 
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next [15] years—about $150 million a year—for the conference’s TV 
rights.”128  More recently, Mercedes-Benz purchased the naming rights to a 
newly constructed NFL stadium for $1.4 billion.129  This is all driven by the 
on-field product provided by these football players.130 
A. NCAA 
Due to the NFL’s draft eligibility rules, it is common practice for a 
football prospect to play at the collegiate level prior to becoming a 
professional.131  In fact, colleges serve as a de facto development league for 
the NFL.132  The NFL is grateful for the financial rewards of having colleges 
as a supplier of premier football services.133  Although both the NFL and 
NCAA may identify as competitors providing similar products, they both 
benefit financially from practices that unreasonably restrain the market for 
football players.134  This is possible because of their firm control on the 
market for the players’ services.135 
                                                 
128. Michael Smith & John Ourand, ESPN Pays $2.25B for SEC Rights, 
SPORTS BUS. J. (Aug. 25, 2008), 
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2008/08/20080825/This-Weeks-
News/ESPN-Pays-$225B-For-SEC-Rights.aspx. 
129. Tim Tucker, Falcons Officially Announce Mercedes-Benz as Naming 
Rights Partner, AJC.COM (Aug. 24, 2015, 10:04 AM), 
http://www.ajc.com/news/sports/football/falcons-officially-announce-mercedes-benz-as-
namin/nnP9Y/. 
130. See Underwood, supra note 1, at 22. 
131. See id. at 22–23; NBA Draft Rules, supra note 5. 
132. Underwood, supra note 1, at 24. 
133. See id. 
134. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1062 
(9th Cir. 2015) cert denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016); Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. 
Supp. 2d 379, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
135. Michael Janofsky, U.S.F.L. Loses in Antitrust Case; Jury Assigns Just $1 
in Damages, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 1986), http://www.nytimes.com/1986/07/30/sports/usfl-
loses-in-antitrust-case-jury-assigns-just-1-in-damages.html.  Despite losing, the U.S.F.L. 
succeeded in proving that the NFL was a monopoly.  Id.; see also United States v. Walters, 
997 F.2d 1219, 1225 (7th Cir. 1993). 
The NCAA depresses athletes’ income—restricting payments to the value of 
tuition, room, and board, while receiving services of substantially greater worth.  
The NCAA treats this as desirable preservation of amateur sports; a more jaundiced 
eye would see it as the use of monopsony power to obtain athletes’ services for less 
than the competitive market price. 
Walters, 997 F.2d at 1225. 
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1. Amateurism 
Founded in 1906, the NCAA sought out to remedy the problem that 
was being created by colleges competing for the best players.136  In doing so, 
“one of [its] earliest reforms . . . was a requirement that . . . participants be 
amateurs.”137  To maintain amateurism, a student-athlete must not receive 
compensation other than what is permitted by the NCAA.138  Even then, the 
compensation received was insufficient.139  In 2014, the NCAA finally 
allowed scholarships to be awarded up to the full cost of attendance.140  In 
addition to the compensation rules, the NCAA adopted several other 
amateurism protecting rules that restrain the market for football players’ 
services.141  An amateur may lose their eligibility to play at the collegiate 
level if they sign a contract with a professional team, enter a professional 
league’s player draft, or hire an agent.142  Additionally, the NCAA generally 
limits the mobility of an athlete by imposing a transfer penalty, mandating 
that a transferring athlete sit-out one season immediately after transferring 
before being eligible to play.143  This can potentially affect an athlete’s 
ability to market themselves to the future purchasers of their services, the 
NFL.144 
Players, however, suffer a severe penalty for 
transferring—the loss of a year of athletics eligibility.  This can 
make them a very unattractive option for coaches who are under 
constant win now pressure.  The NCAA’s transfer rules restrain 
players’ ability to make the best choices for themselves, including 
                                                 
136. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1054; History, supra note 29. 
137. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1054. 
138. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 20, at art. 12 § 12.1.2. 
139. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1054. 
The cost of attendance at a particular school includes the items that make up a grant 
in aid plus ‘[nonrequired] books and supplies, transportation, and other expenses 
related to attendance at the institution.’  The difference between a grant in aid and 
the cost of attendance is a few thousand dollars at most schools. 
Id. at 1054 n.3 (alteration in original). 
140. Id. at 1054–55. 
141. Id. at 1055. 
142. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 20, at art. 12 § 12.1.2. 
143. Joe Nocera, With College Transfer Rules, Hypocrisy Never Sits Out a 
Year, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/02/sports/ncaabasketball/with-college-transfer-rules-
hypocrisy-never-sits-out-a-year.html; see also NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra 
note 20, at art. 14 § 14.5.1. 
144. See Nocera, supra note 143; NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra 
note 20, at art. 14 § 14.5.1. 
159
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 2017
282 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
ones based on financial considerations, academic considerations, 
athletics considerations, and personal circumstances.145 
However, the most important rule prohibits athletes—with a few 
exceptions—from receiving, either direct or indirect, payment for their 
athletic skill.146 
The NCAA, with varying success, has used the defense that all 
amateurism rules are legally valid.147  Recently, O’Bannon I provided a 
clearer depiction of the intent in the NCAA v. Board of Regents of the 
University of Oklahoma148 case, holding that not all rules that are linked to 
amateurism were immune from antitrust scrutiny.149 
2. Rule of Reason Application to Amateurism Rules 
The NCAA’s bylaws applying to amateurism may be afforded 
antitrust scrutiny due to their effect on commerce.150  “[T]he modern legal 
understanding of commerce is broad, ‘including almost every activity from 
which the actor anticipates economic gain.’”151  “Despite the nonprofit status 
                                                 
145. Steve Berkowitz, Lawsuit Challenges Rule for Transfers Between NCAA 
Division I Football Schools, USA TODAY (Mar. 9, 2016, 6:44 AM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2016/03/08/lawsuit-ncaa-division-football-
transfer-rules-peter-deppe-iowa-hawkeyes-northern-illinois-huskies/81510022/; see also 
Nocera, supra note 143. 
[T]he case of Baker Mayfield, the Sooners’ current quarterback, who walked on to 
the Texas Tech team as a freshman, then transferred to Oklahoma, where he walked 
on to its football team, too.  Mayfield not only had to sit out a year but also lost a 
year of eligibility because of a Big 12 rule that punishes players who dare to move 
to a different college within the conference.  The fact that Mayfield [did not] have 
an athletic scholarship made no difference. 
Nocera, supra note 143. 
146. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055; NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra 
note 20, at art. 12 § 12.1.2.1.  “[M]ost importantly, an athlete is prohibited—with few 
exceptions—from receiving any pay based on his athletic ability, whether from boosters, 
companies seeking endorsements, or would-be licensors of the athlete’s name, image, and 
likeness, NIL.”  O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055 (alteration in original). 
147. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1063.  “Quoting heavily from the language in 
Board of Regents that we have emphasized, the NCAA contends that any Section 1 challenge 
to its amateurism rules must fail as a matter of law because the Board of Regents Court held 
that those rules are presumptively valid.”  Id.; see also Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. 
of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984). 
148. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
149. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1063; Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. at 
120. 
150. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1065. 
151. Id.; see also Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 340 
(7th Cir. 2012).  “No knowledgeable observer could earnestly assert that big-time college 
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of NCAA member schools, the transactions those schools make with premier 
athletes—full scholarships in exchange for athletic services—are not 
noncommercial, since schools can make millions of dollars as a result of 
these transactions.”152  Student-athletes considering scholarship offers often 
weigh economic factors, such as the earning potential of a degree or the 
likelihood of entering the NFL.153  Therefore, the transactions that take place 
between the NCAA and student-athletes are somewhat commercial in 
nature.154 
“In December 2010, the Buckeyes suspended star quarterback 
Terrelle Pryor,” and four other players “for the first five games of the 2011 
season for selling memorabilia and receiving discounted services at a local 
tattoo parlor.”155  “Pryor sold his 2008 Big Ten championship ring, Fiesta 
Bowl sportsmanship award,” and other personal items.156  “He was ordered 
to repay a total of $2500.”157  This punishment seems counterintuitive to the 
promotion of capitalism to prevent anyone from profiting from his or her 
own hard work in any capacity.158 
a. Substantial Adverse Effect on Competition Within the Market 
There is a market for football players’ services, in which some 
football players are the reluctant sellersand the schools are the 
purchasersof their “athletic services and licensing rights.”159  The NCAA 
thus operates as a monopsony,160 in that it is the only purchaser of this 
particular good for a reserved population of football players.161  
Consequently, price-fixing occurs when the compensation awarded to 
                                                                                                                   
football programs competing for highly sought-after high school football players do not 
anticipate economic gain from a successful recruiting program.”  Agnew, 683 F.3d at 340. 
152. Agnew, 683 F.3d at 340; see also Berkowitz et al., supra note 30. 
153. Agnew, 683 F.3d at 341. 
154. Id. 
155. Zach Dirlam, Scandal at Ohio State (Part 1 of 5):  The Tattooed Five and 
Tressel’s Cover Up, BLEACHER REP. (June 1, 2011), 
http://www.bleacherreport.com/articles/719411-scandal-at-ohio-state-part-1-of-5-the-tattooed-
five-tressels-cover-up. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. Kevin Trahan, How the NCAA’s Marxist Philosophy is Hurting its 
Athletes, FORBES (Aug. 18, 2014, 4:49 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kevintrahan/2014/08/18/how-the-ncaa-hurts-the-players-it-
claims-to-protect/. 
159. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 991 
(N.D. Cal. 2014). 
160. Id. 
161. See id. 
161
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student-athletes is limited to the grant-in-aid provided by the school, despite 
the level of talent.162  The students have no bargaining power.163  Likewise, 
the schools cannot exceed the compensation awarded without facing 
penalty.164  However, due to the same rule, the schools still have another 
profitable venture in which they have no competition—the licensing rights of 
their players.165  Although the NCAA prohibits the use of a student-athlete’s 
name, image, or appearance to promote commercial ventures,166 it is able to 
profit from student-athletes through disingenuous means.167 
Throughout college stadiums, fans don the jerseys of their favorite 
players.168  Every year, a portion of the revenue from different programs 
across the nation can be attributed to jersey sales.169  Although a student-
athlete cannot sell his or her own personal belongings attributable to their 
athletic ability, a school can sell a replica jersey of that same player under the 
facade that it does not reflect the player’s likeness or image simply because 
their name is missing from the jersey.170  This thinking is pure lunacy.171  The 
                                                 
162. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1054 
(9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 85 U.S.L.W. 3139 (Oct. 3, 2016).  “The ‘combination[s] 
condemned by the [Sherman] Act’ also include ‘price-fixing . . . by purchasers’ even though 
‘the persons specially injured . . . are sellers, not customers or consumers.’”  Id. at 1070 
(alteration in original). 
163. Nicolas A. Novy, “The Emperor Has No Clothes”:  The NCAA’s Last 
Chance as the Middle Man in College Athletics, 21 SPORTS LAW. J. 227, 232 (2014). 
164. See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 20, at art. 16 § 
16.01.1; Eric Dodds, The ‘Death Penalty’ and How the College Sports Conversation Has 
Changed, TIME (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.time.com/3720498/ncaa-smu-death-penalty/.  
SMU infamously violated several NCAA rules, by providing illegal compensation for recruits 
to attend the university.  Dodds, supra.  The NCAA imposed what was dubbed the death 
penalty, with sanctions including the program being banned from bowl games and stripped of 
forty-five scholarships for two years.  Id.  “There[] [is] a reason that a popular sports joke in 
the early ‘80s was that [Eric] Dickerson took a pay-cut when he graduated and went to the 
NFL.”  Id. 
165. See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 20, at art. 31 § 
31.6.4.2. 
166. Id. at art. 12.5.1.1. 
167. Joseph Milord, It’s All Profit and No Pay:  How the NCAA is an Ingenious 
Business, ELITE DAILY (Mar. 20, 2014, 1:03 PM), http://www.elitedaily.com/money/ncaa-
ingenious-business-ever-created-tuesday/. 
168. See Novy, supra note 163, at 237. 
169. See id. at 236; Milord, supra note 167; Marc Tracy, Days of Selling 
Popular College Players’ Jerseys Seems Numbered, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/06/sports/ncaafootball/days-of-selling-popular-college-
players-jerseys-seem-numbered.html. 
170. Novy, supra note 163, at 236–37; Milord, supra note 167; Tracy, supra 
note 169. 
171. See Kevin Trahan, Long Past Time for College Football Teams to Stop 
Selling Real Player Jerseys, SB NATION (June 5, 2014, 2:23 PM), 
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number 23 is forever linked to Michael Jordan, just like any other sports 
hero’s number will be forever tied to that team.172  If we are to believe that 
jersey numbers are ambiguous representations of the school themselves and 
not the player, then why do schools retire a revered student-athlete’s number, 
a la professionals?173  It is evident that this practice presents an 
anticompetitive arrangement that allows only the school to profit from the 
marketability of their athletes.174  Even so, schools still use their current 
student-athletes likeness in a commercial setting.175  Meanwhile, players are 
subjected to watch as schools reap the financial reward from their services, 
while they are unable to receive a breadcrumb for their efforts.176 
b. Challenged Conduct Promotes Competition 
While the courts have generally recognized the importance of 
maintaining the amateurism aspect of the college football product,177 they 
have also determined “that the NCAA’s definition of amateurism [is] 
malleable, changing frequently over time in ‘significant and contradictory 
ways.’”178  The NCAA’s current rules do serve a procompetitive benefit by 
                                                                                                                   
http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2014/6/5/5783202/college-football-player-jerseys-
real-numbers. 
172. See Maureen Callahan, Jeter’s Retirement Marks End of Yanks’ Single-
Digit Numbers, N.Y. POST (Mar. 30, 2014, 3:45 AM), http://nypost.com/2014/03/30/jeters-
retirement-marks-end-of-yanks-single-digit-numbers/; Tracy, supra note 169.  “The Yankees 
will hit another milestone this season besides the retirement of Derek Jeter:  [It is] the last time 
a single-digit jersey will be worn by a Bronx Bomber.”  Callahan, supra.  The Yankees are 
famous for not displaying player names on their uniform.  See id. 
173. See Craig Barnes, Seminoles to Retire Deion’s Number Tonight, SUN 
SENTINEL (Oct. 7, 1995), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1995-10-
07/sports/9510060566_1_doak-campbell-stadium-sanders-charlie-ward. 
174. See Tracy, supra note 169; Trahan, supra note 171.  “Worried about the 
ramifications of selling the numbers tied to student-athletes, several schools have decided not 
to sell football jerseys with star players names on it this upcoming season, sources tell ESPN.”  
Trahan, supra note 171. 
175. Jason Kirk, NCAA President Faces Fact That Colleges Sell Jerseys with 
Real Player Numbers, SB NATION (June 20, 2014, 12:20 PM), 
http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2014/6/20/5827802/ncaa-player-jerseys-numbers-
mark-emmert-obannon.  During the O’Bannon case, “Georgia Tech tweeted an image of 
football schedule cards, each with a current [player] posed next to a corporate sponsor’s logo.”  
Id.  Although the schedules were handed out by the school, and not sold, the presence of 
commercial sponsors implies a mutual partnership that financially benefits both parties, 
through advertising.  See id. 
176. See Novy, supra note 163, at 228. 
177. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1062 (9th 
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016). 
178. Id. at 1058. 
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promoting amateurism, which helps drive the consumer’s demand for the 
product that is college football.179  However, studies have shown that these 
rules “do not promote competitive balance” amongst football programs.180  
In fact, “restrictions on student-athlete compensation lead many schools . . . 
to spend larger portions of their athletic budgets on coaching, recruiting, and 
training facilities.”181  It is hard to argue that competitive balance is a true 
driving force, with the increasing number of bowl games awarded to 
teams.182 
The number of bowls has doubled in the last [twenty] years and [it 
is] unknown if there will even be enough teams to fill the slots.  In 
order to qualify for a bowl game, teams must win at least six 
games, but a [five-seven] team can fill out a waiver to play for an 
available slot.183 
To fulfill consumers’ insatiable demand for football, the NCAA has 
capitalized on the time period when the NFL season is dwindling down to 
steadily increase the number of games available to the market.184  It is 
                                                                                                                   
The court suggested that, even today, the NCAA’s definition of amateurism is 
inconsistent:  [A]lthough players generally cannot receive compensation other than 
scholarships, tennis players are permitted to accept up to $10,000 in prize money 
before enrolling in college, and student-athletes are permitted to accept Pell grants 
even when those grants raise their total financial aid package above their cost of 
attendance.  It thus concluded that amateurism was not, in fact, a core principle[] of 
the NCAA. 
Id. at 1058–59 (citations omitted). 
179. Id. at 1059. 
180. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 978 
(N.D. Cal. 2014). 
[S]ince the 1970s, numerous sports economists have studied the NCAA’s 
amateurism rules and nearly all have concluded that the rules have no discernible 
effect on the level of competitive balance. . . .  [Also], a 2007 study by economist 
Jim Peach published in the Social Science Journal, found that there is ‘little 
evidence that the NCAA rules and regulations have promoted competitive balance 
in college athletics and no a priori reason to think that eliminating the rules would 
change the competitive balance situation.’ 
Id. 
181. Id. 
The fact that high-revenue schools are able to spend freely in these other areas 
cancels out whatever leveling effect the restrictions on student-athlete pay might 
otherwise have.  The NCAA does not do anything to rein in spending by the high-
revenue schools or minimize existing disparities in revenue and recruiting. 
Id. at 97879. 
182. See Nick Schwartz & Laken Litman, Are There Too Many College 
Football Bowl Games?, USA TODAY (May 6, 2015, 3:11 PM), 
http://ftw.usatoday.com/2015/05/are-there-too-many-college-football-bowl-games. 
183. Id.  “Playing in a bowl game used to be a reward.  Now [it is] getting 
overly commercial and out of control.”  Id. 
184. See id. 
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apparent that this is mainly commercially driven based on the astounding 
profits from bowl games, despite the dilution of competition.185 
Although the NCAA promotes a product that is unique from the 
NFL, and amateurism is an integral component of that product, student-
athlete compensation is not the driving force behind consumer demand for its 
product.186  “Dr. Emmert, [the NCAA commissioner], himself noted that 
much of the popularity of the NCAA’s annual men’s basketball tournament 
stems from the fact that schools from all over the country participate ‘so the 
fan base has an opportunity to cheer for someone from their region of the 
country.’”187 
The NCAA has also argued that the restraints on student-athlete 
compensation integrates athletics and academics, and promotes competition 
for football players’ services by increasing the quality of the educational 
services its member schools provide to student-athletes.188  Contrarily, one of 
the NCAA’s expert witnesses in the O’Bannon v. NCAA (“O’Bannon II”)189 
case, Dr. James Heckman, “testified that the long-term educational and 
academic benefits that student-athletes enjoy stem from their increased 
access to financial aid, tutoring, academic support, mentorship, structured 
schedules, and other educational services that are unrelated to the 
[compensation] rules.”190  It is well documented how schools exploit the 
talents of student-athletes while shuffling them through the education 
                                                 
185. See Dosh, supra note 28.  An increase in bowl games from thirty-five 
games in 2014 to thirty-nine in 2015, resulted in a $196 million increase in revenue.  College 
Bowl Payouts Surpass $500 Million, ESPN.COM (Apr. 14, 2015), 
http://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/12688517/college-bowl-game-payouts-
surpass-500-million-first-year-college-football-playoff.  Surprisingly, schools’ expenses in 
relation to the revenue declined more than ten percent over this span.  See id. 
186. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1059 (9th 
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016).  “[C]onsumers are primarily attracted to 
college sports for reasons unrelated to amateurism, such as loyalty to their alma mater or 
affinity for the school in their region of the country.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
187. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 978 
(N.D. Cal. 2014). 
188. Id. at 980. 
189. 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014).  
190. Id. at 980. 
The only evidence that the NCAA has presented that suggests that its 
challenged rules might be necessary to promote the integration of academics and 
athletics is the testimony of university administrators, who asserted that paying 
student-athletes large sums of money would potentially create a wedge between 
student-athletes and others on campus.  These administrators noted that, depending 
on how much compensation was ultimately awarded, some student-athletes might 
receive more money from the school than their professors.  Student-athletes might 
also be inclined to separate themselves from the broader campus community by 
living and socializing off campus. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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system.191  Recently, before a Congressional Committee, Myron Rolle, a 
former football player and Rhodes Scholar at Florida State University, “said 
that many universities [do not] prioritize an athlete’s education, rendering the 
term student-athlete inaccurate.”192 
Calling himself an anomaly, Rolle, who was a Rhodes 
Scholar, said the number of hours occupied by games, traveling, 
workouts, injury treatments, and practices left little time for 
studying.  With so few athletes continuing their sport after college, 
he said, many students do not have much to show for their work 
upon graduation.193 
A 1980s study done by Northeastern University showed the sad state 
of educational affairs for prep athletes, placing “the functional illiteracy rate 
for . . . high school football and basketball players at 25[%} to 30[%], twice 
the national average.”194 
Ed O’Bannon, a former UCLA basketball star, testified that he felt 
like “‘an athlete masquerading as a student’ during his college years.”195  A 
1986 study revealed that roughly six out of every ten NFL players did not 
have a college degree.196  Though players’ early departure to the league may 
have contributed to this statistic, several were ill-equipped to thrive in an 
academic setting anyhow.197  Couple this with the rigorous demands the sport  
                                                 
191. See id. at 975, 984. 
192. Paul Cottle, Former FSU Football Star Tells Congressional Committee 
About College Athletes:  “A Lot of Them Would Go Through this Academic Machinery and 
Get Spit Out, Left Torn, Worn, and Asking Questions.” BRIDGE TO TOMORROW (July 10, 
2014), https://bridgetotomorrow.wordpress.com/2014/07/10/former-fsu-football-star-tells-
congressional-committee-about-college-athletes-a-lot-of-them-would-go-through-this-
academic-machinery-and-get-spit-out-left-torn-worn-and-asking-questions/ (emphasis added).  
“‘Many of my fellow teammates struggled in that environment,’ Rolle said.  ‘Some of them 
sent some of their scholarship money home to help their families.  They struggled 
academically.  A lot of them would go through this academic machinery and get spit out, left 
torn, worn, and asking questions.’”  Id. 
193. Id. 
194. Diana Nyad, How Illiteracy Makes Athletes Run, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 
1989, at S8.  Former NFL and Oklahoma State football player, Dexter Manley, was a 
functioning illiterate, but somehow was accepted into and studied at the school for four years.  
Id. 
195. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 980–81. 
196. Bogan, supra note 37. 
197. See Lederman, supra note 32.  The Atlanta Journal Constitution 
conducted a study of admission reports for fifty-four colleges between 1990 and 2006.  Id.  
There was a noticeable difference between football players’ average SAT score when 
compared to the average SAT score of a non-athlete incoming student.  Id. 
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requires,198 and football players are left with little time to realistically focus 
on the education aspect that the NCAA vehemently declares is a core 
value.199 
B. NFL 
The NFL’s draft eligibility rule is not foreign to antitrust suits.200  
However, they have escaped antitrust scrutiny due to the non-statutory 
exemption that promotes a national labor policy favoring free and private 
collective bargaining and requiring good-faith bargaining over wages, hours, 
and working conditions.201  The NFL and its player union negotiated the 
current collective bargaining agreement that includes the agreed upon 
eligibility rules.202  While the National Labor Relations Act was enacted 
primarily “to promote collective bargaining and to protect . . . concerted 
employee” efforts,203 eligibility rules that regulate commercial activity 
certainly create a restraint on trade.204 
The mere fact that a rule can be characterized as an eligibility rule, 
however, does not mean the rule is not a restraint of trade; were 
the law otherwise, the NCAA could insulate its member schools’ 
relationships with student-athletes from antitrust scrutiny by 
                                                 
198. See Chris Isidore, Playing College Sports:  A Long, Tough Job, CNN 
MONEY (Mar. 31, 2014, 6:58 AM), 
http://www.money.cnn.com/2014/03/31/news/companies/college-athletes-jobs/. 
 Up until the season starts, the workload trails off to [fifty] to [sixty] 
hours a week.  That eases to [forty] to [fifty] hours a week once the season, and 
classes, begin.  Weeks with road games include a [thirty-seven] hour stretch that 
includes travel, practice, a [three] to [four] hour game and some time to sleep in a 
strange hotel. 
 
 The season usually runs until late November—unless the team is 
successful.  Then it has to work through to a bowl game, sometimes played on New 
Year’s Day.  There might be a brief break for the holidays, but, as the NLRB found, 
‘While the players are allowed to leave campus for several days before Christmas, 
they must report back by Christmas morning.’ 
Id. 
199. Finances, supra note 23. 
200. See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 2004). 
201. Id. at 130.  “[F]ederal labor statutes . . . delegate related rulemaking and 
interpretive authority to the National Labor Relations Board.”  Brown v. Pro Football Inc., 
518 U.S. 231, 236 (1996). 
202. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 126–27. 
203. McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 44, at 383. 
204. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1065 (9th 
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 85 U.S.L.W. 3139 (Oct. 3, 2016). 
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renaming every rule governing student-athletes an eligibility 
rule.205 
The broad scope in which the Supreme Court of the United States 
determined whether an employer-union agreement could be afforded 
exemption status, was announced in Justice White’s opinion “advocat[ing] 
that the application of the non-statutory exemption should be determined by 
balancing the ‘interests of union members’ served by the restraint against ‘its 
relative impact on the product market.’”206  Even so, there is ongoing debate 
regarding the boundaries of the exemption and what test to apply in 
determining whether a rule is truly a mandatory subject of collective 
bargaining.207 
1. Dispelling the Mandatory Bargaining Subject Ruling of Clarett 
In an age in which player safety has come to the forefront for issues 
involving the sport, it seems counterintuitive to restrain the labor market 
when it is known that these players will subject themselves to the same threat 
of injury, albeit at an amateur level.208  With the average career being around 
3.5 years,209 the shortest of any major North American professional sport, the 
rule accomplishes one thing—prolonging the chance of injury without freely 
negotiated compensation, ensuring that “the cream [of NFL talent] will rise 
to the top.”210 
While it is the NFL Players Association’s (“NFLPA”) duty to seek 
the best deal for NFL players, it is far-fetched to still believe—with the 
rookie salary amendments—that the “eligibility rules . . . have tangible 
effects on the wages and working conditions of current NFL players.”211  The 
court in Clarett v. NCAA (“Clarett II”)212 opined that “the complex scheme 
by which individual salaries in the NFL . . . was built around the 
longstanding restraint on the market for entering players imposed by the 
                                                 
205. Id. 
206. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 132. 
207. See id. at 131–34. 
208. See id. at 129. 
209. Schwartz, supra note 12. 
210. See id.; Chris Vannini, David Shaw:  A College Coach’s No. 1 Job is NOT 
to Get Players to the NFL, COACHINGSEARCH.COM (Apr. 16, 2016), 
http://www.coachingsearch.com/article?a=David-Shaw-A-college-coachs-No1-job-is-NOT-
to-get-players-to-the-NFL. 
211. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 140. 
212. 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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eligibility rules and the related expectations about the average career length 
of NFL players.”213 
The court later states, “by reducing competition in the market for 
entering players, the eligibility rules also affect[ed] the job security of 
veteran players.”214  In a dangerous sport where job security and health are so 
deeply intertwined that the average career span is shorter than the average 
contract length for a rookie player,215 this problem seems de minimis.216  The 
NFL has the largest roster size of the major professional sports, yet feels 
compelled to impose the strictest draft eligibility rules to prevent younger 
players from securing jobs seemingly meant for veterans.217  “[I]t is unlikely 
that such raiding would destroy college football . . . since there are relatively 
few athletes who are capable of playing professional football without the 
benefit of . . . college competition.”218 
Furthermore, the NFL has taken less restrictive alternative steps that 
have directly addressed job security concerns of veteran players in the 
league.219  In the latest collective bargaining agreement, the players’ union 
and the league agreed to modify rookie contracts by predetermining the 
contract amount for each draft pick.220  “[T]he NFLPA negotiating team, led 
by veterans who were frustrated with rookies entering the league and making 
more than proven players, was only too happy to shift funds to established 
guys.”221  Through this amendment, veteran players gained more leverage in 
contract negotiations for their proven skills, rather than have unproven 
rookies set an inflated market price for their position.222 
                                                 
213. Id. at 140. 
214. Id. 
215. See McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 44, at 434, 438 n.284; Cork 
Gaines, Here’s How Much Money Players Lose When They Fall in the NFL Draft, BUS. 
INSIDER (Apr. 27, 2016, 3:06 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/nfl-draft-contract-values-
2016-4.  Rookies generally sign a four-year contract.  Gaines, supra. 
216. See McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 44, at 434. 
217. Id. at 407. 
218. Id. at 433; see also Legwold, supra note 19. 
219. See Andrew Brandt, The New Age of Rookie Contract Negotiations, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED: MMQB (May 22, 2014), http://mmqb.si.com/2014/05/22/nfl-rookie-
contract-negotiations. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. 
222. See John Czarnecki, Rookie Cap Biggest Win from New CBA, FOX SPORTS 
(July 27, 2011, 1:00 AM), http://www.foxsports.com/nfl/story/NFL-rookie-salary-cap-
biggest-win-from-new-CBA-less-risk-for-owners-072711.  “The new collective bargaining 
agreement somewhat changes what had become a ridiculous system in which a rookie, an 
unproven professional, often was suddenly making more money than most of his veteran 
teammates, even Pro Bowl selections.”  Id. 
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Conversely, the NFL has taken measures that have proven to be 
detrimental to players’ job security.223  NFL Europe lasted for sixteen years, 
operating as the NFL’s development league, prior to the NFL terminating the 
league in 2007.224  On a roster, where more than twenty players are 
considered reserves, it is a constant battle to stay employed.225  The defunct 
development league helped to develop talents in ways unobtainable with the 
current teams.226  Due to player safety concerns, offseason training activities 
have been reduced,227 causing coaches to focus more on contributing players 
rather than developing depth on their roster.228  NFL Europe, though 
costly,229 allowed players on the fringe of making an NFL roster to gain 
valuable practice opportunities and experience, which certainly enhanced 
their prospects of securing and maintaining a job in the NFL.230  From a 
business perspective, the league simply closed NFL Europe to maximize 
profits,231 thanks, in part, to the free farm system that is college football.232  It 
can certainly be argued that the draft eligibility rule does not primarily 
                                                 
223. See Sean Keeler, ‘You Didn’t Play to Get Rich’:  What Killed NFL 
Europe?, GUARDIAN (June 23, 2016, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/sport/2016/jun/23/you-didnt-play-to-get-rich-what-killed-nfl-
europe. 
224. Football:  After 16 Years, NFL Closes European League, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 30, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/29/sports/29iht-nfl.4.6417232.html. 
225. See Marc Lillibridge, The Anatomy of a 53-Man Roster in the NFL, 
BLEACHER REP. (May 16, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1640782-the-anatomy-of-
a-53-man-roster-in-the-nfl; Released? Waived? Practice Squad?  An NFL Roster Moves 
Primer, FOX SPORTS (Sept. 2, 2016, 5:38 PM), http://www.foxsports.com/nfl/story/released-
waived-practice-squad-an-nfl-roster-moves-primer-090216; Keeler, supra note 223. 
226. See Keeler, supra note 223. 
227. Judy Battista, Players Like Camp Restrictions; They’re Growing on 
Coaches, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2012, at B8. 
228. See id. 
229. Football:  After 16 Years, NFL Closes European League, supra note 224.  
“The league was reportedly losing about [thirty] million a season.”  Id.  But see Total Revenue 
of all National Football League Teams from 2001 to 2015 (in Billion U. S. Dollars), 
STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/193457/total-league-revenue-of-the-nfl-since-
2005/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2017).  In 2007, when NFL Europe closed, league posted revenue of 
7.09 billion.  Id.  Meaning that an expense of 30 million still equated to less than 1% of their 
revenue.  See id. 
230. See Keeler, supra note 223.  “The value [of NFL Europe] was just in 
terms of [the fact] guys that are on the lower end of the roster, you [a]re not getting much 
better in OTAs.  You [a]re not getting much better, honestly, in camps.”  Id. (alteration in 
original). 
231. See Football:  After 16 Years, NFL Closes European League, supra note 
224.  “Goodell said it was time to develop a new international strategy, describing the move to 
fold NFL Europa as the best business decision.”  Id.; Keeler, supra note 223. 
232. Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 408 n.181 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); Keeler, supra note 223; see also Football:  After 16 Years, NFL Closes 
European League, supra note 224. 
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address a mandatory bargaining subject, instead acting as a market barrier for 
a certain population of players which forces them to bargain their services 
for a scholarship.233 
2. Rule of Reason Application to Draft Eligibility Rules 
Despite the unsuccessful challenge to the eligibility rules in Clarett I, 
courts have found that similar entry barriers violated the antitrust laws.234  
Since the NFL has been recognized as a monopoly controlling the market for 
football players’ services,235 it is pertinent to ensure that their practices are 
not unreasonable restraints on the market for these players’ services.236 
a. Substantial Adverse Effect on Competition Within the Market 
The Supreme Court of the United States has allowed an intermediate 
inquiry, known as quick-look, if the conduct is a naked restriction.237  They 
explained that a quick-look analysis, under the rule of reason, is appropriate 
where “the great likelihood of anticompetitive effects can easily be 
ascertained,” and “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of 
economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an 
anticompetitive effect.”238 
As previously addressed, the market is clearly for football players’ 
services.239  The market for professional football players and college football 
players is illusory, as the players providing this labor market involuntarily 
submit to the mandatory pre-requisite that they provide services as a college 
football player prior to becoming a professional.240  Certainly, few players 
can make the jump from the high school rank to the pros,241 but they should 
be afforded the right to pursue their profession free of unreasonable 
obstructions.242  The only alternative to college football that would provide 
monetary compensation is the minuscule Arena Football League (“AFL”).243  
                                                 
233. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 395, 401–02. 
234. Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 2004); 
Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 395, 401–02.  But see Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 
F. Supp. 1049, 1058 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
235. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 407; Janofsky, supra note 135. 
236. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 138; Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 401–02. 
237. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769–70 (1999). 
238. Id. at 770. 
239. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 138; Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 401–02. 
240. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 141; Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 401, 409 n.185. 
241. Legwold, supra note 19. 
242. See id. 
243. See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, NEGOTIATED BY AND 
BETWEEN ARENA FOOTBALL ONE, LLC AND ARENA FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS UNION 13 
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Based on the pay,244 it seems unfeasible to choose this path given the risk of 
injury and the fact that the game itself is different than the NFL style of 
play.245 
In Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc.,246 the court 
considered an NBA bylaw that restricted eligibility to players who were at 
least four years removed from the date of their high school graduation an 
unreasonable restraint of trade.247  Since then, the NBA has amended their 
draft eligibility rules to once again prevent immediate eligibility to high 
school graduates, albeit a reasonable restraint of only one year.248  Similar 
age-based restrictions have been struck down in professional hockey.249  
Therefore, it is evident that the restriction constitutes a naked restriction that 
has the anticompetitive effect of excluding players’ ability to render their 
services to the NFL.250 
b. Challenged Conduct Promotes Competition 
The Clarett I case provides the NFL’s procompetitive justifications 
for the rule: 
The purposes of the eligibility rule include [1] protecting younger 
and/or less experienced players—that is, players who are less 
mature physically and psychologically—from heightened risks of 
injury in NFL games; [2] protecting the NFL’s entertainment 
product from the adverse consequences associated with such 
injuries; [3] protecting the NFL clubs from the costs and potential 
                                                                                                                   
(Aug. 10, 2012), www.aflpu.org/resources/ALFPU+AFL+CBA+2012.pdf; Sharks to Host 
Open Tryout in Georgia, ARENAFOOTBALL.COM (Dec. 9, 2015), 
http://www.arenafootball.com/sports/a-footbl/spec-rel/120915aad.html. 
244. See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 239, at 13.  AFL 
salary range for veteran/rookie, $17,220–$18,375, over a twenty-one-game schedule, based on 
fixed salary.  Id. 
245. See Matt Bonesteel, Movement to Eliminate Kickoffs in College Football 
Reportedly Gaining Steam, WASH. POST (July 18, 2016), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2016/07/18/movement-to-eliminate-
kickoffs-in-college-football-reportedly-gaining-steam/. 
246. 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
247. Id. at 1054. 
248. NBA Draft Rules, supra note 5. 
249. Linseman v. World Hockey Ass’n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1317, 1320–21 (D. 
Conn. 1977) (preliminarily enjoining a rule declaring players younger than twenty ineligible 
for the hockey league draft because it was an illegal “group boycott, or a concerted refusal to 
deal, [which] has been long and consistently classified as a per se violation of the Sherman 
Act”). 
250. Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 398, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004); see also Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1321. 
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liability entailed by such injuries; and [4] protecting from injury 
and self-abuse other adolescents who would over-train—and use 
steroids—in the misguided hope of developing prematurely the 
strength and speed required to play in the NFL.251 
While the NFL wants to ensure the health of the younger players, the 
first and fourth justifications are misguided attempts to feign caring for 
players’ health, because it simply does not want to have the players injured at 
its expense.252  These players face the same threat of injury at the collegiate 
level.253  Under this notion, the NCAA should not allow true freshmen to 
play against upperclassmen who have completed at least a year of a semi-
professional training regimen.254  This does not occur because of the 
numerous opportunities high school prospects have to perfect their craft.255  
The temptation of steroid use and overtraining exists, regardless of this rule, 
as prep players are exposed to the pressures of reaching the exclusive 
collegiate level to continue their aspirations of becoming a professional.256  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of the United States emphasized that 
justifications offered under the rule of reason may be considered only to the 
extent that they tend to show that “the challenged restraint enhances 
competition.”257  Consequently, the first and fourth justifications hoping to 
protect younger players’ wellbeing do not promote competition.258  The 
second explanation prescribes that by “limiting the occurrence of player 
injuries, [the rule] maintains the high quality of its entertainment product 
and, thus, presumably enables the League to better compete with other 
providers of sports entertainment such as other professional sports leagues or 
amateur football.”259  Here, the league incorrectly assumes the validity of the 
rule simply because it provides competition in a market—sports 
entertainment—other than the market—football players’ service—in which 
                                                 
251. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 408. 
252. See id. at 408, 408 n.181. 
253. See Bonesteel, supra note 245. 
254. See id.  “NCAA moved kickoffs to the [thirty-five] yard line,” similar to 
the NFL’s kickoff amendment in lieu of player safety concerns.  Id. 
255. See Edwin Weathersby, Top 10 Camps Where College Football Recruits 
Get Noticed, BLEACHER REP. (Mar. 26, 2014), 
http://www.bleacherreport.com/articles/2005928-top-10-camps-where-college-football-
recruits-get-noticed/page/9. 
256. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 20, at art. 16 § 31.2.3.4.  
Percentage of high school football players to play in NCAA is 6.7%.  NCAA RESEARCH, 
supra note 1. 
257. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 
468 U.S. 85, 103–04 (1984); Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 408 n.182. 
258. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 408. 
259. Id. at 409. 
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the rule has an anticompetitive effect.260  Lastly, the NFL asserts that the rule 
shields its teams from these injury-related costs.261  Cost reduction, alone, is 
not considered a legitimate procompetitive justification;262 rather, it is a 
component of a bargain that is “favorably affected by [competition].”263  
Based on the reasons provided, it seems that the NFL has not offered any 
strong justifications that the rule promotes competition in the market for 
football players’ services.264 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The NCAA and NFL are the two biggest providers of American 
football entertainment.265  There is an undeniable nexus between these 
organizations, in that one serves as the de facto development league for the 
other.266  Both have implemented practices that unreasonably restrain this 
shared labor market to their economic benefit.267 
The NFL identified that they are direct competitors in the sports 
entertainment market with amateur football.268 
                                                 
260. See id. at 408–09, 409 n.185. 
[T]he freedom guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small, is the 
freedom to compete—to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity 
whatever economic muscle it can muster.  Implicit in such freedom is the notion 
that it cannot be foreclosed with respect to one sector of the economy because 
certain private citizens or groups believe that such foreclosure might promote 
greater competition in a more important sector of the economy. 
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
261. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 408. 
262. Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1022 (10th Cir. 
1998).  “[C]ost-cutting by itself is not a valid procompetitive justification.”  Id. 
263. Id.; see also FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 
423 (1990). 
[T]he ‘Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will 
produce not only lower prices but, also, better goods and services.’  This judgment 
‘recognizes that all elements of a bargain—quality, service, safety, and durability—
and not just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free opportunity to 
select among alternative offers.’ 
FTC, 493 U.S. at 423 (citation omitted). 
264. See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 408–10.  Let it be noted that the only case 
to analyze the procompetitive justifications of the modern draft eligibility rule held that “the 
League . . . failed to offer any legitimate procompetitive justifications for the Rule.”  Id. at 
409. 
265. See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 2004); 
Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 409, n.185. 
266. Underwood, supra note 1, at 24. 
267. See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 409. 
268. Id. 
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The conspiracy or agreement to fix prices or to rig bids is the key 
element of a Sherman Act criminal case.  In effect, the conspiracy 
must comprise [of] an agreement, understanding or meeting of the 
minds between at least two competitors or potential competitors, 
for the purpose or with the effect of unreasonably restraining 
trade.269 
More damning is the fact that the NFL attempted to justify their draft 
eligibility rule by “excluding the most talented college players from the NFL, 
[to sustain] ‘the NCAA’s ability to compete in the entertainment market.’”270  
With the dissolution of NFL Europe, it is apparent that the NFL has a keen 
interest in the viability of its free farm system.271  Unfortunately, this is in 
direct conflict with the precedent established in United States v. Topco 
Associates, Incorporated,272 that competition in one market—football players 
services—may not be suppressed in favor for another market—entertainment 
market.273  Additionally, the NCAA has further impacted the restraints on 
football players’ services by promoting amateurism rules that render any 
hopeful professional player an indentured servant for a minimum of three 
years.274 
Since the NCAA has now allowed for student-athletes to receive 
scholarships capped at the full cost of attendance,275 it seems that any further 
compensation may contradict the idea of amateurism.276  With perpetual 
                                                 
269. Antitrust Resource Manual:  Elements of the Offense, U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/usam/antitrust-resource-manual-7-elements-offense (last updated Oct. 
2011). 
270. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 409 n.185. 
271. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); 
Football:  After 16 Years, NFL Closes European League, supra note 220; Mike Florio, 
Fournette Definitely Should Take a Year off in 2016, NBC SPORTS (Sept. 30, 2015, 9:33 AM), 
http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2015/09/30/fournette-definitely-should-take-a-year-off-
in-2016/. 
272. 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
273. Id. at 610. 
274. See Daniel Roberts, Does the NCAA Make Its Money from Indentured 
Servants?, YAHOO: FIN. (Feb. 19, 2016), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/does-the-ncaa-make-
its-money-from-indentured-servants-184409356.html. 
[T]he athletes are promised an education, but in fact [do not] get the same one their 
fellow students get because they devote the vast majority of their time to their sport.  
Second, the NCAA’s strict rules around amateurism bring down harsh punishments 
on athletes for even the tiniest of infractions . . . .  The third problem is the big 
money the NCAA sees, while its athletes see none of it.  “The NCAA is running a 
cartel,” Nocera rails, “where everybody gets rich except the labor force.”  He likens 
NCAA athletes to indentured servants. 
Id. 
275. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1054–55 
(9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016). 
276. See id. at 1058; Novy, supra note 163, at 229. 
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yearly revenue increases,277 this appears to be a temporary solution to an 
aspect of a larger problem.278  Schools will continue to benefit financially 
from the services provided by football players at a fixed cost of attendance, 
which ensurs unfathomable profit margins.279  The state of college sports will 
continue to have improper benefits scandals, ironically, due to the collusion 
by the NFL and NCAA to promote the importance of college.280  As students 
are forced to attend class each day and go through the rigors of being a 
college athlete, they realize the limited earning potential of their fragile 
careers.281  With the popularity of the sport being at an all-time high, student-
athletes see the earnings that their respective programs gross as a result of 
their hard work.282  Yet they face unreasonable restrictions that, if violated, 
could effectively end their ability to earn a living from their skill before it 
ever materialized.283  This greedy practice has led sports pundits to call for 
star college players to sit-out seasons to remain healthy and keep their 
professional aspirations intact.284  However, it would take a selfless 
individual to do so, because this is a daunting task to place on a nineteen or 
twenty year old who does not want to offend the establishment.285  This 
displays the overwhelming amount of power these two entities possess.286 
Some students choose to attend college to obtain marketable skills 
that will benefit them in their career.287  Although the likelihood of reaching 
the professional level is low,288 some football players only want to acquire 
                                                 
277. See Berkowitz et al., supra note 30.  Texas A&M’s 2014 revenue 
increased by $73,133,004 in comparison to the previous year.  Id. 
278. See Novy, supra note 163, at 230. 
279. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1054–55; Berkowitz et al., supra note 30. 
280. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1054.  “[T]he NFL has required aspiring 
professional football players to wait a sufficient period of time after graduating high school to 
accommodate and encourage college attendance before entering the NFL draft.”  Clarett v. 
Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 2004).  This statement makes the rule seem 
far less stringent than it actually is.  See id.  It appears as though football players are truly 
given a choice to either play at the collegiate level in exchange for only a college education or 
become a professional.  See id.  Since there is no realistic alternative to college, they are 
forced to accept the only option on the table.  Id. 
281. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055; Novy, supra note 163, at 229–30. 
282. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 126; Berkowitz et al., supra note 30. 
283. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 126; Florio, supra note 271. 
284. Florio, supra note 271.  The position Fournette plays, running back, has 
the second shortest average career span, at only two and a half years.  Rob Arthur, The 
Shrinking Shelf Life of NFL Players, WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-shrinking-
shelf-life-of-nfl-players-1456694959 (last updated Feb. 29, 2016, 12:42 AM). 
285. See Florio, supra note 271. 
286. See id. 
287. Id. 
288. See NCAA RESEARCH, supra note 1. 
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marketable skills that will benefit them in their professional careers.289  In 
Denver Rockets, the court stated, “[p]rofessional basketball is the only trade 
in which Haywood can employ his unusual talents and skills.  Unless 
Haywood plays professional basketball, those skills and talents will 
depreciate.”290  Taking the same approach in regards to football players, 
professional football is the only trade in which players can employ their 
talents and skills.291  Though some players have no desire to obtain a college 
education, the NFL sees fit to force it upon them—possibly depreciating a 
players’ talent and worth at that players’ expense.292  Unlike other careers, 
where certain skills transcend across a variety of jobs giving an individual 
several options to establish a career path, the unique skill of a football player 
is forced down the same beaten path.293  Even in other professional sports, 
players are afforded various options into the labor market.294  This liberty 
would certainly help improve the amateur image that the NCAA tries so 
vehemently to uphold because athletes would be given a true choice to attend 
school for the benefit of an education rather than begin their professional 
careers.295 
It is unfortunate that arguably the most violent sport is controlled by 
two entities that continually exploit the skills of football players.296  It is 
almost a guarantee that a football player will suffer some type of injury prior 
to embarking on their professional career.297  The limits placed on these 
individuals ensures that both the NCAA and NFL can milk a player for six or 
seven years of labor while only paying compensation, at an equitable rate,298 
for half that time.299  The NFL gets a player that is possibly already in their 
                                                 
289. See Florio, supra note 271. 
290. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1053 (C.D. 
Cal. 1971). 
291. See Glauber, supra note 95. 
292. Thamel, supra note 6, at 42. 
293. See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004); Glauber, supra note 95. 
294. MLB Draft Rules, supra note 7.  A baseball prospect can turn professional 
immediately after graduating from high school or after their junior college season.  Id.  If 
prospects elect to go to junior or community college, they can declare for the draft regardless 
of time spent in school.  Id.  Basketball prospects can play a season overseas to avoid college 
and immediately turn professional once graduating high school.  See Thamel, supra note 6. 
295. Thamel, supra note 6; see also Roberts, supra note 274. 
296. See Viera, supra note 20, at D1. 
297. See id. 
298. See Soffian, supra note 33; Underwood, supra note 1, at 24.  Until 2015, a 
majority of school scholarships were year-to-year and renewable at the school’s discretion.  
Soffian, supra note 33.  Ironically, the athlete’s performance on the field could determine 
whether he remained a student.  Id. 
299. Underwood, supra note 1, at 24. 
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prime without spending a dime to develop them, while the NCAA just 
milked that cash cow and maybe did not even have to pay for a fourth year of 
schooling.300  The average NFL career span shows the sacredness of every 
snap in a player’s careermeaning that a lot of players may not be able to 
maximize their earnings because the NFL would of course devalue them as 
damaged goods.301  Yes, there are superstar football players being paid 
boatloads of cash, but there are only a few of these players on every team 
roster.302  For a majority, lasting past their rookie contract is a blessing and 
they are willing to take what a NFL team deems is their value.303  Older 
players commanding a higher veteran minimum salary are essentially ushered 
out of the league because they are considered to have too much wear and 
tear on their bodies.304  It is a tragedy to limit these players’ talents as their 
value diminishes with each hit.305 
Pending the conclusion of O’Bannon, the NCAA’s amateurism rules 
may receive another chink in its armor.306  However, hopes are that this 
Comment has displayed the collusive practices that the NCAA and NFL have 
engaged in to effectively control the labor market for all football players’ 
services.307  The NFL and NCAA have a symbiotic relationship in that the 
League’s eligibility rule provides a steady flow of talent to colleges—whom 
fatten their wallets from this talent—while colleges provide the best 
developed talent at no cost to the league.308  Forget the Fail Mary or the 
Immaculate Reception, this arrangement between the NCAA and NFL is the 
biggest logic-defying play in the sport’s history.309  There’s just one problem:  
There is a flag.310 
                                                 
300. See id. 
301. See Gaines, supra note 215; Schwartz, supra note 12. 
302. See Gaines, supra note 215; Schwartz, supra note 12. 
303. See Gaines, supra note 215; Schwartz, supra note 12. 
304. Brandt, supra note 215. 
305. See Breslow, supra note 16. 
306. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1062–63 
(9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 85 U.S.L.W. 3139 (Oct. 3, 2016). 
307. Id.; Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 408–09 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); Janofsky, supra note 135. 
308. See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 409; Underwood, supra note 1, at 22. 
309. John McTigue, MNF Moments, No. 1:  The Fail Mary, ESPN.COM (Sept. 
8, 2014), http://www.espn.go.com/blog/nflnation/post/_/id/138835/mnf-moments-no-1-the-
fail-mary; see also Gary Meyers, Top 10 Greatest Plays in NFL History:  From the 
Immaculate Reception to John Elway’s Helicopter Ride, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 9 2015, 
8:51 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/football/top-10-greatest-plays-nfl-history-
article-1.2354371.  During a brief NFL referee lockout, a replacement referee notoriously 
incorrectly declared an interception a touchdown to give the Seattle Seahawks an improbable 
win over the Green Bay Packers.  McTigue, supra. 
Just [twenty-two] seconds remained and [the Steelers] trailed the Raiders 7–6 in the 
divisional round of the playoffs.  Steelers owner Art Rooney was already on his 
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way to the locker room to console his players when Terry Bradshaw threw a pass 
intended for John Frenchy Fuqua at the Oakland [thirty-five].  Safety Jack Tatum, 
one of the hardest hitters in NFL history, crashed into Fuqua and the ball went 
flying backwards.  [Franco] Harris grabbed it . . . just before it hit the ground and 
ran [forty-two] yards for a touchdown. 
Meyers, supra. 
310. See McTigue, supra note 309. 
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